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Professor Owen Fiss once observed, in perhaps the preeminent
insight in the field of employment discrimination law, that there are
two competing understandings of the meaning of discrimination:
discrimination as unequal treatment and discrimination as unequal
achievement (unequal result).1 Fiss argued not only that there are
distinct potential conceptions which may compete for the judicial im-
agination, but that the competition was being played out in the case
law interpreting Title VII.' The central contentions of this article are
that the competition continues unabated, that a judicial failure to
choose between incongruous objectives in interpreting the statute has
rendered the law of employment discrimination incoherent, and that
the resulting unstable compromise is incapable of serving as a basis
for reasoned decision.'
1. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 237-38
(1971).
2. Id. at 281-91. Professor Fiss nevertheless anticipated Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)-the primary source of the equal achievement theme in Title
VII law.
3. This is not a new charge, but is made here from a perspective distinct
from that underlying criticism favoring the equal achievement objective or some varia-
tion of that objective. See, e.g. Bartholet, Application of Title VII To Jobs In High Places,
95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982); Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action" An Analysis
of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REV. 531 (1981); Belton, Burdens
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The purpose of this article is nevertheless the drawing of a map
which will provide both a summary of discordant themes and a
proposed reconciliation. The article will proceed in three parts. First,
a model conception of Title VII's disparate treatment prohibition will
be postulated and deviations from that model necessitated by the im-
perfections of the adjudication process will be justified. The argument
underlying this first inquiry will be that the disparate treatment model
is a relatively coherent prohibition expressing known and well ar-
ticulated policy. Second, Title VII's disparate impact prohibition will
be examined both in light of the Supreme Court's most recent elabora-
tion of the impact model in Connecticut v. Teal4 and in terms of four
substantial issues regarding the content and function of the model
reflected in but not fully resolved by the Teal opinion. The argument
underlying this second inquiry will be that the impact model has been
and remains an incoherent prohibition because the Court has failed
to choose between the diverse alternative functions which might be
served by the model implicit in the court's formulations of the elements
of the model. Third, an attempt will be made to propose both an ex-
planation of those formulations and a scheme for resolving them. The
argument will be that the disparate impact model, if viewed as an
alternative to and as conceptually independent of the disparate treat-
ment model, should be narrowly confined and that a variation of the
disparate treatment model should be invoked as the controlling and
limiting rationale in many contexts presently subject to argument from
the disparate impact model.
of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice,
34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Edwards,
Preferential Remedies and Affirmative Action in Employment in the Wake of Bakke,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 113; Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through An-
tidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1083-99, 1114-18 (1978). Cf. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977) (constitutional law level of analysis). For
criticism of the disparate impact model, see, e.g., Cox, The Question of "Voluntary"
Racial Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on Judicial Role, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 87
(1981); Lerner, Employment Discrimination, Adverse Impact, Validity and Equality, 1979
SuP. CT. REV. 17; Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level Employment-A Response To Professor
Bartholet, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 776 (1983); Maltz, The Expansion of the Role of the Effects
Test in Antidiscrimination Law: Critical Analysis, 59 NEB. L. REV. 345 (1980); Meltzer,
The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employ-
ment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1980); Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:
Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA.
L. REV. 844 (1972); Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liabil-
ity Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1979).
4. - U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
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I. DISPARATE TREATMENT
A, Disparate Treatment: A Model
Disparate treatment is, in the words of the Supreme Court, "the
most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."' It is also the "type of
discrimination" Congress most clearly had in mind when it enacted
Title VII. Despite, however, its apparent simplicity and legislative
pedigree, the disparate treatment theory has been abused in practice
both by courts and commentators. The abuse has taken the form both
of attempts at expanding the prohibition beyond its narrow scope'
and attempts at restricting the prohibition in a fashion inconsistent
with its fundamental meaning.'
What follows is a discussion of three elements of the theory of
prohibition. Each is formulated as a statement of an essential compo-
nent of the basic conception, and, because at least some are controver-
sial, each statement should be understood as an argument about the
character of a model conception. That model, it is hoped, will serve
as a basis for later discussion here of disparate impact as an alter-
native theory of discrimination. Two preliminary observations about
the model are warranted at the outset. First, the model contemplates
a narrow prohibition of conduct on the part of an employer which
treats an employee differently than the employee would be treated
but for the employee's race. The justifications for a narrow prohibi-
tion are that it is consistent with the congressional conception of the
conduct to be rendered illicit by Title VIP and that it is consistent
5, Int'l Bhd, of Teamsters v, United States, 431 U.S, 324, 355 n, 15 (1977).
6, See, e.g., burdine v. Texas Dept. Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563 (5th
Cir. 1979), rev'd., 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Waters v. Furnco Constr. Co., 561 F.2d 1085
(7th Cir. 1977), rev'd 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
7. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-35 (1976) (exclu-
sion on basis of pregnancy is not exclusion on basis of gender); Wright v. Olin Corp,
697 F.2d 1172, 1183-86 (4th Cir. 1982) (exclusion of fertile women from toxic work en-
vironment is a gender neutral rule having a disparate impact on women).
8. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 226-55 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J. dissenting). Advocates of the disparate impact model have on occasion conceded
that the disparate treatment mode) best captures both the ethica perspective and
policy choice made by the Congress in 1964. See, e.g,, Belton, Dis~omination and Af.
firnative Action, supra note 3, at 591; Fss, supra note 1. at 297. Support for the im-
pact model is therefore grounded upon the view that an ultimate objective of the
legislation - increased participation in the economic pie for protected groups and most
particularly for racial minorities-is achievable only through use of the broad remedies
implicit in the impact model. Underlying such an argument is of course an expansive
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with the view of those members of Congress whose support was essen-
tial to the passage of Title VII and whose support was conditioned
upon the immunity of legitimate employer business interests from the
prohibitions of Title VII Second, the model is to be understood as
a relatively abstract conception of the meaning of the prohibition un-
compromised by complexities and uncertainties generated by the pro-
cess of enforcement. Departures from the model in the real world
litigation process are departures potentially explicable as adjudicative
approximations of the model."° Indeed, a fundamental point made by
this article is that the practical needs of the litigation process should
not be confused with the core meaning of the substantive prohibition;
means to ends are not themselves ends.
(1) Motive or Intent?
The first element of the model is that a prohibition of disparate
treatment is a prohibition of employer action motivated by an illicit
basis for decision (race or sex)." The prohibitory provisions of Title
view of the role of the judiciary in discovering and implementing the "spirit" of legisla-
tion, as distinguished both from the letter of legislation and the political compromise
inherent in what may be termed the policies of legislation. See Fiss, supra note 1,
at 297; Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in
the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 765-66
(1974); Neuborne, Observation of Weber, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 546, 544-565, 555 n.32 (1979).
I have argued elsewhere that such a view is as illicit as 19th century literalism in
its claim to judicial hegemony because it fails to distinguish between congressional
ends and the judicial obligation to enforce the means chosen by Congress to achieve
such ends. See Cox, Judicial Role, supra note 3, at 175-78; Cox, Book Review, 1983
UTAH L. REV. 453, 457-58.
9. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2j (1976); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 206-07 (1979); note 24 infra. But see Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Ac-
tion, supra note 3, at 547-48; Shoben, Probing the'Discriminatory Effects of Employee
Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV.
1, 38-40 (1977).
10. See text and notes 49-73 infra.
11. Cf. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
(distinguishing motive and intent for purposes of equal protection analysis); City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (same).
Critics of disparate treatment theory object to the model on three grounds.
First, motive is not discoverable in the litigation process, particularly if defined as the
rationale for or psychology of decision. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 1, at 297; Miller,
If "The Devil Himself Knows Not the Mind of Man", How Possibly Can Judges Know
the Motivation of Legislators? 15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1167 (1977). Second, motive inquiry
is a conceptualistic excuse for judicial decision reached on other grounds, particularly
when expressed in terms of legal causation. Cf. Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent
in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formal-
ity, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968) (motive inquiry under the Labor Act); Green, The Causal
19831
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VII make it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate "because
of" one or more of the illicit bases for decision proscribed."2 That
language has been properly interpreted in the context of disparate
treatment cases to mean that the crux of the theory of liability is
"intentional discrimination."' 3 The difficulty is that "intent" is a no-
tion with more than a single legal meaning.
For present purposes, there are two alternative meanings poten-
tially applicable: one may be characterized as intending the conse-
quences of one's action if those consequences are the natural, probable,
foreseeable or inevitable consequences of the action,' or one may be
Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962) (criticizing legal cause in
tort law). Last, requiring illicit motive as an essential element of the prohibition of
discrimination renders the prohibition an inadequate means of furthering antidiscrimina-
tion policy. See, e.g., Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 311-26 (1982); Fiss, supra
note 1, at 298.
It is true both that illicit motive is difficult to discover (it must often be infer-
red from effects and circumstances) and that the language used to describe the in-
quiry is conceptualistic. As I have argued in another context, however, an illicit motive
requirement is not merely conceptualism, it is an expression of a policy choice. See
generally Cox, A Reexamination of the Role of Employer Motive Under Section 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 161 (1982).
Criticisms from the charge of difficulty or the charge of conceptualism are in fact,
then, criticisms from disagreement with that policy choice.
It should be noted, however, that advocates of motive inquiry are not of one
mind regarding the scope of the prohibition implied by a motive requirement or,
therefore, the policy expressed by the requirement. To the extent that an actor's im-
partiality obligation includes an obligation to take into account the effect of an action
or the preexisting condition of those affected by an action, see Brest, Forward: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-37 (1976), an affirm-
ative obligation is imposed by motive inquiry. The disparate treatment model advocated
in the text implies only a negative obligation. See Perry, supra note 3, at 553-57.
12. 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-2(a) (1976). Although Title VII includes prohibitions of
discriminatory practices on the part of unions, employment agencies and some others,
this article will concentrate on employer conduct. Moreover, although Title VII pro-
hibits discrimination on bases other than race and sex, the article focuses on the lat-
ter bases for employer conduct. In general, the article's analysis is applicable to
discrimination "because of " national origin as well as to discrimination "because of"
race or gender. But see Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. , 414 U.S 86 (1973).
13. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, __ U.S. __ 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982); Texas
Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). The Court has identified Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 20OO0e-2(a)(1) (1976), as
the source of disparate treatment theory and Section 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(2)
(1976) as the source of disparate impact theory. See Connecticut v. Teal, __ U.S.
- .. 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (1982); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-43
(1977). General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976).
14. See Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 474-75 (1968).
[Vol. 18
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characterized as intending consequences if one was motivated by a
desire to bring them about. 5 To illustrate: An employer who adopts
a high school diploma requirement as a prerequisite for employment
may recognize that such a requirement will exclude more minority
applicants from employment than white male applicants for employ-
ment. The employer may therefore be said to have intended to ex-
clude minorities from employment in the sense that the foreseeable
or inevitable consequence of adopting the requirement was the exclu-
sion. The employer was not, however, motivated by a desire to ex-
clude minorities unless the employer's reason for the diploma require-
ment was exclusion of minorities.'6 The employer's reason may well
have been independent of exclusion-for example, a desire, however
wrongheaded from the standpoint of the predictive capacity of a
diploma, to utilize the diploma as a proxy for the ability of applicants
to read and write in a job requiring reading and writing.
The distinction between these two understandings of the term
"intent" is fundamental; confusing them is unfortunately common."
15. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
16. It has however been argued that an actor may not desire that harm be
inflicted on, e.g., a racial group, and simultaneously be indifferent to the harm inflicted
on that group by a decision. Such "indifference" should, by the terms of that argu-
ment, be subject to prohibition. Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31 (1982). See Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Prin-
ciple, supra note 11, at 14 (1976) (selective indifference). To the extent that what is
meant by this argument is that race may motivate the selection of means to a legitimate
end and that such a motivation is illicit, it is an argument consistent with the model
proposed in the text. To the extent, however, that the argument imposes an obliga-
tion to refrain from indifference to the consequences of race-neutral decision on pro-
tected racial groups, it is inconsistent with the model. That inconsistency does not
of course obviate the extreme difficulty inherent in determining by means of the litiga-
tion process whether an employer has been indifferent or "selectively indifferent" to
consequences.
17. See, e.g., Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978), rev'd,
442 U.S. 256 (1979); Blumrosen, Duty of Fair Recruitment, supra note 14, at 474-75.
It should be at the same time made clear that what is meant by the term
"motive" in the text is not the decision maker's rationale for decision by reference
to race but, rather, decision by reference to race. But see C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER
& R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 18-22, 30-33
(1980) (apparently attempting a distinction between disparate treatment and "intent").
It does not matter for purposes of the model whether an employer utilizes a racial
criterion because it will harm blacks or utilizes that criterion because it will benefit
blacks; the employer is in both instances motivated by race. But cf Fiss, supra note
1, at 297-98 (correctly identifying the proof problems inherent in establishing that a
race-neutral employment criterion was chosen because of race and distinguishing motive
from rationale, but apparently arguing that an inquiry into pretext is inherently an
inquiry into the employer's rationale for decision and that any presumption of illicit
motive derived from disparate consequences is fictional).
1983]
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The source of the confusion is that foreseeable consequences are rele-
vant evidence of motive: they generate an inference of motive.18 As
a matter, however, of the model, intentional discrimination is treat-
ment of an employee or potential employee which is motivated by
e.g., race. The reason that the model requires motive rather than in-
tent should be clear. A prohibition of disparate treatment is in fun-
damental conception a prohibition only of the use of proscribed dif-
ferences between persons as reasons for disparate treatment of those
persons. 9 If the proscribed reason was in fact not the difference upon
which the disparate treatment was based, the disparate treatment
must in fact have been based on some other difference between the
affected persons. So long as that other difference was not itself pro-
scribed, there is no applicable prohibition.
A foreseeable or inevitable disparate consequence, although
evidence of the use of a proscribed difference between persons as
the reason for disparate treatment of those persons, is merely
evidence. If the foreseeability or even the inevitability of consequences
is permitted to satisfy the requirements of the disparate treatment
model, the model risks the imposition of liability for conduct under-
taken for reasons not proscribed. Indeed, the foreseeable or inevitable
consequences understanding of intent renders disparate treatment a
prohibition not of intentional discrimination but of disparate conse-
quences qua disparate consequences. An employer cannot avoid liabil-
ity except by means of avoiding the consequences which, under the
foreseeable or inevitable test, automatically render the employer's con-
duct "intentional." When the foreseeability or inevitability of conse-
quences is utilized as the conception controlling the meaning of in-
tent rather than as an evidentiary device for reaching a motive con-
ception of intent, foreseeability or inevitability becomes in fact a means
of expressing a quite distinct model: the model of disparate impact.'
18. See, e.g., Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978); Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
19. Cf. Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Respon-
sibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 655-57 (1975) (equal protection
clause, to the extent that it embodies principle of treating alike persons similarly
situated, requires a reference to values outside the clause to identify prohibited bases
for distinction); Weston, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (prin-
ciple of equality requires reference to external values). It is of course the case that
the external value relied upon in giving content to an "equality" or "antidiscrimina-
tion" idea may be considerably broader than merely the notion that race or gender
may not "cause" decision. The essential problem is determining the scope of what
Professor Alexander has termed an obligation of impartiality. Alexander, Motivation
and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 941-42 n.56 (1978).
20. See Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981);
Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978).
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(2) "But For" or "In Part" As Tests of "Cause"
If disparate treatment requires proof of an illicit basis for
employer decision as the motive for employer decision, it must be
conceded that an employer may have "mixed motives." In the high
school diploma example, the employer may have been motivated to
impose the requirement both as a proxy for talents he viewed as useful
to job performance and as a means of excluding minorities he knew
to be disproportionately lacking diplomas. Indeed, the employer may
have been motivated by the more subtle but no less illicit notion that
persons in the minority group the employer wished to exclude lack
the talents for the job performance he desired.
The problem of mixed motive may be characterized, conceptu-
ally, as a problem of causation: did an illicit basis for decision "cause"
the employer's action? As so conceived, the model of disparate treat-
ment requires a test of just how great a role an illicit basis for deci-
sion must play in the employer's decision before it may be said that
the employer's treatment was prohibited.
There are, again, two possible understandings: (1) an illicit basis
for decision may be said to have motivated decision or "caused" an
employer's action if it was "a factor" in the employer's decision (if
it caused the action "in part") or (2) an illicit basis for decision may
be said to have motivated decision or caused action if it was a "but
for" cause-that is, if it was a necessary condition. The model of
disparate treatment requires, again conceptually, a necessary condi-
tion test."
21. See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10
(1976); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773 n.32 (1976); Lee v.
Russell County Bd. Ed., 684 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1982); Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck Co.,
607 F.2d 1014, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Mack v. Cape
Elizabeth Sch. Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977). Cf Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (unconstitutional
motivation); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (discharge
for unconstitutional reasons). But see Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 630 (1977) (Brennan
J. dissenting) (but for test at constitutional level of analysis is relevant to remedy);
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., - U.S. - , 51 USLW 4761 (1983) (but
for test relevant to remedy under Labor Act); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 952
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (but for test relevant to remedy); Rodriguez v. Board of Ed., 620 F.2d
362, 367 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Note, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under
th Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy and
Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 725, 750-52 (1976) (same). The "but for" test
is criticized in Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action:
A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982) on policy grounds rather closer
to those supporting the disparate impact model than the disparate treatment model.
Note that, although allocations of burdens of production or persuasion may
alter the litigation risks encountered by the parties to litigation, they do not necessarily
1983]
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The "a factor" or "in part" test of causation is inconsistent with
the model because it contemplates a.prohibition of any employer con-
sideration of an illicit basis for decision and therefore contemplates
a prohibition of treatment which would have occurred for licit reasons
even if the illicit basis had never been considered." Such a prohibi-
tion is a prohibition of evil thoughts: race or gender may not be con-
sidered by the employer, whatever the employer's ultimate use of that
consideration. A prohibition of disparate treatment is, by contrast,
a prohibition of employer conduct undertaken for illicit reasons.
The latter distinction may be clarified by reference to the distinc-
tion between intent as foreseeable consequence and intent as motive.
An "in part" test of causation is the handmaiden of a foreseeability
test of intent; if a consequence was the natural, probable, foreseeable
or inevitable product of an action, the inference that the consequence
was considered is irresistible. It is of course possible to suggest that
a consequence may be considered and rejected as a reason for action,
and, therefore, to suggest that the contemplated consequence was not
"a cause" of the decision, but that possibility does not alter the con-
gruity between foreseeable consequence and in part causation. A
foreseeable consequences conception of intent mandates a prohibition
of consequences: even where it is established and believed that an
act was motivated by licit reasons, consequences establish intent and,
therefore, liability. The same prohibition is mandated by an "in part':
test of causation. If it is established that an illicit reason for employer
action was a motivation for the action but that the action would have
been undertaken for a licit reason even in the absence of the illicit
reason, there is liability under the "in part" test. In short, the conse-
quences of the action are prohibited despite the assumption that the
consequences would have flowed from licit decision.
A necessary condition or "but for" test of causation is equally
congruous with intent as motive. Motive is the appropriate under-
standing of illicit intent under the disparate treatment model because
alter the underlying conception. If the employer has the burden to establish that a
legitimate reason would have caused his decision even absent consideration of an il-
legitimate reason, the employer has a burden of disproving "but for" causation. Proof
that a legitimate reason was a sufficient condition for an action precludes a conclusion
that an illegitimate reason was a necessary condition for that action. Cf. Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 29 (1978) (Stevens, J. dis-
senting) (when an employer proves a legitimate reason for an action, the employer
simultaneously disproves illegitimate motivation).
22. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981) (making this
argument with respect to "discrimination" under the National Labor Relations Act),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1612 (1982).
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the model prohibits only action undertaken for illicit reasons; it does
not preclude that same action undertaken for licit reasons. But for
causation is the means by which that distinction may be made: action
which would have been undertaken for licit reasons is not precluded.
This leaves of course the question why action undertaken for
licit reasons is not precluded, for such an action may generate harm.
In the context of Title VII, licitly motivated employer action may
generate harm in the form of disparate consequences: a protected race
or gender group may be excluded from participation in an employ-
ment opportunity or benefit (e.g. jobs) at a rate greater than the rate
experienced by white males. There are nevertheless two possible lines
of argument justifying a narrow prohibition merely of illicit motive.
First, it may be argued either conceptually or by virtue of
legislative purpose that the character of the right conferred by a pro-
hibition of discrimination is an individual right to freedom from ac-
tion undertaken for group status reasons. Conversely, a prohibition
of consequences and even of insufficiently justified consequences in-
herently recognizes and enforces a group right because the prohibi-
tion cannot be invoked absent proof of harm to the race or gender
group protected by the prohibition." As a matter of legislative pur-
pose, this first justification of a narrow prohibition is consistent with
the ethical conception dominating the Congress which enacted Title
VII.24 It is as a pragmatic matter, however, an arguably inadequate
instrument for achieving the equality of economic opportunity view-
ed by that Congress as the ultimate objective of the legislation, and
a focus upon the latter objective has constituted the judiciary's
justification for creating the distinct disparate impact model.'
23. See Blumrosen, The Group-Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination,
and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99 (1983);
text accompanying note 99 infra.
24. See e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (Case-Clark memorandum); Wilson, supra
note 3, at 852-58; Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113-19 (1971); Comment, The Business Necessity
Defense, supra note 3, at 926-29.
25. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 215 (1979) (Blackmun,
J. concurring). In 1972, Congress amended Title VII but neither approved nor disap-
proved of impact doctrine by express enactment. The legislative history suggests a
recognition of the inadequacy of the original conception which may be argued to con-
stitute acquiesence in disparate impact doctrine. See Connecticut v. Teal, - U.S.
-, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 n.8 (1982); Maltz, Response, supra note 3, at 783. But cf.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977) (1972 legislative history can-
not, absent formal enactment, be read to constitute approval of perpetuation of past
discrimination theory). On the question of the propriety of treating congressional silence
as approval, see Cox, Judicial Role, supra note 3, at 132-33. But Cf Tribe, Toward
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The second line of argument justifying a narrow prohibition
merely of illicit motive is that such a prohibition preserves from
regulatory scrutiny business interests independent of race or gender
qua race or gender. The narrow prohibition in effect narrowly defines
the employer's obligation of impartiality. The employer must refrain
from partiality founded on the group status of employees or applicants
for employment; the employer need not consider or weigh the effect
of its business decisions upon race or gender groups.28 A prohibition
of unjustified consequences removes business discretion from the
employer and places it in a regulatory authority (here, the courts)
by authorizing a regulatory balancing of adverse consequences and
concerns of economic efficiency.27 Such an allocation of decision mak-
ing authority is unjustified if one believes either that such regulation
is generally undesirable or that Congress intended no such
allocation-a belief at least supportable by references to the legislative
history of Title VII.1
(3) Motive or Invidious Motive: The Threat Presented by the Model
to Independent Values.
Ironically, a primary conceptual confusion in the history of judicial
application of the disparate treatment model has arisen from efforts
to restrict the scope of its operation. Despite the narrow character
of the prohibition, its logic compels application in contexts in which
it would threaten other values. There are two major examples: ap-
plication of the prohibition to gender as an illicit basis for decision
where taboos regarding sexual behavior would be thereby threatened'
a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence,
57 IND. L. J., 515, 518 n.22, 530-31 (1982) (arguing that congressional silence sometimes
may and sometimes may not be used as a datum in determining meaning).
26. See Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981);
Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978).
27. See text and notes 224-55 infra.
28. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 231-54 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J. dissenting). But see Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, supra note 23. Although
I agree with Professor Blumrosen's characterization of the impact model as creating
a group right, I do not agree with his characterization of the legislative history of
Title VII as contemplating such a right. It is clear that a congressional objective was
to increase employment opportunities for protected groups; it is not clear that this
objective was to be achieved by means of enforcing a group right to those oppor-
tunities. Indeed, it seems clear that a prohibition of group harm qua group harm was
rejected as a means of achieving the objective. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(j) (1976). Con-
gress prohibited illicitly motivated employment decisions. That such a prohibition may
be an inadequate means of achieving the contemplated objective is not a legitimate
reason for a judicial substitution of legislative ends for legislative means to those ends.
29. See generally Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe Benefit Plans, 65 VA.
L. REV. 199 (1979).
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and application of the prohibition to the problem of "reverse
discrimination" where the judicially perceived ultimate objectives of
Title VII would be thereby threatened. 3°
The model of disparate treatment requires application of the pro-
hibition to any express classification on the basis of, e.g., race or sex,
without regard to the reasons which might justify disparate treat-
ment. In form, the question the disparate treatment prohibition asks
of an employer's rule is whether the race or sex of an employee must
be determined to apply the rule.31 If an affirmative answer is given
to that question, there is disparate treatment.
In practice, affirmative answers to the question have been occa-
sionally thought inconvenient. Discrimination against homosexuals is
not prohibited by Title VIIF even though it is obvious that an employer
rule against same sex sexual preference cannot be applied without
determining the gender of the employee or applicant for employment
against whom it is sought to be applied. A "benign" racial preference
is not prohibited if it was adopted pursuant to an affirmative action
plan' despite the fact that it is expressly a racial classification.
The disparate treatment model has been judicially circumvented
in such inconvenient contexts by means of two alternative devices:
a denial that disparate treatment has occurred' or a recognition of
a "defense" to the prohibition in the form of a plea in justification. 35
The former device is a patent fiction inconsistent with the model.38
30. See generally Cox, supra note 3.
31. See Los Angeles Dept Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
Manhart was recently reaffirmed in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, - U.S.
-, 51 U.S.L.W. 5243 (1983).
32. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979);
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
34. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-35 (1976) (exclu-
sion on basis of pregnancy is not exclusion on the basis of gender); Wright v. Olin
Corp. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (exclusion of fertile women from toxic work en-
vironment is a gender neutral rule). DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327
(9th Cir. 1979) (relying on congressional intent); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing
Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (relying on mutability of characteristic banned by
employer and notion that "fundamental right" must be invaded by employer).
35. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 443 U.S. 321, 334-36 (1977) (BFOQ defense).
36. See Los Angeles Dept. Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712-13
(1978); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977). To the extent, however, that the device of denial is in fact advocacy
of an equal achievement or group right conception of Title VII's purposes, it is less
a fiction than a theory which denies the legitimacy of the treatment model (or, at
least, severely restricts its scope of operation). Compare Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimina-
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The legitimacy of the latter device is a question which cannot be
answered by the model except to the extent that the rationale of the
model itself is relied upon as justification for a departure from it.
For example, to the extent that sexual privacy is a value thought
to justify an exception to the prohibition of disparate treatment,37 the
model cannot evaluate the validity of or weight to be assigned that
external value. To the extent, however, that it is claimed that the
logic or purposes underlying the model are not consistent with its
application in a context in which the model would threaten sexual
privacy, the model is itself the appropriate basis for evaluation of that
claim.
Judicial and academic arguments of the latter type have con-
sistently focused upon the twin notions that disparate treatment in
inconvenient contexts is not "invidiously motivated" and does not pro-
duce the stigmatic harm which it is the underlying objective of the
prohibition to prevent.' Because these rationales for the model are
inapplicable in such contexts, the model should be inapplicable. The
model of disparate treatment advocated here rejects that argument
for two reasons.
First, the argument assumes that it is within the judicial com-
petence to detect "invidious" motive and stigmatic harm and to
distinguish circumstances in which neither is present. That, it is sub-
mitted, is a delusion both because judicial competence in characteriz-
ing human pyschology is questionable and because invidiousness and
stigma are legal constructs, not empirically demonstrable phenomena
with precise meanings. 9 It is legitimate to conclude, even as a matter
of fact finding, that race and gender, when used as grounds for deci-
sions, often produce stigmatic harm-that the risk of such harm is
tion: Manhart, 1979 A.B.F. RES. J. 83 (defending an analysis which focuses on the group,
albeit on the special ground that actuarial issues are unique) with Brilmayer, Hekeler,
Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal
and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1980) (rejecting a focus on the group
and defending a focus on the individual).
37. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 443 U.S. 321, 346 n.5 (1977) (Marshall, J. dis-
senting); Sutton v. Nat'l Distiller Products Co., 445 F. Supp. 1319 (S.D. Ohio 1978);
Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., 16 E.P.D. Cases 8244 (D. Del. 1978), affd, 591 F.2d
1334 (4th Cir. 1979).
38. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d
325 (5th Cir. 1978); Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th
Cir. 1975); Karst & Horwitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14
HARV. C-R. C.-L. L. REV. 7, 26 (1979); Karst, Foreward: Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1977).
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substantial. It is not legitimate to pretend that the judiciary is capable,
as a matter of fact finding, of distinguishing between race or gender
based decisions which will and race or gender based decisions which
will not generate stigma. For example: it has been argued that a white
male is not stigmatized with a badge of inferiority by reason of his
disqualification for a benign racial preference favoring a minority."0
If what is meant by that argument is a badge of inferior "merit" in
the sense of competence or achievement or seniority, it is at least
possible that the white male is not stigmatized (although the persons
preferred by reason of race or sex may well be thought to be
stigmatized in precisely this sense'). But the meaning assigned stigma
by this interpretation is conspicuously artificial -there are other poten-
tial "badges of inferiority" with which the white male has been labeled;
most obviously the badge of moral inferiority. 2 Examples of this dif-
ficulty in the context of gender discrimination are, moreover, legion.
The case law is strewn with the wrecks of judicial perceptions, most
particularly in contexts in which sexual behavior as well as gender
was in issue, that stereotypical gender distinctions reflected accep-
table, "non-invidious" understandings of the appropriate roles assign-
ed males and females in American society."3 Whatever may be one's
39. See Cox, supra note 3, at 151-155; Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future
of "Affirmative Action," 67 CAL. L. REV. 171, 176-77 (1979); Posner, The De Funis Case
and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT.
REV. 1, 20; Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, The Supreme Court, and the Constitution,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 800-803 (1979); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1959).
40. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 170-71 (1980); Brest, In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 11, at 16-17; Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra
note 38, at 5-11.
41. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting);
Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 154-55.
42. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 526, 532 (1980) (Stewart, J. dis-
senting); Cox, supra note 3, at 150 n.422.
43. Compare General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-35 (1976) (deci-
sion on basis of pregnancy is not decision on basis of sex) with 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(k)
(Supp. V 1981) (1978 amendment to Title VII defining "because of sex" as including
"because of pregnancy") and compare Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1969) ("sex plus" discrimination not prohibited) with Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) ("sex plus" discrimination is prohibited) and compare Will-
ingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (differential grooming
standards not discrimination on basis of sex) with Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (weight requirements are grooming rules within Title VII
prohibitions where they impose a significantly greater burden of compliance on females);
Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979) (some
differential dress requirements constitute sex discrimination) and compare DeSantis
v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.) (discrimination on basis of sexual
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view of the legitimacy of such role definitions and of their incorpora-
tion into the law of disparate treatment, the gender cases do not sug-
gest a viable judicial track record in detecting invidious classification
and distinguishing non-invidious classification." The courts have been
far more successful when they have justified disparate treatment in
the gender context on the grounds that external values independent
of the values supporting the disparate treatment prohibition outweigh
application of the prohibition.45
Second, arguments about invidious motive or stigma defeat the
primary justifications for a prohibition of disparate treatment by
substituting the vagaries of judicial fact finding (or, at least, the
pretense of such fact finding) for a relatively clear and uncontrover-
sial standard. This is not an objection merely from judicial administra-
tion and efficiency or from the desirability of predictability of law.
It is grounded as well upon central justifications for the disparate
treatment prohibition: pedagogy and avoidance of uncertainty. By
pedagogy is meant the role of law as moral teacher."' By uncertainty
is meant the historical volatility of considerations of race or sex and
their established capacity for generating self-deception in decision
makers who employ such considerations.47 The disparate treatment
model is a prophylactic educator:48 it makes unambiguous the proposi-
preference not prohibited), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1979) with Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (sexual harassment prohibited on theory harassment occur-
red on basis of sexual preference).
44. In this connection compare Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 101 S. Ct.
2646, 2655 (1981) (Congress did not act "unthinkingly" in excluding women from draft
registration) with id. at 2662 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (legislation reflects "ancient canards
about the appropriate role of women") and compare Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
206-07 (1977) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (statute unconstitutional because it reflects ar-
chaic and overbroad generalizations regarding sexual roles) with id. at 218 (Stevens,
J. concurring) (classification not invidious because it does not imply inferiority); id.
at 234-35 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (congressional reasons for enactment not invidious).
45. But cf. Freed & Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, And The Equality of Men and
Women: A Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination In Employment, 1981 A.B.F. RES.
J. 585 (arguing that external values may outweigh presumptive illegality of explicit
sex lines where individual's claim to individual treatment is "weak"). By more suc-
cessful, I mean, however, that the courts have displayed great candor; I do not imply
agreement with the results reached.
46. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1950); A. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975); Van Alstyne, supra, note 39, at 810.
47. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S 448, 431-32 (1980) (Stewart, J. dissent-
ing); Van Alstyne, supra, note 39, at 803-08.
48. See Posner, De Funis, supra note 39, at 21-26. Cf. Laycock, Taking Con-
stitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REV. 343, 382-91 (1981) (im-
mutability, irrelevance and historical abuse make racial classifications suspect and re-
quire individualistic equal protection doctrine).
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tion that race or gender is an unacceptable basis for decision. The
model is also, however, a prophylactic guide to decision. It precludes,
absent a conscious judicial choice (and hopefully an expressed choice)
to abandon the model in favor of independent and compelling con-
siderations, decisions tainted by historical conceptions of racial and
sexual roles internalized by the judicial decision-maker.
B. Departures From The Disparate Treatment Model Nevertheless
Consistent With The Model: Adjudicative Approximation of the
Model
Judicial enforcement of any theoretical model is enforcement by
means of a process with its own dynamic, and that dynamic will in-
evitably structure and by the structuring in degree alter the real world
content of the model. The judicial process is a decision making pro-
cess with an internal logic expressed by devices for ordering that pro-
cess, and that logic is independent of the substantive law which forms
the basis for decision. This is no less the case with the disparate treat-
ment model; the model is filtered in litigation through process con-
structs (rules of evidence, burdens of production and persuasion,
etcetera) which express both the logic and the limitations of the
judicial process.
It is however crucial that the relationship between constructs
of process and the theoretical model of substantive prohibition be
understood. Constructs of process, although supported in theory by
worthy values independent of the substantive law, are nonetheless
merely the means by which the substantive law is enforced. Such con-
structs of process will inevitably alter in degree the meaning of the
substantive model, but the objective underlying their application must
be approximation of the substantive model.'9
There are two process constructs of primary importance to an
understanding of the judicial system's response to the disparate treat-
ment model: (1) disparate consequences are evidence of motive; 5 (2)
the employer, as defendant, has a burden of proof regarding its licit
motive once the plaintiff has established a "prima facie case" and the
employee or applicant for employment, as plaintiff, has a burden of
49. See generally, e.g., 0. FIss & R. COVER, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979);
Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 807 (1961); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 2
J. LEG. STUD. 419 (1979); Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
50. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
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proof regarding the pretextual character of a claim to licit motive.51
The importance of these constructs for present purposes is that each
may be viewed as in degree serving to approximate the disparate
treatment model, but that each, as a matter of emphasis and judg-
ment, may be employed to defeat that model and to impose by ap-
proximation a quite distinct model of the substantive prohibition.
(1) Disparate Consequences As Evidence of Motive
The intuitive appeal of the use of consequences as evidence of
illicit motive is the appeal of the natural, probable or foreseeable con-
sequences understanding of the term "intent". Disparate consequences
generate an inference of illicit motive" particularly when viewed from
the uncontroversial premise that there remains extant racial and sex-
ual prejudice in American society. For example, in a case involving
an individual employment decision (the "individual disparate treat-
ment" category of case), the hiring of a qualified white male appli-
cant rather than equally qualified black and female applicants for a
job is a consequence of the employment decision which may be
legitimately viewed with some suspicion. The intuitive appeal of con-
sequences in a case challenging an employer's employment system as
discriminatory in the long-term (the "pattern and practice" or
"systematic disparate treatment" category of case) is even more
compelling.'
In a systematic disparate treatment case, proof sufficient to
generate a prima facie case requiring employer rebuttal normally takes
the form of a comparison of the racial or gender composition of the
employer's workforce (or some relevant subset) with the racial or
gender composition of an external population (or, again, some rele-
vant subset).' The logic of that comparison is consistent with approx-
imation of the disparate treatment model; absent illicit motive it is
normally to be expected that a workforce drawn from a given popula-
tion will roughly approximate the demographics of that population.
The process by which the parties to such a lawsuit progressively
51. See Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
52. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977);
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
53. See Teamsters v. United States 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
54. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
55. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977). Cf. Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(impact is evidence of motive for equal protection purposes); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J. concurring) (same).
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eliminate potential licit causes of any disparity in composition in an
effort to verify the inference generated by that disparity confirms
that consistency.'
There are nevertheless risks of inconsistency with approxima-
tion inherent in the use of the consequences as proof constructs. The
sources of these risks are two. First, tests of statistical significance17
are employed in systematic disparate treatment cases to, in effect,
eliminate "chance" as a potential legitimate cause of a disparity be-
tween workforce and external population representation rates.58 The
value of the inference of illicit motive which may be derived from
such a test is directly dependent upon the data used in calculation.
Specifically, a failure to eliminate other potential causes of disparity
(e.g., geographic proximity of the external population, pre-act
discriminatory practices, a population with undisputed qualifications,
and self-selection by potential employees) significantly distorts the
viability of the inference and thereby imposes, pro tanto, an effective
prohibition of consequences rather than motive.59 More importantly,
a test of statistical significance in this context is not a test of the
probability that an employer engaged in disparate treatment. The
56. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-12 (1977);
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
57. See generally, H. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 105-222 (Rev. 2d ed. 1979);
D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION, 287-328 (1980); L. Braun,
Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1980).
58. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 309 n.14, 311 n.17 (1977).
59. See, e.g., id. at 309; Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 721, 733
(8th Cir. 1982); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 408-409 (5th Cir. 1981);
E.E.O.C. v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979); Detroit Police Officers
Assoc. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 688 (6th Cir. 1979, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1980);
Williams v. Tallahassee Motors, Inc., 607 F.2d 689 692 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
858 (1979). But cf Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (for purposes
of prima facie case, only minimum qualifications must be taken into account).
60. By probability, I mean a direct probability statement regarding the issue
of disparate treatment (the probability that disparate treatment occurred is X) as
distinguished from the indirect probability statements (the probability of the observed
result given an hypothesis of random selection is X) utilized in hypothesis testing.
See, e.g., BALDUS & COLE, supra note 57, at 304; Braun, Quantitative Analysis and the
Law: Probability Theory as a Tool of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1982 UTAH L. REV.
41, 46-48, 63-65; Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 34, 41-42, 44 n.35, 51 n.57 (1979); Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other
Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 104-08. The former statement is an objective of Baye-
sian theory, the utility and value of which for legal purposes is much debated. See
Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 116 (1978); Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian
Theory in Evidence Law 57 IND. L.J. 1 (1982); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach
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conclusion that there is less than a 1 in 20 chance8 that an employer's
workforce of the composition discovered would be expected in a nor-
mal distribution of workforces composed of randomly selected
employees does not directly state the probability of disparate treat-
ment. It states only the probability of observing the composition
discovered if employees were selected without reference to race or
gender and without reference to some race and gender neutral factor
correlated with race or gender but not excluded as a cause of the
data used in calculation of the probability.2 The conclusion is merely
a statement that at a .05 significance level, 3 randomness is, as a mat-
ter of the suppositions of the statistical methodology, rejected as a
cause of a race or gender disparity in composition to the work force.
The conclusion is evidence, not a compelled legal conclusion about the
presence or absence of illicit motive. 4 Unfortunately, some courts
to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Kaye, The Laws of Probability,
supra; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1329 (1971); Tyree, Proof and Probability in the Anglo-American Legal System,
23 JURIMETRICS 89 (1982). Cf. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVEABLE (1977)
(Generally distinguishing proof in law from mathematical theories of probability).
61. The selection of a significance level is a matter of judicial judgment; the
.05 level is the social science convention. See E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 645-50 (4th Cir. 1983); BALDUS & COLE, supra note 57, at 318;
Braun, supra note 57, at 70.
Note that there are a number of distinct tests of significance, the appropriate
test is a matter of context. Compare Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977) (binomial test) with Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employ-
ment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978) (test of the
difference between independent proportions). See generally H. BLALOCK JR., SOCIAL
STATISTICS 105-219 (Rev. 2d ed. 1979).
62. See, e.g., BALDUS & COLE, supra note 57, at 303-04; Fisher, Multiple Regres-
sion in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 717 (1980).
63. See note 61 supra.
64. There are two senses in which a rejection of a null hypothesis at an
established significance level may be confused with a burden of persuasion. First,
although it has been argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard (is it
more likely than not the defendant engaged in disparate treatment) is approximated
by a significance level less stringent than .05, See E.E.O.C. v. American National Bank,
652 F.2d 1176, 1192 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982), it is not the
case that an .05 significance level (.95 confidence level) necessarily imposes a probability
requirement in excess of a preponderance test. See Fisher, supra note 62, at 717. But
cf. Dawson, Are Statisticians Being Fair to Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs?, 21
JURIMETRICS 1 (1980); Henkel & McKeown, Unlawful Discrimination and Statistical Proof-
An Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS 34 (1981) (treating significance level in terms of standards
of persuasion but correctly recognizing that the conservatism of a .05 level may not
be appropriate if imposed as a standard for establishing a plaintiff's prima facie case).
The conservatism reflected by a .05 significance level arises from the fact that
such a test is applied in the present context on the plausible but by no means in-
disputable premise that a given workforce will reflect the racial composition of the
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mistake satisfaction of a significance level for satisfaction of a stan-
community from which it is obtained if selection occurs without reference to race.
The null hypothesis tested is that the composition of the employer's workforce is the
product of random variation-"chance." Rejection of that null hypothesis at the .05
level (or at the 2 or 3 standard deviation level for large samples postulated in Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 443 U.S. 299, 308 n.14, 311 n.17 (1977)) is rejection in the
following form: there is less than a 1 in 20 chance of discovering a workforce of the
race or gender composition discovered if the workforce was selected without reference
to race or gender (or to some characteristic not controlled which is correlated with
race or gender). Such a probability statement is not a statement that there is a .05
probability that the employer did not discriminate; nor is it a statement that there
is a .95 probability that the employer did discriminate. See BLALOCK supra note 57,
at 157-66. At most, the statement is a statement about the probability of discovering
the evidence discovered if discrimination did not occur, and even this formulation is
misleading because it implies a statement of causal relationship-a relationship not
directly addressed by a test of statistical significance. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note
57, at 304 n.31; 320-21; Cohn, Book Review, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1295, 1302-03 (1980).
The second sense in which rejection of a null hypothesis may be confused with
satisfaction of a burden of persuasion is more complex. To the extent that a court
broadly frames the null hypothesis tested as, e.g., "the defendant did not engage in
disparate treatment," it is possible to interpret a rejection of the null hypothesis at
even a .05 or .01 level as amounting to a conclusion that the plaintiff has prevailed
"by a preponderance of the evidence." Such an interpretation is supported by academic
writing which emphasizes the notion that a court should establish the level of
significance to be used on the basis of considerations similar to those supporting selection
of a standard of persuasion-e.g., allocation of risks of judicial error and the degree
of toleration of error. See, e.g., BALDUS & COLE, supra note 57, at 69-70; Dawson, supra
at 2. There are two difficulties with conceiving of the rejection of a null hypothesis
at some selected significance level as synonymous with a plaintiffs satisfaction of a
burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of disparate treatment.
First, the null hypothesis cannot accurately be so broadly stated. In a systematic
disparate treatment case, a test of significance can only exclude random variation as
an explanation of a workforce disparity; the viability of the inference that intentional
discrimination caused the disparity arising from a rejection of chance as a cause is
dependent upon whether other potential causes have also been eliminated. See
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14, 311 n.17 (1977); BALDUS
& COLE, supra note 57, at 292; D. BARNES, STATISTICS As PROOF, FUNDAMENTALS OF QUAN-
TITATIVE EVIDENCE 182, 229 (1982); Braun, Quantitative Analysis, supra note 60, at 63-65;
Cohn, Book Review, supra note 64, at 1304-05; Smith & Abram, Quantitative Analysis
and Proof in Employment Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 33, 43.
Second, a finder of fact's evaluation of probabilities under a preponderance of the
evidence standard must take into account all of the evidence, the credibility of evidence
and the often conflicting inferences arising from evidence. Cf. United States v. Test,
550 F.2d 577, 584 (10th Cir. 1976) (statistical significance and quantitative significance
are both relevant); BALDUS & COLE at 317-18 (practical and statistical significance should
not be confused). A test of statistical significance does not tell us anything directly
about causation (motive); it is merely evidence from which a trier of fact's degree
of belief that illicit motive caused employer decisions may be increased. Id. at 320-21.
Cf. Kaye, Laws of Probability, supra note 60, at 44 n.35, 47-53, 51 n.57 (distinguishing
data regarding relative frequency from the question of the probability that some
material conclusion is true). But cf BALDUS & COLE at 317 n.48 (significance level is
somewhat analogous to weight of burden of proof).
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dard of persuasion and by so doing again generate, pro tanto, a pro-
hibition of consequence."
The second source of a risk of inconsistency with approximation
is that a concentration upon consequences can distort analysis if it
is not recognized that consequences are merely evidentiary means to
proof of motive. The persuasiveness of the inference from consequence
is a matter of judgment. To the extent that judgment is exercised
within the conceptual structure of the disparate treatment model, one
may disagree with the conclusion reached, but not with the legitimacy
of judgment. It should nevertheless be apparent that it is possible
to so emphasize consequences that decision is in fact reached within
the conceptual structure of a quite distinct model. When that occurs-
and it has repeatedly occurred in judicial decision making under the
treatment model 6 -one may legitimately question the legitimacy of
65. In E.E.O.C. v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982) the court distinguished the use of a test of statistical
significance (the Hazelwood 2 or 3 standard deviations rule) for purpose of establishing
that chance did not produce challenged consequences (if standard deviations exceed
2 or 3, chance is eliminated as a potential cause of disparities) and the use of such
a test to establish that chance did produce challenged consequences (if standard devia-
tions are fewer than 2 or 3, consequences are attributable to random variation rather
than illicit motive). Id. at 1192-93. To the extent that the bases for this distinction
were that courts are obliged to derive conclusions from all of the evidence before
them, that tests of significance are evidentiary tools rather than formulae for deci-
sion, and that the possibility that illicit motive caused consequences could not be
eliminated merely because random variation remained a potential cause as well, the
court's analysis seemed sound. See E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Board of Richmond,
698 F.2d 633, 645-50 (4th Cir. 1983). To the extint, however, that the distinction was
grounded on the propositions either that the defendant has a burden of persuasion
on the question of establishing that random variation caused disparate consequences
or that a plaintiff may exclude random variation as a potential cause of disparate con-
sequences at a statistical significance level measured by a preponderance of the evidence
standard, the court's analysis imposes substantial risks of liability for disparities rather
than liability for illicitly motivated decision. American Nat'l Bank at 1218-20 (dissent-
ing opinion). For a judicial analysis employing healthy levels of skepticism in this con-
text See E.E.O.C. v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
66. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-40 (1977) (relying
on general population statistics, a reliance explained in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977) on the theory that anyone can drive a truck).
On the dangers inherent in uncritical reliance on consequences generally See
E.E.O.C. v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980) (all persons in general
population are not qualified to be bank tellers); Lerner, supra, note 3, at 31-34 (all
persons in general population are not qualified to drive trucks); Smith & Abram, Quan-
titative Analysis and Proof of Employment Discrimination, U. Ill. L. Rev. 33, 45-59 (1981).
For cases involving problems of defining qualified labor pools for purposes of com-
parison, see DeMedina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Croker v. Boeing
Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 662 F.2d 975 (3d. Cir. 1981).
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decision, not because of the model in fact utilized is itself illegitimate,
but because the decision maker is guilty either of confusion or
dishonesty.
(2i The Employer's Burden
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case-that is, once
he has established a set of facts giving rise to an inference of illicit
motive-the employer is compelled to rebut that inference through
evidence of a licit motive. 7 This process construct is again facially
consistent with an effort to approximate the disparate treatment
model. If the appropriate legal question is whether an illicit reason
for the employer's action was a necessary cause of that action, proof
of licit causes is both appropriate and justified by the process value
(relative access to evidence) expressed by the construct.
There are, however, again risks of inconsistency with approx-
imation. The first and most obvious of such risks is in the nature
of the rebuttal burden. If the burden is a burden of persuasion, the
risk of nonpersuasion has been allocated to the employer on the basis
of proof of disparate or otherwise suspicious consequences. In degree
the substantive prohibition therefore moves in the direction of a pro-
hibition of consequences. 8 By imposing risks of judicial error (and,
therefore, high litigation costs), an allocation of a burden of persua-
sion to employers penalizes failures to avoid the consequences which
give rise to that burden. Such an allocation therefore operates less
as a means of approximating a prohibition of illicit motive than as
a means of approximating a prohibition of race or gender disparities
in the results of an employment decision or process. The Supreme
Court, recognizing this tendency, has imposed the lower litigation cost
of a burden of production on the employer and therefore moved, again
in degree, in the direction of approximation of the disparate treat-
ment model. 9
Risks of inconsistency generated by an allocation of a burden
to the employer arise, however, not merely from the character of the
67. See, e.g., Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
68. See Texas Dept Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981);
Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-58 (1978).
69. Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). There
remains some question, however, whether this allocation applies as well in systematic
disparate treatment cases. Compare Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir.
1981) (Burdine applied in such a case) with Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673
F.2d 798, 818 (5th Cir. 1982) (Burdine distinguished in such a case).
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litigation burden imposed but also from the nature or quality of the
licit reason the employer must establish in its effort to meet the
burden. For example, an employer may claim that the reason for his
selection of white applicants for employment rather than black ap-
plicants for employment (and, consequently, the reason for a dispar-
ity between the proportion of black employees in the employer's
workforce and black employees in the population from which the
workforce was selected) is that he requires five years experience in
a relevant craft as a prerequisite for employment. Because other
employers (or unions) discriminated in the past, few black persons in
the population have such experience. The employer's reason is race
neutral, but must the employer "prove" as well that job experience
is a necessary quality for job performance or that some other require-
ment (a requirement which more black persons in the population could
satisfy) would not satisfy its business interest in job performance? 0
If such an additional burden is imposed on the employer, it can
be argued that the burden is consistent with approximation of the
disparate treatment model because questions of necessity and of "less
burdensome alternative" are relevant to the issue of the credibility
of the employer's claimed licit reason. Employment requirements (ex-
perience, education and testing requirements are examples) which
generate disproportionate race or gender consequences may be ex-
plained either as proxies for desired race and sex neutral
characteristics or as proxies for race or gender. The first explanation
is that the proxy, although almost inevitably over- and under-inclusive
(some applicants with less than five years' experience will be compe-
tent and some applicants with five years' experience will be incompe-
tent) is justified by the employer's legitimate interest in reducing in-
formation costs.71 The second explanation is that the employer,
recognizing that a given requirement will have a disproportionate im-
pact, adopted the requirement as a proxy for race or gender: the
reason asserted is "pretextual."72
Necessity and less burdensome alternative are self-evidently rele-
vant to the issue of credibilty-i.e., to the issue of pretext. If a re-
quirement is unnecessary or if there is a readily available alternative
70. See Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
71. By legitimate interest I do not include the use of race or gender as a
proxy for qualifications. Rather, I refer to race and gender neutral considerations cor-
related (even if imperfectly) with employee qualifications the use of which is motivated
by a desire to avoid the costs imposed by individual assessment as well as identifica-
tion of qualification.
72. See note 16 supra.
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which would not generate disproportionate consequences, one is
justified in entertaining an inference of illicit motive as necessary con-
dition. The difficulty is that necessity and less burdensome alternative
are also consistent with a prohibition of consequences. Necessity is
in the eye of the beholder. A court employing such a notion risks
imposing its view of necessity on an employer motivated solely by
a perception of business needs. The costs or potential costs of other
alternatives are both often not measurable or, if measurable, are
equally in the eye of the beholder. A court which assesses the necessi-
ty of a race and gender neutral reason for disparate consequences
or the advisability of alternative business practices moves in the direc-
tion of prohibiting consequences insufficiently justified on a scale of
judicially perceived social or economical utility and therefore risks
deviation from and even abandonment of the disparate treatment
model.
One means of reconciling the tension between the relevance of
necessity to the issue of credibility and the risk of the imposition of
a distinct substantive model is by the device of imposing the burden
to establish pretext on the plaintiff: the plaintiff retains at all times
the burden of persuasion; the employer satisfies its burden by
establishing only a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason", and the
plaintiff has an opportunity to establish pretext. This, indeed, is the
Supreme Court's reconciliation."3 But that reconciliation is structural.
It can order and channel judicial discretion and it places boundaries
on that discretion, but sufficient discretion remains within those boun-
daries for judicial attempts at approximating models other than the
disparate treatment model. An honest exercise of judgment within
the boundaries of the model requires a judicial recognition that ap-
proximation of the disparate treatment model does not seek to balance
business needs and undesirable disparities in the consequences of
employment processes. Approximation seeks, rather, identification of
illicit motive.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT: THE RECEIVED MODEL AND ITS INCOHERENCE
A. An Introduction to the Problem: Connecticut v. Teal
The disparate impact model of discrimination prohibition is easily
stated: an employment criterion which adversely and disproportion-
ately affects a protected class of employees or potential employees
is unlawful under Title VII unless justified by "business necessity." 4
73. Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
74. See, e.g., New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979);
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In conception, the model renders employer motive immaterial, for a
facially race neutral and gender neutral criterion adopted for reasons
wholly independent of race or gender may be rendered unlawful under
the model if its impact is disproportionate. The prohibition, in short,
is a prohibition of insufficiently justified disparate consequences.
Although easily stated, the model's function, the meaning of its
elements and the relationship between its function and the meaning
of its elements are in a state of near complete disarray. It is submit-
ted in this section of this article that the model, at least as applied
by the Supreme Court, is incoherent, and that its incoherence is
traceable to the Court's failure to explain which of a number of plausi-
ble but largely inconsistent functions the model serves.
In outline form, the possibilities are the following: First, the
model may be viewed as an equal achievement model; its function
is to ensure proportionate distribution of economic resources among
race and gender groups."5 The right generated by such a function is
a group right to a proportionate share of the economic pie. 6 Enforce-
ment of such a right is by means of prohibiting employment criteria
which fail to produce proportionate shares."
Second, the model may be viewed as prohibiting a relatively nar-
row range of employment criteria which operate to give current ef-
fect to historical societal discrimination by barring from employment
opportunity victims of that historical discrimination." Such a prohibi-
tion has a quasi-compensatory function. It shifts the burden of
historical discrimination to employers in the form of the costs imposed
by the prohibition not for purposes of mandating equal achievement,
but for purposes of partial redress. 9 The right implicit in such a func-
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
75. See Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept in Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Law, 12 N.C. CEN. L.J. 1 (1980); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise, supra note 3,
at 103-04.
76. See Connecticut v. Teal, __ U.S. 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2539 (1982)
(Powell, J. dissenting); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 129 (1976).
77. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 227 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J. dissenting), rev'd, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
78. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); "Basic intelligence
must have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in the testing process.
Because the are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated
schools. . . "
79. See Freeman, supra note 3, at 1095. Cf. Perry, supra note 3, at 561 (adverse
impact theory at constitutional level distinguishable from affirmative action because
of former requires only that government not exacerbate present effects of past
discrimination).
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tion is a group right, but is less a right to equal achievement than
a right to competition for employment opportunity free of the disad-
vantages imposed by societal discrimination upon the exercise of op-
portunity. Group status is a proxy for victim status.
Third, and despite the conceptual irrelevance of motive, the model
may be viewed as in fact a process construct designed to approximate
a disparate treatment model by stating a proof scheme for attacks
upon purportedly race and gender neutral criteria suspected in fact
to be used by an employer as proxies for race or gender."0 The right
implicit in the third of these explanations is an individual right to
employment decision free of considerations of group membership.
There are variations on each of these themes, but the foregoing
states the general alternatives. Each theme is potentially present as
an explanation of certain of the lines of cases purportedly decided
within the impact model, and no one of the alternatives has been unam-
biguously adopted by the Court. The court's latest opportunity to
clarify the scope and function of the impact model came in Connec-
ticut v. Teal,81 and that case illustrates both the alternatives and the
ambiguity of the Court's emphasis upon one or another of the alter-
natives in particular cases decided under the impact model.
The employer in Teal utilized a passing score on a written ex-
amination as a first step in its selection process for employee promo-
tion to supervisor. A failing score on the examination eliminated the
candidate for promotion from further consideration, but a passing score
placed a candidate on an eligibility list. Promotions were made from
that list on the basis of considerations of relative advantage, specific-
ally supervisory recommendations, seniority and past performance. The
written examination had a disparate racial impact. The black pass rate
was 680/0 of the white pass rate on the particular occasion on which
the examination was administered to the plaintiffs in Teal." However,
the employer, apparently utilizing an affirmative action program,83
selected candidates from the eligibility list in a manner which
generated racial proportions. Approximately 15/o of the initial (pre-
80. See, e.g., Fiss, supra, note 1, at 297-98; Freeman, supra note 3, at 1094,
1116; Furnish, A Path Through The Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 419, 443 (1982); Rothchild & Werden, Title VII and the Use of Employment Tests: An
Illustration of the Limits of the Judicial Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 271-79 (1982);
Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 234 n.146; Comment, The Business Necessity Defense, supra
note 3.
81. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
82. Id. at 2529.
83. Id.
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examination) applicants for promotion were black; approximately 24%
of the candidates actually promoted were black. 4 In short, the
employer utilized a race neutral criterion (the examination) which had
a racially disproportionate impact upon an identifiable group of
employees (applicants for promotion), but compensated for that im-
pact by engaging in disparate racial treatment of promotion candidates
on the eligibility list generated by the examination.
Black applicants for employment who received failing scores on
the examination sued under the impact model. The employer defended
on a "bottom line" result theory:" although the examination had a
disparate impact, the promotion system did not have such an impact.
It is important to recognize what was at stake in the employer's
theory. There were two potential classes of plaintiffs in Teal. White
employees who received passing scores on the examination and who
were therefore named on the eligibility list but who were not selected
by reason of their race could contend that the employer had engaged
in disparate treatment. The employer's defense to such a contention
would presumably be the affirmative action defense to disparate treat-
ment liability recognized in United Steelworkers v. Weber." The ac-
tual plaintiffs in Teal were, however, black employees who received
failing scores on the examination, and those employees utilized an im-
pact model theory. Because the employer's promotion system produced
no "bottom line" racial disproportion, the plaintiffs were logically
compelled to argue that the function of the impact model was not
satisfied by racial proportion and, therefore, that the right recognized
by the impact model is not (or at least is not merely) a right of
racial groups to proportional representation in the workforce or a sub-
category of the workforce. The employer, on the other hand, was com-
pelled to argue either that the impact model is in fact a process con-
struct for approximating the disparate treatment model 7 or that the
right recognized by the impact model is only the right of racial groups
to proportional shares of employment opportunities.
84. Id. at 2530.
85. The "bottom line" theory is derived from an E.E.O.C. guideline govern-
ing that agency's prosecutorial discretion. 29 CFR S 1607.40 (1978). Prior to Teal most
courts of appeals had accepted bottom line results as a defense to impact model liability.
See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3rd Cir. 1980); E.E.O.C. v. Navajo
Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Troyan 520 F.2d at 492 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. Correctional
Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). But see Teal
v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, __ U.S. __ 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
86. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
87. See __ U.S. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2535.
88. Id. at 2530-31.
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A bare majority of the Supreme Court rejected bottom line
results as a defense. The dissent embraced a group right to racial
proportion as the function of the impact model, but did so for the
apparent reason of easing the practical difficulties faced by employers
in adhering to the impact model. 9 The majority's theory was that in-
dividual members of a racial minority have an individual right under
Title VII to be free of "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary" barriers
to "employment opportunity."9 Under this conception an individual
black applicant's right to compete for opportunities free of such bar-
riers is not satisfied by the fact that the racial group of which the
applicant is a member is proportionately represented in the workforce.
Nor, according to the majority, is the right satisfied if the employer
has not utilized the barrier as a device for disparate treatment: The
impact model is not a process construct for approximating disparate
treatment, it is an independent substantive model. 1 The dissent's
theory was that only groups have rights under the impact model and
that those rights are satisfied if the employer's employment system
viewed as a whole produces no disproportionate results." According
to the dissent, individual members of a protected race or gender group
who are excluded from an employment opportunity by a race or gender
neutral component of an employment system therefore have no
cognizable complaint where the group itself achieves a proportionate
share of the opportunity. 3
The majority's theory points in the direction of confining the im-
pact model to the elimination of objective and absolute barriers to
employment-presumably barriers which perpetuate the effects of past
societal discrimination.14 Because the theory rejects racial proportion
as a defense to impact model liability, it is conceptually inconsistent
with equal achievement as the function of the impact model. It is,
moreover, facially inconsistent with the case coming closest to adopt-
ing proportion as the function of the model, United Steelworkers v.
89. Id. at 2539 (Powell, J. dissenting): "Our cases ...have made clear that
discriminatory impact claims cannot be based on how an individual is treated in isola-
tion from the treatment of other members of the group. Such claims necessarily are
based on whether the group fares less well than other groups under a policy, practice
or test."
90. - U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2534-35.
91. Id. at 2535.
92. Id. at 2538-39. (Powell, J. dissenting). But see id. at 2539-40.
93. Id. at 2539.
94. See __ U.S. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2533: "The suggestion that disparate
impact should be measured only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII
guarantees these individual respondents the opportunity to compete equally with white
workers on the basis of job-related criteria" (emphasis in original).
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Weber.5 The Court adopted a "voluntary affirmative action" defense
to disparate treatment model liability in Weber: disparate treatment
of whites does not subject an employer to liability if that treatment
is the means by which an employer ensures that protected racial
groups enjoy a proportionate share of employment opportunities. As
employers risk liability under the impact model for insufficiently
justified racial disproportion in the enjoyment of employment oppor-
tunities, and as Weber eliminated the chief obstacle to avoiding ex-
posure to the impact model through use of racial preferences," the
affirmative action defense appeared clearly designed to implement an
equal achievement objective. It is, however, the dissenting opinion
in Teal which points in the direction of an equal achievement
understanding of the impact model; the demands of the impact model
are satisfied, according to the dissent, by proportionate results. 7
But these impressions are merely facial impressions. The dissent's
theory may be viewed as consistent with the view that the impact
model is a process construct for a disparate treatment model: bottom
line proportion vitiates any inference from the disparate racial conse-
quence of the use of an employment test that the test was utilized
for the purpose of bringing about those consequences." There are,
moreover, two aspects of the majority's opinion which undermine its
theory and the direction suggested by that theory.
(1) Individuals and Groups
The majority's characterization of the right conferred by an anti-
barrier view of the function of the impact model as an individual right
is patently wrong. No individual has a right to be free of a barrier
to employment under the impact model merely on the basis that the
barrier is "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary." Rather, the individual
has a right under the model to freedom from such a barrier only upon
a showing that the race or gender group in which he or she is a
95. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
96. See id. at 209-11 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
97. - U.S. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2536-40 (Powell, J. dissenting).
98. See id. at 2537 (Powell, J. dissenting):
In one set of cases-those including direct proof of discriminatory intent-
the plaintiff seeks to establish direct, intentional discrimination against
him. In that type case, the individual is at the forefront.... In disparate
impact cases, by contrast, the plaintiff seeks to carry his burden of proof
by way of inference-by showing that an employer's selection process
results in the rejection of a disproportionate number of members of a
protected group to which he belongs (emphasis in original).
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member is disproportionately excluded by the barrier.9 The right is
inherently a group right, for it attaches only by virtue of group harm.
Upon the assumption that the majority's underlying rational was
redress, individual membership in the group harmed generates a
presumption of individual victimization.
It is nevertheless the case that the group right suggested by
an anti-barrier conception of the impact model differs from the group
right suggested by a proportional representation conception of that
model. It differs because if minority group freedom from barriers of
an "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary" character is the sole right
conferred by the impact model, the group right conferred by the model
is merely a right to freedom from barriers of a particular variety-
on a redress rationale, barriers identifiable with past societal
discrimination. 0 Competition for scare employment opportunity may
on this theory continue to occur following elimination of the barrier,
and the legal system's regulation of that post-elimination competition
is conducted without reference to how members of the minority group
fare in the competition absent disparate treatment. A group right to
proportion, by contrast, is a group right to "bottom line" proportion
whether or not a barrier is present; the group has a right to freedom
from competition whether or not competition is distorted by "artificial,
99. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal - U.S .... 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529
n.4 (1982) (evidence of impact); New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). The possibility that an individual plaintiff might use the disparate
impact theory in an individual action does not alter this conclusion-the individual
plaintiff establishes liability only if he establishes group harm. See Wright v. Nat'l.
Archives & Records Service, 609 F.2d 702, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1979).
100. That the number of "barriers" subject to the impact model is so limited
is suggested by the Court's treatment of attacks on subjective hiring or promotion
systems under the disparate treatment model and its treatment of objective barriers-
particularly tests-which "perpetuate" historical discrimination (particularly in educa-
tion) under the impact model. Compare Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567
(1978) (treatment model); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (treatment
model) with Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (impact model). But
see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (application of impact model to criteria
the operation of which was independent of historical discrimination); Rowe v. General
Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) (application of impact model to subjective
criteria); Bartholet, supra note 3 (explaining cases on the theory courts have responded
differently to employer decision making processes for blue collar jobs and white collar
jobs). If subjective hiring systems are subject to the impact model, it may be for reasons
quite distinct from the reasons supporting an application of the model to, e.g., an in-
telligence test. The latter application is explicable on a redress or equal results ra-
tionale; the former application is explicable on the ground that subjectivism risks
disparate treatment. See text and notes 294-325 infra.
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arbitrary and unnecessary" devices which stack the deck against the
minority. The presence of such barriers, and the disparate impact
theory used as a basis for an attack on such barriers, are merely the
legal excuse for generating the desired result.01
(2) Barriers to Opportunity
This distinction between the nature of the group rights confer-
red by the anti-barrier and proportion conceptions of the impact model
is, however, viable as a distinction only if the right recognized by
the court's anti-barrier theory is solely freedom from barriers. The
second difficulty with the Court's theory in Teal is that there is no
indication in the opinion that this is the case, and there is reason
to believe it is not the case. Teal involved an employment examina-
tion, a criterion most ripe for an "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary"
characterization and a criterion which perpetuates discrimination in
education.102 But there is nothing in the majority's opinion in Teal from
which a standard for determining either which employment criteria
are subject to attack under the impact model or the appropriate test
of "artificial, arbitrary or unnecessary" may be gleaned. To the ex-
tent that all criteria are subject to the model and to the extent that
the employer's burden of justification is made very difficult, the nar-
rowness of the group right conferred by the anti-barrier conception
is illusory. The right becomes functionally the right to equal achieve-
ment purportedly rejected by the majority opinion.
As the dissent pointed out in Teal, the Court's rejection of bot-
tom line balance forces employers to either eliminate barriers or to
undertake the expensive (and dubious) task of justification."'3 If those
alternatives were limited to barriers of an "artificial, arbitrary or un-
necessary" character under a standard which provides some predic-
tability regarding that characterization, this complaint would not, on
anti-barrier premises, have merit. But the very absence of a standard
of predictability generates risks of unpredicted exposure to liability.
Assuming risk averse employers (an appropriate assumption given
101. The group right implications of the impact model, and the intimate rela-
tionship between the impact model and "affirmative action" programs clearly designed
to achieve proportionate results are matters explored in Cox, supra, note 3, at 107-113.
See also Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 563 F.2d 216, 228-34 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J. dissenting), rev'd., 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Meltzer, supra note 3, at 426-37.
102. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267
(9th Cir. 1981); Boston Chapter N.A.A.C.P. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (lst Cir. 1974);
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
103. - U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2540 (Powell, J. dissenting).
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potential back pay exposure) the dissent's further contention-that
employers will respond to Teal by both eliminating barriers and engag-
ing in quota hiring so as to achieve "bottom line" proportion''4-is
not unwarranted.
In summary, then, the majority opinion's anti-barrier theory in
Teal is inconsistent with the Court's implicit recognition of a group
right to proportionate representation in the workforce in United
Steelworkers v. Weber °5 only if Teal and Weber are compared at the
level of theory. If they are compared instead from the perspective
of function they yield a consistent judicial effort to ensure propor-
tionate distribution of race and gender shares of employment
opportunities.
The tension between the majority's individualistic rationale in
Teal and the potential function of the result reached in Teal suggests
that the impact model is incoherent. That suggestion is confirmed by
the dissent, for the most striking feature of Teal is the fundamental
difference in theoretical perceptions of the purpose served by the im-
pact model articulated in the majority and dissenting opinions. That
difference is reflected in each of four questions to be asked in the
following subparts of this article: (1) With respect to whom must
disparate impact be found? (2) What neutral criteria are subject to
the model? (3) What form of disproportion is subject to the model?
(4) What is the character of the "business necessity" which will
preclude application of the model?
B. Impact on Whom?
(1) The Relevant Population Unit: The External Population Or The
Population Actually Subjected to The Challenged Criterion?
The meaning of "impact" is unclear in part because there are
conflicting versions in the cases of the relevant population with respect
to which disproportion is to be determined. ' More specifically, it is
104. Id.
105. 433 U.S. 193 (1979). See Cox, supra note 3, at 139-44.
106. The best recent example of this confusion is Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 1983). The confusion is reflected, however, in Supreme Court opinions. Com-
pare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (general population data indicating
greater percentage of women than men in the general population would be excluded
under challenged criterion); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971)
(general population data indicating that greater proportion of white males than black
males in general population were qualified under the criterion challenged) with Con-
necticut v. Teal, __ U.S. _ 102, S. Ct. 2525, 2529 n.4 (1982) (applicant data in-
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not clear whether protected race or gender populations viewed as a
whole must be disproportionately affected by a challenged rule or prac-
tice or whether the group of employees or applicants for employment
actually affected by the challenged rule or practice is the appropriate
unit for making that determination. Confusion on this point is il-
lustrated by Dothard v. Rawlinson.""
In Dothard the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute im-
posing minimum height and weight requirements for prison guards
on the ground that the requirements disproportionately excluded
women from such positions. The case was in short predicated expressly
on the impact model.0 8 The evidence of impact upon which the Court
primarily relied was census data indicating that the combined re-
quirements would disqualify 41.13% of the female and less than 1%
of the male populations of the United States.0 9 The unit of measure-
ment was, in short, the female population viewed as a whole, at least
where that population was assumed to possess undisputed qualifica-
tions (qualifications other than the challenged height and weight re-
quirement) for the position in question. Justice White, in dissent,
argued that this unit was inappropriate. Applicant flow data-the
population unit consisting of applicants for the position of prison
guard-was, in White's view, crucial. " The Court, in response to
White's dissent, agreed that applicant data would be relevant, but
argued both that it would be distorted by the deterrent effect of the
challenged criterion upon applicants and that the employer had failed
to present such data in rebuttal.'
There are a number of potential reasons for the use of an appli-
cant pool as the appropriate unit for purposes of determining the ques-
tion of disproportionate impact. First, if the relevant unit for that
determination is the general population and impact on that popula-
dicating disparity in selection and failure rates); New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 585 (1979) (population data indicating that, of the group disqualified under
challenged criterion, most were black or hispanic). To some extent, this conflict is a
matter of the availability of data: the general population may not be qualified under
employer criteria not challenged by a plaintiff or there may not be data available
on the effect of a challenged criterion on any population other than actual applicants.
The conflict may also reflect, however, a judicial failure to identify the relevant popula-
tion unit for determining the impact question.
107. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). A second example is Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1983).
108. 433 U.S. at 328-29.
109. Id. at 329-30.
110. Id. at 348. (White, J. dissenting).
111. 433 U.S. at 330-31.
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tion is unknown, known disparate impact in an applicant pool may
be used to infer disparate impact in the general population."1 ' One
difficulty with such an inference is that it treats the applicant pool
as a "sample" from the external population."' It can be argued that
it is not in fact a sample because applicants self-select employers-
there is no known probability by which persons become part of the
"sample..... This is not a viable explanation of Justice White's in-
sistence on applicant data as relevant in Dothard because impact on
the external population was known in Dothard."'
Second, if impact on the general population is known, but there
are employment qualifications not disputed by the plaintiff and not
possessed by all members of that general population, it can be argued
that applicant data is the best source of information about impact on
a general population possessing undisputed qualifications. The focus
remains the question of impact on an external minority or female
population viewed as a whole, because applicant data is used for the
sole purpose of eliminating the influence of unchallenged, and therefore
immaterial, employer requirements."' This potential explanation of
Justice White's dissent, and of the Court's concession of relevance,
is equally unhelpful: Justice White did not seriously contest (and the
Court assumed) that the general population possessed undisputed
qualifications." 7
Third, applicant data may be used if it is necessary to exclude
self-selection as a potential cause of disproportionate consequences:
disparities may be caused by differences in the rates in which pro-
tected groups and white males apply for employment opportunities.
It is clear that Justice White's dissent was predicated on that per-
ceived necessity."8 But the primary ground for exclusion of self-
112. See Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing, supra note
61; Shoben, Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 9, at 8.
113. See, e.g., Shoben, Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 9, ate 8; Rothschild
& Werden, supra note 80, at 274-75.
114. Cohn, On The Use of Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 55
IND. L.J. 493 (1980); Cohn, Statistical Laws and The Use of Statistics in Law: A Rejoinder
to Professor Shoben, 55 IND. L. J. 537 (1980). But see BALDUS & COLE, supra note 57, at
316-17; Shoben, In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII: A Reply to
Dr. Cohn, 55 IND. L. J. 515 (1980).
115. 433 U.S. at 329-30.
116. See Shoben, Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 9, at 33-34. Cf. Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310-11 (1977) (use of this technique for
disparate treatment purposes).
117. See 433 U.S. at 348. (dissenting opinion)
118. Id.
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selection is rebuttal of the inference of illicit motive arising from
disparities in representation rates. To the extent that self-selection
"caused" a disparity between a protected group's representation in
a workforce and that group's representation in the general popula-
tion or the external labor force, the inference of illicit motive arising
from that disparity is dissipated.'19 If this is the reason for Justice
White's concern for self-selection (and the Court's concession that ap-
plicant data was relevant), the real theory in Dothard was in illicit
motive (disparate treatment model) theory, not an illicit consequences
(impact model) theory. Indeed, Justice White's failure to distinguish
systematic disparate treatment cases in his analysis of the applicant
data question suggests that he may have been of the view that
Dothard presented an issue of disparate treatment. 2
Finally there is another and independent reason that applicant
data might be used to exclude self-selection as a cause of dispropor-
tionate consequences. If the relevant population unit for purposes of
determining impact is defined as only those persons actually interested
in and available for the opportunity in question, the actual applicant
pool satisfies that definition. The implications of such a view are,
however, problematic.
If the appropriate unit for determining the impact question is
the population viewed as a whole, the function of the disparate im-
pact model may viably be said to be the elimination of barriers to
employment for the ultimate purpose, presumably, of increasing
minority and female participation in society's economic pie. There are
but three requirements (ignoring defenses) under such a view for in-
validating an employment criterion: a plaintiff with standing (e.g., an
applicant for employment who meets procedural prerequisites to suit);
proof of disparate impact on a racial minority or on women viewed
as a whole; and the plaintiffs membership in the group impacted. The
plaintiff's legal right to be free of the requirement is by virtue of
the plaintiffs membership in the disproportionately affected race or
gender group, and it is in this sense that such a right is a "group
right". The right is the right of a racial minority or of females to
be free of a barrier which adversely affects those groups; an individual
has no right to be free of an employment requirement absent proof
that the race or gender group to which he or she belongs has suf-
fered disproportion. The implication of such a right for the function
of the impact model is that the model is designed for purposes of
119. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 312 (1977).
120. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 347-49 (1977) (White, J. dissenting).
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social engineering. The plaintiff may have standing by virtue of his
or her application, but the function of the plaintiff's lawsuit is the
prospective elimination of a criterion which operates as a barrier to
opportunity for the race or gender group in which he or she is a
member.121
If, however, the relevant unit for purposes of determining im-
pact is the actual applicant (or incumbent employee) group, the nature
of the right defined by the impact model is altered. In the first place,
the elimination of barriers to employment is made, as a practical mat-
ter, significantly more difficult. The actual applicant requirement ig-
nores the deterrent effect of the challenged employment criterion on
applications and attacks on the criteria must await the building of
a record of impact upon actual applicants. More fundamentally, plain-
tiff must now establish standing, disproportionate impact on actual
applicants who are members of a particular race or gender group,
and membership in that group. The plaintiff's right to be free of the
employment criterion in issue once these elements have been estab-
lished remains a group right, for the plaintiff has no right absent proof
of disparate exclusion of a protected group within the pool of ap-
plicants. But the group's right is rather different than the group's
right where the minority or gender population as a whole is the ap-
propriate unit for the impact determination. The right is no longer
a race or gender group right to the elimination of unjustified bar-
riers to potential applicants; rather, it is a right to the elimination
of unjustified barriers to a race or gender subpopulation with im-
mediate expectations in the employment opportunity in question.122
121. See Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 12-13, (1st Cir. 1983) (Bownes, J. dissent-
ing). Cf. M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION, 386-87 (1982) (interpreting continuing violation theory as means of per-
mitting an attack upon a criterion having a disparate impact despite time barred harm
suffered by particular plaintiff).
122. See Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1975). BALDUS
& COLE, supra note 57, at 108 argue for a preference in favor of actual applicant data
in disparate impact model cases on the ground that such data is "a proxy for the
population that would have applied under conditions of normal labor supply." Such
a view appears viable in a disparate treatment case because the issue in such a case
is what was the employer's conduct. The view would moreover be viable in disparate
impact cases if it is assumed that the group protected by the impact model is the
group of minority or female applicants "under conditions of normal labor supply." What
is not clear is why the impact model should be confined to that group. (Unless the
impact model is an attempt at approximating the disparate treatment model). See
Shoben, Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 9, at 22-23, 29-29.
Lerner, supra, note 3, at 30-39 rejects the use of general population data and
apparently supports use of a comparison of representation rates in the qualified labor
force in a relevant geographical area with representation rates in a workforce as a
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Under the applicant data requirement, the impact model is far closer
to the traditional notion that an individual harmed by another has
a right to redress than it is to the notion that barriers to minority
or female employment are to be prospectively eliminated. The dif-
ficulty is that this right to redress remains a function of group
membership, and the applicant data requirement has no apparent rela-
tionship to the group character of the right to redress."
measure of impact. But Lerner's analysis rejects the disparate impact/disparate treat-
ment distinction, Id. at 29-30. That analysis may be viable if it is assumed that the
function of Title VII is to require rational decision making on the part of employers,
see Id. at 23, and if an obligation of rationality is viewed as an operative means of
precluding employer action motivated by race or gender. But it is at best difficult
to see why general population data is irrelevant if it is assumed that the courts are
serious about focusing upon the differential effect of particular criterion upon pro-
tected groups. Note again, however, that general population data are not, under the
latter assumption, an appropriate basis for decision if they do not account for undisputed
qualifications. Moreover, the issue discussed in the text should be distinguished generally
from the problem of identifying a relevant data base. For example, challenges to neutral
promotion criteria may of necessity require a focus on encumbant employees where
the criteria challenged (e.g. an experience with the employer requirement) is applied
only to encumbant employees. Such a use of available data does not necessarily sug-
gest, however, that the long-term impact on a protected population viewed writ large
is not the subject of inquiry. But see Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F2d 1271, 1273
(5th Cir. 1975).
123. This point may be illustrated by considering two hypotheticals: Suppose
that it is known that an employment criterion has a disproportionate impact on a
minority race within the general population and that there are no undisputed qualifica-
tions which would threaten that assumption. Suppose further that the applicant data
for an employer who utilizes the criterion discloses no such impact. Under these facts,
the employer's data suggests either that only members of the impacted group who
are unlike their fellow members (in that they satisfy the criterion) are interested in
the employment in question or that random variation- "chance" -explains the
employer's experience. Could an applicant for employment who both failed to meet
the criterion and is a member of the racial minority impacted writ large successfully
seek elimination of the employer's requirement? Justice White's apparent answer (and
the Dothard Court's apparent answer if it could be shown that no deterrence of ap-
plicants occurred) would be in the negative. If the appropriate answer is negative,
the impact model is not effectively eliminating barriers to potential applicants, for
it grants a right to freedom from such barriers only upon proof of actual harm to
a limited number of persons disproportionately foreclosed in fact from an employment
opportunity. Nor, if the appropriate answer is negative, is the right conferred by the
model a group right to proportionate shares-there is no right unless a subpopulation
of a protected race or gender group (actual applicants who are members of that group)
is disproportionately excluded. See Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 10-12 (1st Cir. 1983).
Suppose, instead, that it is known that the criterion has no disproportionate
impact within the external population possessing undisputed qualifications, but there
is evidence that a particular employer's use of the criterion has resulted in a dispropor-
tionate impact upon actual minority applicants - suppose, in short, random variation
produces a "sample" in which disproportion has occurred in fact. May a rejected minority
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(2) The Problem of "Significant" or "Substantial" Impact
The Supreme Court has variously characterized the impact re-
quired by the disparate impact model as "significant impact" '124 or
"substantial impact." '125 The EEOC, in establishing a standard for the
exercise of its enforcement discretion, adopted a "4/5 rule of thumb"
arguably expressive of the significance or substantiality notions: an
employee selection criterion has an adverse impact on a minority if
the minority (or female) pass rate is less than 80% of the white male
pass rate.'26 Some courts of appeals have adopted the 4/5 rule as a
rule of substantive, prima facie liability.'
The significance or substantiality notion, whether or not arbitrar-
ily expressed by an 80% standard, has three potential alternative
meanings, no one of which has been authoritatively selected as the
appropriate meaning and each of which has distinct implications for
the substantive content of the impact model.'28
(a) Substantiality as Quantitatively Unacceptable Disparity
It is possible that the substantiality or significance notion is a
reference to quantitatively substantial disparity: disparities are
tolerable unless the disparities (the difference between white male
and minority or female success or failure under a challenged rule or
practice) exceeds some quantitative standard.'29 The 4/5 rule may be
viewed as suggesting such a standard with respect to selection rate
applicant seek elimination of the criterion? If the appropriate answer under the im-
pact model is affirmative, a prospective remedy precluding use of the criterion has
no intelligible relationship to a policy of eliminating barriers to employment oppor-
tunities which disproportionately affect minorities: there is no such barrier. Nor, if
the answer is affirmative, is a focus upon applicant data consistent with a propor-
tional shares conception of the right conferred by the model: The group, by hypothesis,
has a proportional share.
124. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
125. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971).
126. 29 CFR S 1607.4(D) (1981).
127. See, e.g., Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, __ U.S.
__, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982); Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St.
Louis, 616 F.2d 350 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1980) Jackson v. Nassau Co.
Civil Serv. Comm'n., 424 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
128. Calculation of a "disparity" is of course a function of the character of
the comparison made. See text and note 176 infra.
129. See, e.g., Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 545 n.22 (5th Cir.
1982); Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979). Cf. United
States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 589 (10th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing practical and statistical
significance in jury context); Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431,
439 (10th Cir. 1975) (same), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
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comparisons in applicant data. A similar quantitative notion is also
possible, however, in the evaluation of impact if impact on the exter-
nal population is the relevant focus. A known disparate impact on
an external population may be viewed as insufficient if the dispropor-
tionate disqualification of the general minority population is not ex-
cessive (e.g., if 21% of the white population would be disqualified and
22/o of the black population would be disqualified).
What are the implications of a quantitative measure of tolerable
disparity? Such a conception of substantiality or significance would
appear to serve one or more of three functions. First, and by analogy
to the purpose served by the EEOC's "rule of thumb", a quantitative
measure might serve to allocate judicial resources so as to force a
detailed judicial inquiry into employer justification only in cases of
egregious impact: absent quantitatively unacceptable disparity, there
is no prima facie case.
Second, a quantitative measure may be viewed as serving as a
rough basis for engaging in a balancing test.13° That is, if the impact
model is designed to in effect force a greater protected group par-
ticipation in society's economic pie, but to limit that objective to in-
stances in which economic efficiency (and, therefore, the size of the
pie) will not be seriously threatened, the model may be characterized
as a framework within which a court balances the participation objec-
tive against the efficiency objective. On that premise, a quantitative
measure of disparity provides some sense of the importance of the
participation objective in the balance. It informs the court (somewhat
arbitrarily) about the degree to which the participation objective is
threatened by an employer's pursuit of efficiency.
Third, a disparity in success or failure rates under a challenged
neutral criterion may be viewed as a measure of the similarity of ex-
clusion from an employment opportunity under such a criterion to
exclusion under an explicit race or gender criterion. A significant quan-
titative disparity establishes a greater probability of protected group
exclusion under a neutral criterion than white male exclusion under
that criterion. That greater probability of exclusion is arguably
analagous to the certainty or near certainty of exclusion where employ-
ment decisions are motivated by race or gender.131 If the function of
130. Strict versions of the business necessity defense are framed explicitly in
terms of balancing disparate impact against the employer interests furthered by a
challenged rule, practice or criterion. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorrillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
131. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 301-02; note 169 and text and notes 301-17 infra.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1983], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss1/2
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
the impact model is to approximate a disparate treatment prohibi-
tion, a quantitatively significant disparity may give rise to an inference
of illicit motive. If the function of the impact model is a form of
redress, a quantitatively significant disparity may serve as a proxy
for victimization; where disparities in current success are large, it
might be inferred that they are attributable to past discrimination.
(b) Significance As Statistical Significance
A second possible explanation of the substantiality or significance
test is that it serves to eliminate the possibility that disparate im-
pact in applicant data is the product of random variation.1 32 Both the
4/5 rule of thumb (very roughly and often inaccurately) and more
sophisticated techniques (more precisely but not without theoretical
objection) may be viewed, then, as attempting to determine whether
the neutral criterion used by the employer could be expected to have
a disparate impact on the general population. To the extent that only
applicant data are available, statistical significance projects anticipated
exclusion of the protected minority or gender group viewed as a whole
and therefore serves as a substitute for the known data regarding
that exclusion in a case such as Dothard.33
The statistical significance explanation is consistent with the view
that the impact model creates a group right enjoyed by a protected
group viewed as a whole. Statistical significance establishes that a
challenged rule or practice has a disparate effect within the general
population; if statistical significance is required, a disparate impact
on actual applicants gives rise to liability only were that disparate
impact reflects a projected disparate impact on protected groups in
the general population.'
Proof of statistical significance establishes, then, that the pro-
132. See, e.g., New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 598 n.3
(1979) (White, J. dissenting); Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1978); Watkins
v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1186 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976);
Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp. 467 F. Supp. 587 (D. Colo. 1980).
133. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 57, at 290: Shoben Statistical Proof supra
note 61, at 798; Shoben, Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 9, at 8.
134. See Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1043 (10th Cir. 1981); Wright v. Nat'l
Archives & Records Service, 609 F.2d 702, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1979); Donnell v. General
Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1291, 1296-98 (8th Cir. 1978); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories,
Inc., 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978). See also Gerdom v. Con-
tinental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 612 (9th Cir. 1982) (dissenting opinion). But see
Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 10-12 (1st Cir. 1983). Cf. Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514
F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1971) (rule applicable only to employees must be analyzed
using employees rather than general population as data base).
1983]
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tected group viewed as a whole is disproportionately denied access
to an employment opportunity. The probability or improbability that
members of the protected group will become actual applicants for
employment is immaterial, for it is the protected group's right to be
free from a "barrier to opportunity", not an actual applicant's right
to that freedom, which is crucial.'35 It should be apparent, however,
that the statistical significance explanation is not a viable explana-
tion if impact on the external population of potential applicants or
employees is not the impact model's target. If actual applicants or
employees are the persons with rights to freedom from disparate im-
pact, a conclusion that they are equally victims of chance should be
immaterial. 3
(c) Substantiality or Significance As Quantitatively Unacceptable
Impact Upon the Protected Group Considered As A Whole
Although it does not appear to constitute an alternative to the
foregoing explanations there is another quantitative explanation of
the substantiality or significance element of the impact model which
may be both independent of and a requirement in addition to quan-
titative disparity and statistical significance. That element is not quan-
tity of disparity, but quantity of exclusion from an employment op-
portunity of a protected race or gender group viewed as a whole. 37
135. Compare Cohn, On the Use of Statistics In Employment Discrimination Cases,
55 IND. L. J. 493, 497 (1980) (applicants are not a sample from a population because there
is no known probability by which members of the population became applicants); Lerner,
supra note 3, at 26 (use of general population data ignores problems of self-selection
and undisputed qualifications) with Shoben, In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis
Under Title VII: A Reply to Dr. Cohn, 55 IND. L. J. 515, 527 (1980) ("The relevant legal
question . . . is whether the test has the effect of disproportionately excluding one
group for whatever reason ").
136. See the discussion of Justice White's dissent in Dothard at text and notes
106-23 supra.
137. This distinction may be illustrated by a hypothetical. Assume that a
challenged criterion excludes a subpopulation of 40,000 persons, 63% (26,200) of whom
are black. If the external workforce of the three million persons is 20% (600,000) black,
the disparate effect of the challenged criterion on that workforce is arguably de minimus:
600,000 minus 26,200 (96%) of potential black applicants would succeed under the
criterion and 2,400,000 minus 13,800 (99.99%) of potential white applicants would suc-
ceed under the criterion. See Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607 (5th
Cir. 1979).
To compare the 63% representation rate (in the excluded subpopulation) with
the 20% representation rate in the external workforce, see New York Transit Authority
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 598 (1979) (White, J. dissenting), is not to provide information
about either the comparative rate of white and black exclusion or the comparative
rate of white and black inclusion under the criterion if the relevant population unit
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1983], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss1/2
19831 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
That is, there may be, at least as a threshold matter of the applicabil-
ity of the impact model, a distinction between disproportionate exclu-
sion of a protected race or gender group (to which the model is ap-
plicable) and exclusion of a subpopulation disproportionately composed
of a protected race or gender group (to which the model is arguably
inapplicable).'38
for the impact determination is the protected group viewed writ large.
Judicial use of a black or female representation rate in a subpopulation of per-
sons qualified under a challenged criterion should be distinguished from the use of
such a representation rate in a subpopulation of persons disqualified by a challenged
criterion. For example, in Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 645 F.2d 1251 (6th
Cir. 1981) a two year experience requirement for truck driver positions was challenged
on the theory that the requirement had a disparate impact on women. The evidence
of disparate impact relied upon was data indicating that only 5% of all truck drivers
(a proxy population for persons who would satisfy the experience requirement) were
women. The court's focus was therefore on the gender composition of a subpopulation,
but a subpopulation of qualified persons. Although the challenged experience require-
ment may not have generated a "substantial" disparity in the general population (both
most men and most women would be disqualified under the criterion), it did generate
a substantial disparity within the subpopulation and a substantial exclusionary effect
on women in the general population.
138. But cf. Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 535 n.5 (5th Cir.
1982) (greater quantitative impact required in disparate treatment cases than in
disparate impact cases).
The postulated distinction in the text here is not merely the distinction between
a focus upon fail rates and a focus upon pass rates; it is a distinction, rather, between
a focus upon the effect of a criterion on a protected group viewed as a whole and
a focus upon the effect of a criterion on some subset of that group. Green v. Missouri
Pacific R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) may illustrate this point. The challenged
criterion in that case was an employer rule precluding employment of persons con-
victed of any crime. The court relied upon two measures of impact: (1) Applicant data
indicating that 5.3 per cent of black applicants and 2.23 per cent of white applicants
were excluded under the criterion, a disparity expressed by the court as a rejection
rate for black applicants 2.5 times the rejection rate for white applicants. Id. at 1295.
(2) An expert's testimony that between 36.9 and 78.1 per cent of all black persons
in urban areas would incur a conviction in their lifetimes whereas 11.6 to 16.8 per
cent of white persons would incur a conviction. Id. at 1294. •
The first measure of impact focuses upon degree of disparity and may be criticized
on the ground that, although a 2.5 to 1 rejection rate appears large, the same statistics
produce a 97.7 to 94.6 (1.03 to 1) selection rate. The second measure of impact, if believed,
discloses both a substantial disparity and that the employer's criterion had the poten-
tial of excluding a quantitatively substantial portion of the black population. The court
in Green rejected the district court's theory that the representation rate of excluded
black applicants (a percentage of the total applicant pool) was small in comparison
to the representation rate of blacks in the metropolitan population on the ground that
the issue was "not whether the individuals actually suffering from a discriminatory
practice are statistically large in number." 523 F.2d at 1295. That rejection would ap-
pear to constitute a rejection of the notion expressed in the text here that there must
be disproportionate exclusion of a protected race or gender group viewed writ large.
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It is obvious that if the subpopulation excluded by a criterion
is large and if the subpopulation's composition is dramatically
disproportionate, exclusion of the subpopulation may have the effect
of substantially excluding the protected group. But exclusion under
a challenged criterion of quantitatively small subpopulations need not
have this effect. It is possible for a neutral criterion to exclude some
subpopulation mostly or even overwhelmingly composed of members
of a protected group and to simultaneously have no or very little
disparate impact on the protected group viewed as a whole. A varia-
tion of the proposed distinction is the argument postulated by the
"bottom line" balance theory that inclusion of a protected race or
gender group viewed as a whole (the group has received a propor-
tionate share of a relevant opportunity or benefit conferred by an
employer) obviates the issue of the simultaneous exclusion of a subset
of the protected group (a challenged criterion operates to exclude a
group predominantly or exclusively composed of females or of
members of a racial minority).'39
If, however, the court's myopic reliance on rejection rates (and failure to consider
selection rates) renders its finding of a substantial disparity questionable, the remain-
ing basis for its decision-evidence that the challenged criterion would exclude a
substantial percentage of the urban black population-is precisely that "individuals
actually suffering from a discriminatory practice are statistically large in number."
139. See Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1 (lst. Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980). The bottom line balance defense was rejected by
the Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Teal, - U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), but
Greyhound is useful as an example of the postulated distinction. That case included
a challenge to a facially race neutral employer rule precluding the wearing of beards
by male employees. The rule had a "disparate impact" on the black male population
viewed writ large because a substantial member of black males suffer from a skin
disease unique to blacks rendering shaving medically inadvisable. However, the employer
employed blacks in numbers in excess of their representation in the external labor
force. The Third Circuit reversed a lower court judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
Greyhound on two grounds: (1) the "bottom line" defense (blacks as a group were pro-
portionately included in the employer's workforce) and (2) the plaintiff had failed to
establish "causation" because no comparative evidence regarding the effect of the no
beards rule on whites had been proffered. In form, the later ground for decision is
failure to establish disparity. The difficulty with that rationale is that it imposes on
the plaintiff an obligation to negate hypothetical causes despite the fact that the evidence
in Greyhound suggested that blacks suffer from the disease in question at a far greater
rate than whites. See 635 F.2d at 199 (dissenting opinion). In substance, however, the
Third Circuit's causation theory constituted a refusal to focus upon exclusion of a sub-
population within the black population (those black males suffering from the condition
in question) where there was no exclusion of the black population viewed writ large
(blacks were proportionately included in the workforce).
Note, however, that proportional inclusion of the protected group may merely
be evidence that the group writ large has not been excluded. It is at least possible
that a challenged criterion will have no disparate impact on the protected group viewed
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There appears to be no dispute on the Supreme Court that
disproportionate exclusion of a protected race or gender group viewed
as a whole falls within the scope of the impact model. There has,
however, been a continuing dispute on the Court over the applicabil-
ity of the model to exclusion of a subpopulation disproportionately
composed of a protected race or gender group. The Court concluded
that the latter form of exclusion falls outside the scope of the model
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert14 ° and may be viewed as reaching
the same conclusion in New York Transit Authority v. Beazer."' It
came, however, to an arguably contrary conclusion in Connecticut v.
Teal.1 42
writ large in a case in which there is a current disproportion in the enjoyment of
an employment opportunity. On this theory, however, it may be that the employer's
no-beard rule had a disparate impact on the black population viewed writ large. The
plaintiff contended in Greyhound that 1/4 of black males who shave have a sufficiently
severe case of the disease in issue to make the wearing of beards medically advisable.
In short, the fact of current proportion in Greyhound would not obviate the possibility
of long-term disparate impact on the writ large black population, it was merely evidence
of that possibility. See note 166 infra.
140. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
141. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
142. __ U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
Despite Teal, it may be possible to explain the Court's rejection of the perpetua-
tion of past discrimination theory in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
and United Air Lines, Inc., v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) in terms analagous to these
postulated in the text. Prior to Teamsters and Evans, seniority rules could be attacked
on the theory that they operated to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act or pre-filing
period disparate treatment. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.
Va. 1968). Although the perpetuation theory was obviously a device by which other-
wise time-barred disparate treatment could be remedied, it was in form a disparate
impact theory: incumbant employees who were members of protected groups were
adversely and disproportionately affected by the operation of race neutral seniority
rules because they were the victims of the hiring or job assignment discrimination
perpetuated by such neutral rules. Although Teamsters and Evans were decided on
the basis of Sections 703h and 706e, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) and 2000e-5(e) (1976), the
groups benefitting from the perpetuation theories were small subpopulations of pro-
tected race or gender groups-incumbant minority and female employees. A race and
gender neutral seniority system has, absent current hiring or job assignment discrimina-
tion, no long-term disparate impact on the protected group viewed writ large; it mere-
ly has an impact on a subpopulation of incumbant employees composed of the victims
of past hiring or job assignment discrimination. From the perspective of a view of
the impact model which emphasizes redress (the elimination of barriers to opportuni-
ty which give effect to past discrimination), the abrogation of perpetuation theory would
be anathema. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 377-94 (1977) (Marshall,
J. dissenting); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 561-62 (1977) (Marshall,
J. dissenting). From the perspective, however, of a view of the impact model which
conceives of its function as equal achievement for protected groups viewed writ large,
a neutral seniority rule presents no threat to the long-term realization of that objec-
tive. Although the seniority principle places minorities and women at a current com-
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General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
In Gilbert, the Court concluded that exclusion of pregnancy from
a disability program providing sickness and accident benefits did not
have a disproportionate impact on women despite the fact that an
excluded subpopulation- pregnant persons -consisted entirely of
women. 4 3 That conclusion was grounded on the plaintiffs failure to
prove that women as a group received a lesser actuarial return from
the disability program than men as a group.' Gilbert may therefore
be read as limiting the impact model to neutral criteria which ex-
clude women as a group from a proportionate share of employment
benefits. The exclusion of a subpopulation disproportionately composed
of women (in Gilbert, a subpopulation of "pregnant persons" entirely
composed of women) is not within the scope of the model because
the exclusion of that subpopulation did not have the effect of dispropor-
tionately excluding women viewed as a whole.
Analysis of Gilbert is of course complicated by the fact that the
Court rejected both a disparate treatment and disparate impact at-
tack on the employer's exclusion of pregnancy from its disability
program. 4 ' The Court's rejection of the disparate treatment attack
was grounded upon the fiction.4 . that pregnancy is not synonymous
with gender. That rejection is inconsistent with the disparate treat-
ment model earlier advocated here 47 because it was a rejection of
the individual right recognized and prophylactically preserved by that
model. Individuals have rights to freedom from race or gender
motivated decision even where protected race and gender groups are
petitive disadvantage in the competition for scare jobs because these groups are most
likely to be junior in seniority or to be composed of prospective rather than incum-
bant employees, that disadvantage is imposed, as well, by a rule of incumbancy (in-
cumbant employees are preferred over prospective employees for positions as
employees). Cf Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (rejecting "freedom now" and adopting
"rightful place" view of appropriate remedies). The seniority principle produces no
disparate impact on the protected group viewed writ large in the long term absent
current hiring or job assignment discrimination. See note 166 infra.
143. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137-39 (1976).
144. "As there is no proof that the [insurance] package is in fact worth more
to men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect
in this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive
benefits. ... Id. at 138. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144 (1977).
145. 429 U.S. at 133-136.
146. "By definition [the employer's] rule discriminates on account of sex; for
it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from
the male", 429 U.S. at 161-62 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
147. See text and notes 5-48 supra.
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treated equally under an employer rule motivated by race or gender.""
The Court's rejection of the disparate treatment attack and its
disparate impact model analysis in Gilbert are, however, fully consis-
tent with an equal achievement rationale for the impact model: the
demands of the impact model are satisfied where protected groups
viewed as a whole receive, in the long run, proportional results.149
New York Transit Authority v. Beazer
In Beazer the plaintiff's challenge to an employer's rule precluding
employment of drug users was narrowed, by the time the case reached
the Supreme Court, to a challenge to the rule to the extent that it
precluded employment of persons who had been engaged in a
methadone maintenance program for in excess of one year and who
sought employment in positions not involving a risk to public safety."
The evidence of disparate impact upon which the plaintiffs primarily
relied was that 63% of the persons in a relevant geographical area
engaged in a public methadone maintenance program were black or
hispanic."5 ' The Supreme Court concluded that this evidence was an
inadequate demonstration of impact for three reasons: (1) the data
was general population rather than applicant data;. 2 (2) the data did
not include the racial and ethnic composition of persons in private
methadone programs;"3 and (3) the data failed to indicate the racial
and ethnic composition of the group consisting of persons on
methadone maintenance for over one year."
There are a number of difficulties with the Court's analysis. Its
strict insistence on applicant data"' was inconsistent with its pro-
nouncement in Dothard that general population data is sufficient for
a prima facie case." 6 The Court's concern with the racial and ethnic
148. See Los Angeles Dept. Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978);
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
149. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976): "We need
not disturb the findings of the District Court to note that neither is their a finding,
nor was there any evidence which would support a finding, that the financial benefits
of the plan worked to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of
the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program." (quoting
from Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974)).
150. New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1979).
151. Id. at 585.
152. Id. at 585-86 and n.29.
153. Id. at 586.
154. Id. at 585-86.
155. [Tihe District Court noted that about 63% of the persons in New
York City receiving methadone maintenance in public programs-i.e., 63%
of the 65% of all New York City methadone users who are in such
19831
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composition of private methadone maintenance programs displays a
hypertechnicality inconsistent with its related view of the plaintiff's
burden in prior cases. Finally, the Court's insistence on applicant data
was grounded in part on the proposition that methadone users may
have found employment with other employers."' That ground for deci-
sion in effect adopts Justice White's dissenting view of the impor-
tance of self-selection in Dothard." The fact of employment with other
employers suggests nothing about whether a given employer's rule
excluding methadone users constitutes a disproportionate bar to black
or hispanic employment.
There is, however, an explanation of the result in Beazer indepen-
dent of the Court's explanation of that result. The plaintiffs evidence
was that 63% of persons on public methadone programs in a particular
programs-are black or Hispanic. We do not know, however, how many
of these persons ever worked or sought to work for TA. This statistic
therefore reveals little if anything about the racial composition of the
class of TA job applicants and employees receiving methadone treatment.
More particularly, it tells us nothing about the class of otherwise-qualified
applicants and employees who have participated in methadone maintenance
programs for over a year-the only class improperly excluded by TA's
policy under the District Court's analysis. The record demonstrates, in
fact, that the figure is virtually irrelevant because a substantial portion
of the persons included in it are either unqualified for other reasons-
such as the illicit use of drugs and alcohol-or have received successful
assistance in finding jobs with employers other than TA. 440 U.S. at 585-86.
Notice that the Court's concern with undisputed qualifications (persons who have
participated in a program for over one year) appears partially independent of its in-
sistence on applicant data. The Court criticizes the district court's statistic both because
it "tells us nothing about the racial composition of the class of TA job applicants and
employees" and because "it tells us nothing about the class of otherwise-qualified ap-
plicants and employees" (emphasis supplied).
156. The Court explained this conflict as follows:
Although "a statistical showing of disproportionate impact [need not] always
be based on an analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants," Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330, "evidence showing that the figures for
the general population might not accurately reflect the pool of qualified
job applicants" undermines the significance of such figures. Teamsters v.
United States, supra, at 340 n.20.
440 U.S. at 586 n.29. Beazer is effectively criticized on this point in Friedman, The
Burger Court and The Prima Facie Case In Employment Discrimination Litigation:
A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 48-52 (1979).
157. 440 U.S. at 586.
158. See text and notes 118-23 supra. But cf. New York Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 598 (1979) (White, J. dissenting): "In a disparate impact hiring
case such as this, the plaintiff must show that the challenged practice excludes members
of a protected group in numbers disproportionate to their incidence in the pool of
potential employees."
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geographical locale were black or hispanic. There is no indication that
the total number of black and hispanic persons on such a program
constituted a "significant or substantial" percentage of the black and
hispanic populations of that locale." 9 In Griggs6' and in Dothard"'
significant portions of the black and female populations were excluded
by the challenged employer rule. In Beazer, only that portion of the
black and hispanic population engaged in a methadone maintenance
program were excluded. It is, in short, possible to explain the result
in Beazer on the ground that the employer's anti-drug rule had no
disparate impact upon the minority population viewed as a whole.'62
The disparity generated by the rule was disparity within a subpopula-
tion, and that disparity, at least as a matter of reasonable specula-
tion, did not have the effect of thereby excluding significant portions
of the minority population from employment with the defendant.
Connecticut v. Teal
Recall that in Connecticut v. Teal63 the Court concluded that an
employer's use of an employment test, success on which was a prere-
quisite to promotion, was subject to the impact model even where
the minority group disproportionately excluded by the test was never-
theless promoted in proportion to its representation in the pre-test
applicant pool."' If the impact of the employer's promotion test in
159. According to the District Court's opinion in Beazer, "there are approx-
imately 75,000 persons under methadone maintenance treatment in the United States,
of which about 40,000 are in New York City." Beazer v. New York Transit Authority,
339 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd in part, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd,
440 U.S. 568 (1978).
160. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
161. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
162. However, the closest the Court came to such a rationale was in a foot-
note explaining its insistence on data regarding the racial and ethnic composition of
private methadone programs in terms of quantity of disparity:
If all of the participants in private clinics are white, for example, then
only about 40% of all methadone users would be black or Hispanic-
compared to the 36.3% of the total population of New York City that
was black or Hispanic as of the 1970 census. Assuming instead that the
percentage of those minorities in the private programs duplicates their
percentage of the population of New York City, the figures would still
only show that 50% of all methadone users are black or Hispanic com-
pared to 36.3% of the population in the metropolitan area.
440 U.S. at 586 n.30. See also Id. at 584 n.25: "the percentage of blacks and hispanics
in [the employer's] workforce is well over twice that of the percentage in the work
force in the New York Metropolitan area."
163. - U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
164. See text and notes 82-85 supra.
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Teal is viewed as the equivalent of the employer's benefit system in
Gilbert, neither system generated disproportionate race or gender
shares: under both systems, the employer's exclusion of a subpopula-
tion composed primarily or exclusively of a protected race or gender
group did not operate to disproportionately exclude the protected race
or gender group viewed as a whole. Yet the Court concluded that
the right created by the impact model was satisfied in Gilbert and
was not satisfied in Teal.",
One possible basis for reconciling Gilbert and Teal is to argue
that the employment test at issue in Teal did operate to dispropor-
tionately exclude the protected race group viewed as a whole. If the
focus of analysis is confined to the test, there was a substantial
disparate impact on that group. That argument merely raises,
however, a second inconsistency: the Court was willing to test the
benefit system at issue in Gilbert as a whole by refusing to focus on
the impact produced by a single aspect of that system (the pregnancy
exclusion), but the Court declined to treat the promotion system at
issue in Teal as a whole and focused instead on a single aspect of
that system (the employment test).'6"
165. It is arguably possible to distinguish Gilbert and Teal on the theory that
Gilbert involved a benefit scheme and Teal involved a promotional opportunity. See
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 14445 (1977). Upon the assumption, however,
that the impact model applies to compensation and benefit programs, there was "bot-
tom line" equality of results in both cases. In Teal the challenged employment test
had a projected disparate impact on the black population of otherwise qualified poten-
tial applicants viewed writ large if the 4/5 "rule of thumb" relied upon to establish
impact is viewed as a rough measure of statistical significance. See Connecticut v.
Teal, __ U.S. . . 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529 n.4 (1982); text and notes 133-36 supra.
However, the promotion system at issue in Teal allocated promotions in proportion
to the racial composition of the external workforce. In Gilbert the pregnancy exclu-
sion had a projected disparate impact on females viewed writ large because it excluded
from disability coverage a risk of pregnancy incurred only by females while including
medical risks incurred only by males. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 162 n.5 (Stevens, J. dissenting). However, the disability plan at issue in Gilbert
allocated value proportionately because the actuarial value of the plan to men and
women was assumed to be equal. Id. at 138.
166. It may however be possible to reconcile Gilbert and Teal on the theory
that the Court was concerned in Teal with the long-term or projected impact of the
employment test there in issue on the protected group viewed writ large. See Costa
v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1983) (Bownes, J. dissenting). In Gilbert the Court
assumed that the aggregate actuarial value of the risk protection afforded by the
employer's disability plan for women as a group was proportionate in the long run.
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976). In short, the Court's focus
in Gilbert was not on the actual value of benefits currently received by women as
a group but, rather, upon the projected, long-term effect of the plan upon women as
a group. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144 (1977); note 144 supra.
In Teal, the Court relied upon selection rate disparities in applicant data in
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What policy might justify the Court's rationale in Teal? The ma-
jority opinion in Teal argues that the impact model is applicable to
the exclusion of individuals because the model's function is the elimina-
tion of "unnecessary barriers to opportunity.16 7 As previously pointed
out here, however, the required element of disparate race or gender
exclusion precludes the Court's statement that the right to freedom
from barriers is individual: the impact model is not applicable to the
exclusion of any individual absent proof of disparate race or gender
exclusion, and this is the case even where a challenged criterion ex-
cludes merely a subpopulation." 8 It is nevertheless arguable that evils
targeted by the impact model where the protected group viewed as
a whole is excluded are in degree present where a subpopulation
disproportionately composed of a protected group is excluded.
At least where disparities are large, disparate exclusion under
a race and gender neutral criterion of a protected group viewed as
a whole may in a loose sense be viewed as functionally similar169 to
exclusion motivated by race or gender. An express race or gender
finding impact. - U.S. at - , 102 S. Ct. at 2529 n.4. But that reliance, if viewed
from the perspective of statistical significance, may be characterized as focused upon
the probable long-term impact of the use of the test on the protected racial group
viewed writ large. Although the employer's promotion system viewed as a whole pro-
duced no actual disparity in promotion opportunities currently enjoyed by the group
viewed writ large, the most significant criterion used in that system would, over time,
generate such a disparity. On these premises both Gilbert and Teal may be explained
on the ground that the "bottom line" proportion which is relevant is bottom line pro-
portion in the projected effect of an employer rule upon protected groups viewed writ
large; current effect on members of those groups who actually encounter the rule is
immaterial except as evidence of writ large exclusion. Cf Gordon v. Continental Airlines,
Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 612 (9th Cir. 1982) (Farris, J. dissenting) (where challenged criterion
applies only to female employees and excludes only a subset of females as a group,
impact theory is inapplicable; Teal is distinguishable because the test there in issue
had a disparate impact on one of two racial groups).
167. __ U.S. .. 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2534-35 (1982).
168. See text and notes 99-101 supra.
169. Compare Perry, supra note 3, at 551-53 (pretextual use of neutral criterion
as functional disparate treatment at constitutional level of analysis) with Fiss, supra
note 1, at 299 (use of neutral criterion is functional equivalent of use of race where
the criterion is more likely to deny opportunity to blacks than whites and where quality
measured by the criterion is unrelated to productivity). Professor Perry's use of func-
tional equivalence is grounded on an illicit motive theory: the employer utilizes the
challenged criterion for a purpose of excluding a protected group. Professor Fiss re-
jects the motive theory and utilizes functional equivalence to mean the concurrence
of the reasons he identifies for a disparate treatment prohibition: the irrelevance of
race to productivity and the immutability of race. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 301-02.
There is a third possible use of functional equivalence. Professor Brest, arguing at
a constitutional level, postulates that a judicial effort to prohibit a race-neutral rule
which perpetuates past disparate treatment may be sufficiently tied to the "anti-
discriminatory principle" to permit its legitimacy within his illicit motive model of
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criterion renders it certain that the disfavored race or gender group
will be excluded by the criterion from an employment opportunity
and certain that the favored race or gender group will be included
under the criterion. Use of a race and gender neutral criterion hav-
ing a disparate impact on a protected race or gender group viewed
as a whole renders exclusion of the protected race or gender group
more likely than exclusion of the race or gender group favored by
the criterion.
equal protection. See Brest, supra note 11, at 35. And Professor Perry argues that
the latter prohibition is the proper role for disparate impact theory at a constitutional
level: government has an obligation not to exacerbate the effects of its past illicit
conduct. Perry at 557.
Professor Fiss originally explained the functional equivalence notion on the
grounds that a neutral criterion generating a disparate impact is like disparate treat-
ment where (1) the disparity of impact is such that the criterion is more likely to
exclude members of a protected group than, e.g., white males (2) those excluded by
the criterion have no control over the possession of the quality measured by the criterion
and (3) the criterion is unrelated to productivity. Fiss at 299. Likelihood of exclusion
is like the certainty of exclusion under an explicit race or gender criterion. Absence
of personal control is like the immutability of race. And absence of personal control
may be established where past discrimination (e.g., discrimination in education) has
precluded acquisition of the quality measured by a challenged criterion. Id. (It might
also be established where the criterion measures innate characteristics. See Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.
1980)). The absence of a rational link between the quality measured by a criterion
and productivity is like the absence of a relationship between race and productivity.
Fiss, supra note 1, at 299-304.
One commentator has treated the Fiss theory as a disparate treatment theory.
Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 3. There is much in Professor Fiss' argu-
ment to support that treatment, but there are difficulties with functional equivalence
which place it somewhere between a disparate treatment theory and an equal achieve-
ment theory and impose rather substantial risks of the latter.
First, it is not apparent that the "unfairness" of basing employment decisions
on characteristics over which individuals lack control is "like" the unfairness of bas-
ing employment decisions on race or gender. Title VII was designed to preclude the
latter form of unfairness, but there are a number of its provisions, designed to preserve
employer discretion, which clearly tolerate unfairness of the sort contemplated by the
Fiss theory. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-2(h), 2000e-3(j) (1976).
Second, the notion that past discrimination may have generated the unfairness
of lack of personal control more clearly serves as a basis for implying a causal link
between exclusion under a challenged criterion and race or gender than it does to
identify the ethical underpinnings of the disparate treatment prohibition. See Brest,
supra note 11, at 31-34. The difficulty with that link, as Professor Fiss has recognized,
is that it produces rather substantial evidentiary difficulties only ignored by a presump-
tion that present exclusion is the product of past discrimination. See Fiss, supra note
1, at 301-04; Fiss, Second Decade, supra note 8, at 770; Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107, 144-46 (1976).
Third, the unfairness notion in the theory is a notion about unfairness to indi-
viduals: it is unfair that an individual is excluded for reasons over which the individ-
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Absent use of a race and gender neutral criterion as a pretext
for disparate treatment, the correlation between exclusion under the
neutral criterion and race or gender does not necessarily suggest that
race or gender motivated the employer's decision to exclude, but it
may suggest that historical conditions (e.g. discrimination in educa-
tion) themselves correlated with race or gender "caused" exclusion. 70
ual has no control. But the means by which judicial analysis proceeds under the theory
is a focus upon groups: disparate impact is a group measure of the likelihood of exclu-
sion and past discrimination is an explanation of disparate impact on the group. See
Brest, supra note 11, at 32-33. Individual victimization must be presumed from group
status under the analysis, and that presumption moves the theory clearly in the direc-
tion not of disparate treatment prohibition, but of a prohibition of group harm. See
generally Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, supra.
To the extent that an employer may relatively easily justify an employment
practice as reasonably related to some business interest, these difficulties tend to disap-
pear. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 299, 301-02. (challenged criterion shown to be related
to productivity precludes functional equivalence). To that extent, the theory would
seem a rather close approximation of a disparate treatment prohibition. See Comment,
Business Necessity, supra note 3, at 924-25. To the extent, however, that a substantial
burden of justification is imposed, these difficulties arise with a vengeance: the theory
moves in the direction of a prohibition of disparate consequences. See Fiss, supra note
1, at 300; text and notes 253-61 infra. Specifically, to the extent that the business
necessity defense is made difficult to establish and the notion that neutral criteria
perpetrate past discrimination is emphasized, the theory of functional equivalence moves
from an approximated disparate treatment theory to a redress of past harm or equal
achievement theory. And this appears in fact to have occurred in the case law. Com-
pare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (in which the Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, employs an analysis similar to Professor Fiss' func-
tional equivalence argument) with Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)
(in which the Court adopted a strict test of job relatedness in an opinion from which
Chief Justice Burger dissented).
By "functional similarity" as used in the text here, I mean a variation on the
elements of functional equivalence postulated by Professor Fiss. There is functional
similarity if there is a correlation between race and a challenged criterion sufficiently
strong to conclude that a substantially greater proportion of the members of a pro-
tected group will be excluded under the criterion than white males and if there is
some reason to suppose that the challenged criterion measures a quality or attribute
so related to gender or race by reason of historical discrimination or innate
characteristics that the criterion challenged may be fairly characterized as operating
to identify race or gender. I do not therefore rely on the fairness or unfairness of
making attributes over which a person has no or little control a reason for precluding
imperfect exclusion of a protected race or gender group. Nor do I at this point rely
upon the irrelevance of the quality measured by a challenged criterion to productiv-
ity. See text and notes 294-325 infra. Functional similarity therefore leaves open the
question of the reason for the disparate impact prohibition. The legal rationale for
precluding imperfect exclusion may be approximated disparate treatment, may be
redress or may be equal achievement.
170. By correlation, I mean degree or quality of relationship between
variables-here between exclusion under a criterion and race or gender. In the case
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Indeed, the Supreme Court's opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
the case in which the Court first adopted the impact model, relies
on the notion that some race-neutral criteria give present effect to
past societal discrimination."1 Exclusion under a neutral rule or
criterion may be viewed, then, as functionally similar to illicitly
motivated exclusion because (1) the greater likelihood of protected
group exclusion than white male exclusion under a neutral rule may
approximate the high rate of protected group exclusion under a race
or gender criterion and (2) the quality or credential measured by the
neutral criterion may for historical reasons or for reasons of innate
characteristics' be so related to race or gender that the criterion
may be characterized as identifying race or gender."3
of an express race or gender criterion, the correlation between exclusion and race
or gender is perfect. In the case of a race or gender neutral criterion, the correlation
between exclusion and race or gender is imperfect. Correlation is not, however, causa-
tion. See Brilmayer, Laycock & Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group Average as Non-
discrimination: A Rejoinder To Professor Benston, 50 U. CH. L. REV. 222, 224-35 (1983).
171. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). But see Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (applying impact theory to physical requirements which
cannot be said to have measured qualities related to past discrimination). It is possi-
ble to reconcile these cases on the theory that both deficiencies in qualifications at-
tributed to past discrimination and physical requirements, like the immutable
characteristic of race, are matters over which the person measured by a criterion has
no control. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 299. It is however not clear why the question
of personal control over qualifications may be said to be the subject matter regulated
by Title VII.
172. Although innate or biological conditions correlated with protected group
status are more likely in the gender context, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977), they are occasionally possible in the racial context. See EEOC v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
173. Teal is also explicable, however, in terms of a disparate treatment theory.
If one assumes that a function of the disparate impact model is approximation of a
disparate treatment prohibition, one may explain the judicial distaste for employment
tests on the theory that such tests reflect cultural biases and are therefore possibly
used to identify the objects of those biases. To put the argument in extreme form:
if one assumes that employment tests are suspect on disparate treatment principles
because they reflect white assumptions about concepts of merit, black persons who
are successful under an employment test are rendered "most white" and black per-
sons who are unsuccessful are rendered "most black" (in the sense that failure under
the test may confirm both the cultural assumptions of the test and the racial assump-
tions of the test giver). It is at least possible, then, that Teal is explicable on a "race
plus" disparate treatment theory: the mere fact that blacks were promoted in propor-
tion to their representation in the external population does not preclude the possibil-
ity that exclusion of a subpopulation disproportionately composed of blacks was illic-
itly motivated.
This characterization relies, however, on an assumption of test bias. If that
assumption is inaccurate, the original reason for racial disparities in test performance
postulated in Griggs- discrimination in education-would require the redress rationale
[Vol. 18
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Functional similarity is arguably not present where a criterion
includes the protected group viewed as a whole and excludes a quan-
titatively small subpopulation disproportionately composed of the pro-
tected group. Although the correlation between exclusion under a
challenged criterion and race or gender in the subpopulation exclu-
sion may be high, and although a greater probability of protected
group than white male exclusion is established by substantial
disparities in the composition of the subpopulation, the historical, social
or biological conditions which explain the relationship between race
or gender and exclusion are themselves correlated with only a relative-
ly small portion of the protected race or gender group. Moreover,
to the extent that the impact model is justified as a remedy for past
historical discrimination-as in effect shifting the burden of that
discrimination from the protected group to the employer -it is at least
less clear in the subpopulation exclusion case than in the group view-
ed whole exclusion case that it is the burden of past discrimination
which has been shifted. The absence of a disparate impact on the pro-
tected group viewed as a whole is at least evidence that the subpopula-
tion excluded by a challenged criterion lacks the characteristics
demanded by the criterion for historical reasons independent of at
least overt discrimination.
It may, however, be argued on remedial premises that the most
severe harm inflicted by historical discrimination befalls subpopula-
tions: subgroups within the protected race or gender group bear the
brunt of the effects of historical discrimination and are therefore the
most deserving beneficiaries of a burden shifting remedy. It is this
line of argument which appears to be the most persuasive explana-
tion of the majority opinion in Teal. On the assumptions that defi-
ciencies in test performance are attributable to educational depriva-
tions and that educational deprivations are highly correlated with race,
a bottom line defense of the character proposed in Teal would permit
exclusion of precisely those segments of a protected race or gender
group most likely to be noncompetitive in the labor market due to
the effects of historical discrimination in education. And the defense
would result in the inclusion of those members of the protected group
least affected by those historical conditions.
argued in the text as an explanation of judicial hostility to testing. See COMMITTEE
ON ABILITY TESTING, ASSEMBLY OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ABILITY TESTING: USES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROVERSIES, PART I: REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE 136-49 (A. Wigdor & W. Garner eds. 1982); Lerner, supra note 3, at 41-45. But
see generally Haney, Employment Tests and Employment Discrimination: A Dissenting
Psychological Opinion, 5 IND. REL. L.J. 1 (1982).
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To the extent that reliance is placed on historical discrimination,
this explanation of the right to freedom from barriers to opportunity
invokes a compensatory rationale for the function of the impact model.
That is, there is a group right to freedom from disparate exclusion
not because there is a group right to equal achievement, but because
there is a group right to partial redress-redress at least in the sense
of a right to freedom from the effects of past wrongs. 4 It is impor-
tant to recognize, however, that such a redress rationale relies upon
rather broad definitions of both discrimination and victimization. In
effect, a redress rationale utilizes membership in a subpopulation (e.g.
a subpopulation of persons with low scores on the test at issue in
Teal or a subpopulation composed of persons addicted to drugs in
Beazer) as a proxy for identifying victims of discrimination on the
premise that past societal discrimination "caused" membership in the
subpopulation. Such an assumption is of course overbroad: causes
distinct from past discrimination presumably also contributed to
membership in the subpopulation; it is otherwise difficult to explain
white male membership in the subpopulation.'"5
174. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy test for
voting registration may not be used where segregated education system had provided
inferior education for blacks as test would perpetuate past discrimination) The theory
that the present effects of past discrimination should be remedied under the impact
model and that such an application is at least connected to the principle of antidiscrimina-
tion underlying motive inquiry for equal protection purposes is explored in Brest, supra
note 11, at 31-53. See also Perry, supra note 3, at 557-60.
175. Despite the overbreadth of the assumption, the form of subpopulation ex-
clusion evident in Teal may be characterized as similar to "sex plus" discrimination.
In the "sex plus" cases, the employer bases an action on the concurrence both of gender
and some gender neutral reason for the action; a subgroup composed exclusively of,
e.g., women is therefore treated differently than both men and most women. The ra-
tionale for applying the disparate treatment model to "sex plus" discrimination is that
it is not possible to assume that "sex plus" classifications are not infected with the
evils at which the disparate treatment prohibition is targeted. See text and notes 38-48
supra.
Teal did not involve an express racial classification even in the form of a "race
plus" classification expressly excluding only a subgroup of a racial group. It therefore
did not appear to involve the evils which the disparate treatment model is targeted.
However, the employment system at issue in Teal included within a promotion oppor-
tunity a protected group viewed writ large by hiring or promoting those members
of the group who possessed qualifications approximating the qualifications dispropor-
tionately possessed by whites and excluded a subpopulation disproportionately com-
posed of those members of the protected racial group most likely to have suffered
from the deficiencies in educational opportunity reflected in poor test performance.
Upon the assumption that the impact model's function is a form of limited redress,
the fact that the group viewed writ large enjoyed a proportional share of promotions
under the promotional system at issue in Teal did not satisfy that redress function.
On a redress rationale, it is not possible to assume that the perpetuation of past
discrimination evil targeted by the impact model is obviated by equality of results.
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C. Measures of Impact: The Jursidictions of the Disparate Treatment
and Disparate Impact Models
(1) Alternative Uses of Selection and Representation Rates
Although disparate impact has most often been established by
comparing white male with minority or female pass or fail (selection)
rates under a challenged neutral rule or practice,"' it has also been
established or corroborated by comparing minority or female represen-
tation rates in a pre-criterion population or pool of applicants with
minority or female representation rates in a workforce or post-criterion
pool of applicants.'
The "disparate impact" measured by a disparity in selection rates
or rejection rates under a challenged criterion is the comparative im-
176. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, __ U.S. - , -, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529
n.4 (1982) (applicant data); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971) (general
population data); 29 CFR S 1607.4 (1981) (Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures) (applicant data).
By selection or rejection rates I mean a comparative measure of selection or
rejection under a challenged criterion of a protected group on the one hand and whites
or males on the other. Such a measure relies either upon population data or upon
applicant data and may take the form of a comparison of protected group and white
male representation rates in some external population. If, for example, the employer
utilizes a high school diploma requirement and it is known that 34% of white males
in a relevant geographical area and 12% of black males in that area have completed
high school, white males have a (projected) 34% success rate and black males have
a (projected) 12% success rate. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6
(1971). See also Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981)
(female representation rate in subpopulation of persons qualified under challenged
criterion). If it is known only that 48 black applicants and 259 white applicants took
a challenged employment test and that 26 blacks and 206 whites passed the test, the
black success rate was 54% and the white success rate was 80%. See Connecticut
v. Teal, - U.S. - , - n.4, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529 n.4 (1982).
In a case involving exclusion of a subpopulation, rejection or selection rates
are apt to be misleading. If, for example, some challenged criterion excludes a sub-
population the composition of which is 30/o white and 700/0 black, it cannot be said
that the black rejection rate is 70%/b; rather, the black representation rate in the ex-
cluded subpopulation is 70%/. See note 177 infra.
177. See, e.g., Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1982); Fisher
v. Proctor Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1115
(1981); Green v. Missouri-Pac. Rd. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
By representation rates, I mean the percentage of some population which is
minority or female. A comparison of a protected group representation rate in an ex-
cluded subpopulation with the protected group representation rate in the general popula-
tion or external workforce is not the comparison discussed in the text. See New York
Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 586 n.30 (1978); note 137 supra. Rather,
the concern here is with a comparison of a protected group's representation rate in
an employer's workforce or some subset of that workforce with the group's represen-
tation rate in the general population or external workforce.
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pact of the challenged criterion on white males and the protected race
or gender group in issue. A comparison of a minority representation
rate in an external population or an applicant pool with a minority
representation rate in a workforce or in a post-selection pool measures,
however, a distinct disparity: the disparity between the race or gender
composition of a pre-selection population with the race or gender com-
position of a post-selection (or post-criterion) population. That dispar-
ity says nothing about disparity of success under a challenged
employer criterion except by means of corroborative inference.'78 The
use of such a comparison under an impact model suggests a function
for the model quite distinct from determining the impact of a
challenged criterion. To the extent that the function of the impact
model is to ensure proportionate minority representation in a
workforce (to penalize results inconsistent with an equal achievement
objective) the most direct means of accomplishing that purpose is to
impose liability (at least prima facie) for disproportionate representa-
tion. It is therefore possible to view evidence of disparity in represen-
tation rates purportedly used by a court as a process construct for
analyzing an issue of disparate exclusion under a challenged criterion
as in fact a surreptitious use of representation rates to impose liabil-
ity for an employer's failure to satisfy an equal achievement mandate.'"
The difficulty with the use of representation rates for the pur-
pose of achieving the latter objective is that it would directly con-
travene Section 703(j) of Title VII-a provision precluding liability
for a disparity between a protected group's representation in the
general population and its representation in a workforce.M Judicial
178. See 3 LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION S 74.41 (1982).
179. See, e.g., Id.; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 426. Cf Blumrosen, Bottom Line
Concept, supra note 75, at 6, 18 (bottom line balance in representation rates as a "car-
rot" and Griggs as a "stick" in influencing employer behavior). But see Lerner, supra
note 3, at 28; Shoben, Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 9, at 37-44.
180. 29 USC S 2000 -2(j) (1976)
(j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any
employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or
classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any
apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or na-
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use of selection rates under the impact model circumvents Section
703(j) on the theory that selection rates measure only the disparate
effects of a challenged criterion on protected race or gender groups."'
Liability is therefore imposed for reasons of disparate impact on ap-
plicants or potential applicants for employment, not for the dispropor-
tion which will result from that disparate impact. It is of course ap-
parent that the practical effect of the elimination of a criterion
generating a disparate impact will be proportionate inclusion, but the
theory of liability nevertheless remains arguably distinct from a theory
predicating liability merely on disproportion. And the Court's rejec-
tion in Connecticut v. Teal of representation rate comparisons as an
appropriate measure of disparity for purposes of the impact model
confirms that distinction.'"
However, the primary use made of a comparison of minority
representation rates by the Supreme Court has been in the context
of the disparate treatment model. A large disparity between the
minority representation rate in a population with undisputed qualifica-
tions and the minority representation rate in a workforce generates
an inference of employer selection motivated by minority status." The
use of representation rates under the disparate treatment model
therefore circumvents Section 703(j) on the theory that evidence of
representation rate disparities generates an inference of illicit
motive."'
Some commentators have treated that reliance as an evolutionary
tional origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the
available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
Professor Shoben argues that representation rate comparisons are merely used
to create an inference of discriminatory exclusion and do not therefore contravene
Section 703(j). Shoben, Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 9, at 39. If what is meant
is an inference of illicit motive, Professor Shoben's conclusion is at least arguably viable.
If what is meant is instead that an inference of "unfairness" is generated by disparity
in representation rates, Section 703(j) would seem to have been designed to preclude
judicial reliance on such an inference. The point of the statute was to preclude liabil-
ity for "unfairness" where "unfairness" is defined as an employer's failure to achieve
equal or proportionate race or gender shares.
181. See note 180 supra.
By disparate effect on the protected group, I mean disparate exclusion of the
protected group viewed as a whole. This is the case both where general population
data establishes that effect and where applicant data is used to infer that effect. See
note 176 supra.
182. See Connecticut v. Teal, - U.S .... 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2532-33 (1982).
183. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
184. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
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development within the impact model: the employment systems
themselves may be viewed as having had a disparate impact."5 To
the extent that such an impact may not be rebutted by a showing
of reasons for the impact independent of race or gender-that is, to
the extent that a business necessity rather than an "articulation" of
credible legitimate reasons is required of an employer-such a treat-
ment would seem accurate. But the Court itself has treated such cases
as conceptually distinct from the impact model.18 The Court's objec-
tive has, at least as a matter of its rhetoric, been the discovery of
illicit motive rather than the prohibition of disproportionate conse-
quences. And to the extent that the lower federal courts in good faith
adhere to disparate treatment as the conceptual model under which
systematic impact evidence is evaluated, they may be properly
characterized as attempting to approximate in the litigation process
the disparate treatment model.'87 To that extent they may also be
viewed as precluding the application of a disparate impact model to
systematic impact. The employment system as a whole is arguably
not a criterion subject to attack under the impact model. 88
The implication of this recitation for the function of the impact
model are two. First, if the Court's systematic disparate treatment cases
are in fact impact model cases, it may be inferred that the function
of the impact model is to penalize employer failures to attain an equal
achievement objective. Where a disparity between the minority
representation rate in a workforce and minority representation rate
185. See, e.g., Furnish, supra note 80, at 442-44; Lerner, supra note 3, at 30-39;
Shoben, Disparate Impact Analysis supra note 9, at 9-36.
186. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
187. See text and notes 49-73 supra. There is nevertheless a substantial risk
that a court's manipulation of the burden of production in a systematic disparate treat-
ment case will render the theory employed in such a case closer to the impact model
than the the treatment model. See Gay v. Waiters and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 489
F. Supp. 282, 307, 313 n.41 (N.D. Cal. 1980) affid 694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1983).
188. See Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982) (impact
theory not applicable to system as a whole) Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d
531, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1982) (where elements of a selection process may be isolated,
employer is not required to validate entire process as a whole); C. SULLIVAN M. ZIM-
MER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 17, at 32. Compare Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d
609 (8th Cir. 1981) (impact theory not applicable to subjective criteria) Taylor v. Teletype
Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1132 n.6 (8th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 515 (1982)
with, e.g., Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1982) (impact theory applied
to subjective criteria), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 161 (1983); Williams v. Colorado Springs
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 641 f.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); Kinsey v. First Regional Securities,
Inc., 557 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir 1977) (same); Steward v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d
445 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) (same).
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in an external population is prima facie illicit and where it is made
difficult or impossible for an employer to rebut that prima facie
assumption, the objective is presumably forced proportion in the
workforce. Second, if, however, the Court's invocation of the disparate
treatment model as an explanation of its reliance on representation rates
is taken at face value, it may be inferred that the impact model is
not concerned with disproportionate representation of minorities or
women in a workforce because it is on that assumption made inap-
plicable to systematic impact. If the latter is the case, the function
of the impact model is not equal achievement per se. It is, rather,
the elimination of barriers to employment of a limited (albeit inade-
quately identified)89 character- perhaps barriers of a character satis-
fying what was earlier suggested here as the redress function explana-
tion of the majority opinion in Teal.9' The difficulty with this last
explanation of the impact model is of course the difficulty with Teal
itself. So long as the character of the barriers subject to the impact
model remains undefined and unlimited, the distinction between an
anti-barrier conception of the model and an equal achievement con-
ception of the model is illusory.19'
(2) The Disparate Impact - Disparate Treatment Interface
There is a further reason for suggesting that the distinction be-
tween the anti-barrier and equal achievement conceptions of the func-
189. The Court, or perhaps more accurately, Justice Rehnquist writing for the
Court, has attempted on two occasions to identify the "barriers" subject to the impact
model. See Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters 438 U.S. 567, 575 n.7 (1978) (tests and par-
ticularized requirements are subject to the model); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 434
U.S. 136 144-45 (1977) (compensation and benefits not subject to the model). The dif-
ficulties are that it is less than clear that a majority of the Court would accept Justice
Rehnquist's views and it is not apparent that there is any consistent theme to these
efforts. To the extent that only "objective" criteria are subject to the model, subjec-
tive decision making processes are nevertheless subject to attack on a systematic
disparate treatment theory. See Teamsters v. United States 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
The dilemma presented by the problem of subjective hiring or promotion is that
objective criteria (such as tests or experience requirements) arguably eliminate the
possibility of bias inherent in subjective decision making. See Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J. concurring). Objective criteria often
produce, however, disparate impact. If, as Justice Rehnquist suggested in Furnco, only
"objective" criteria are subject to the impact model, some rationale other than the
mere desire to limit the scope of the impact model is required. If, however, the im-
pact model is applicable to subjective criteria, it may be for reasons distinct from
the reasons which may be assigned for the application of the model to objective criteria.
See text and notes 294-325 infra.
190. See text and notes 163-74 supra.
191. See text and notes 101-74 supro
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tion of the impact model postulated in Teal is illusory. The primary
defense to a systematic disparate treatment allegation resting on
disparities in representation rates is proof that a race or gender
neutral criterion used by the employer explains those disparities.'92
Such a "defense" simultaneously rebuts the inference of illicit motive
arising from consequences and establishes a prima facie case of im-
pact model liability.193 To the extent that the scope of the impact model
remains undefined, this relationship between impact and treatment
theories clearly suggests that litigation averse employers have but
one recourse: proportional hiring and promotion from applicant pools. 194
Elimination of objective and impersonal barriers of the character
at issue in Teal results, in effect, in adoption of subjective and in-
dividual employer decision-making processes as substitutes for the ob-
jective barrier.'95 Such a result is consistent with at least one strong
and recurring theme in the impact model: a preference for employer
decision on the basis of individual characteristics and a distaste for
group measures of desired characteristics even where those measures
are race and gender neutral.' In the words of the Court in G'riggs,
the model requires that the employer "measure the person for the
job and not the person in the abstract . .."'9' The risk attacked by
such a legal assault upon group measures of desired characteristics
is presumably the risk of over- and underinclusiveness: individuals
are not measured by individual characteristics relevant to their per-
formance as individuals, but by proxy characteristics shared with a
group and imperfectly relevant to individual performance. A policy
192. See generally, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1979).
193. See SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS supra note 17, at 32. Cf. Rowe v.
Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982) (analyzing subjective criteria under
both disparate impact and disparate treatment theories); Williams v. Colorado Springs
Sch. Dist. No. 11 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,
718 n.7 (7th Cir. 1969) (invalidating practice on disparate treatment grounds and
postulating an impact analysis of possible substitutes for the practice).
194. See Connecticut v. Teal, __ U.S . . 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2539-40 (1982)
(Powell, J. dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, .422 US. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun,
J. concurring) (objective criteria may be desirable as means of avoiding risks of disparate
treatment inherent in subjective judgment) with Dothard, v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
332 (1977) (objective barriers which measure applicants "in the abstract" are not job
related). Cf. Cleveland Bd. Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (governmental employer's
rule requiring pregnancy leave creates an "irrebutable presumption" violative of due
process). But see New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 n.38 (1979)
(rejecting irrebutable presumption attack on narcotics rule).
197. 401 U.S. at 436.
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disfavoring over- and underinclusive measurement operates to force
employers to abandon impersonal decision making, and by so doing,
to force adoption of the sort of personal and subjective decision mak-
ing processes susceptible to disparate treatment attack.'8 And to the
extent that strong inferences of illicit motive are derived from the
disproportionate consequences of such a decision making process, the
effect of Teal is to require what the dissent in Teal suggested:
employer decision making designed to produce proportion.199
D. Business Necessity: Essentiality or Reasonableness?
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' 0 the Court employed three phrases
in describing the employer's defense to disparate impact: "business
necessity","' a "manifest relationship" between the criterion generating
impact and a business need, and the "job relatedness" of the criterion
imposed. °0 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody °4 repeated this language in
the context of a challenged intelligence test as the criterion generating
impact, and applied the strict and quasi-"scientific" requirements of
the industrial psychologists as the standard under which the defense
was to be met.0 0 In Dothard v. Rawlinson,0 6 the Court emphasized
necessity and rejected the defense where the criterion, although a
198. If the impact model applies to subjective hiring criteria, an attack on an
impact theory is also possible. See note 188 supra. Some courts appear to apply a
disparate impact analysis to subjective criteria within the framework of what pur-
ports to be a disparate treatment case. See Valentino v. U.S. Postal Service, 674 F.2d
56, 71 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Potentially tainted independent variable subject to subjec-
tive bias may not be included in multiple regression analysis); James v. Stockham
Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978)
(independent variables generating disparate impact may not be included in multiple
regression study where not shown to be job related). See generally Cox, Equal Work,
Comparable Worth and Disparate Treatment: An Argument for Narrowly Construing
County of Washington v. Gunther, 22 DuQ. L. REv. 65 (1983).
199. - U.S. - . 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2540 (Powell, J. dissenting).
200. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
201. Id. at 431.
202. Id. at 432.
203. Id. at 431.
204. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
205. Id. at 425. The Court's decision in Albemarle was based on the 1970 ver-
sion of the EEOC's selection procedure guidelines. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970). The
1978 guidelines, 29 CFR S 1607 (1980), are in some respects less stringent than the
1970 guidelines, but remain so strict as to make compliance difficult and perhaps in
some instances impossible. See Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 630 F.2d
79, 89-91 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981). See generally Booth & Mackey,
Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29 EMORY
L.J. 121 (1980); Lerner, supra note 3; Rothschild & Werden, supra note 80.
206. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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rough proxy for the quality the employer could legitimately seek in
employees, was an over- and underinclusive predictor of that quality
and where alternative measures of the quality with less impact were
available."7
There was in these cases, then, a clear indication that the defense
would be difficult to establish. Both Griggs and Albemarle relied
heavily upon the EEOC guidelines on employee selection
procedures-guidelines which imposed a burden of justification widely
believed to be impossible, as a practical matter, to satisfy."8 Here,
too, however, the Court has not been consistent. In Washington v.
Davis..9 the Court, applying Title VII standards to a statutory claim
not brought under Title VII, declined to follow the EEOC's guidelines
and applied a "usefulness" test;21° business "necessity" was apparently
a matter of whether the criterion in issue had a reasonable relation-
ship to the job in issue. And in New York Transit Authority v.
Beazer,"' the Court interpreted Grigg's reference to "manifest rela-
tionship" to mean that a criterion which "significantly serves" an
employer's legitimate interests satisfies the defense even where the
criterion was conceded to be an overinclusive proxy for those
interests212-an apparent contradiction of the Court's methodology in
Dothard.
207. Id. at 331-32:
[A]ppellants produced no evidence correlating the height and weight re-
quirements with the requisite amount of strength thought essential to
good job performance. Indeed, they failed to offer evidence of any kind
of specific justification of the statutory standards. If the job-related, quality
that the appellants identify is bona fide, their purpose could be achieved
by adopting and validating a test ... that measures strength directly.
208. See note 205 supra.
209. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
210. Id. at 250-51:
The advisability of the police recruit training course informing the recruit
about his upcoming job, acquainting him with its demands, and attempt-
ing to impart a modicum of required skills seems conceded. It is also ap-
parent to us, as it was to the District Judge, that some minimum verbal
and communicative skill would be very useful, if not essential, to satisfac-
tory progress in the training regimen.
But see Nat'l Edue. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026, 1027-28 (White, J. dissenting).
211. 440 U.S. 568 (1978).
212. Id. at 587 n.31:
Respondents recognize, and the findings of the District Court establish,
that TA's legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency require
the exclusion of all users of illegal narcotics, barbiturates, and am-
phetamines, and of a majority of all methadone users. The District Court
also held that those goals require the exclusion of all methadone users
from the 25% of its positions that are "safety sensitive." Finally, the
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1983], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss1/2
1983] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
The lower courts have not been immune to similar inconsisten-
cies. Race and sex neutral criteria are sometimes tested under a
reasonableness standard,"3 sometimes tested under a strict (if not im-
possible) standard of essentiality,2"4 sometimes tested (whether or not
they are employment tests) under the validation standards of the
EEOC guidelines,"' and sometimes tested under a standard which re-
jects the absolute authority of those guidelines.1 ' Some commentators
have detected trends in these cases. It is said that an employment
test may be subjected to a higher burden of justification than other
criteria,1 7 that criteria imposed for technical, managerial and profes-
sional positions are subject to a lower burden of justification than
criteria imposed for blue collar positions,"8 and that criteria for jobs
which entail responsibilities affecting important competing social values
District Court noted that those goals are significantly served by-even
if they do not require-TA's rule as it applies to all methadone users
including those who are seeking employment in non-safety-sensitive posi-
tions. ... The record thus demonstrates that TA's rule bears a "manifest
relationship to the employment in question."
213. See, e.g., Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc. 475 F.2d 216 (10th
Cir. 1972). Cf. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981) (insisting
on job relatedness as established by professional standards of validation, but reject-
ing an additional "necessity" requirement), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1719 (1982).
214. See, e.g., Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 563 F.2d 216, 232 (5th
Cir.) (Wisdom, J. dissenting), rev'd, sub. nom., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 928 (1980); Green v. Missouri Pacific Rd., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson
v. Lorrillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
215. See, e.g., Parson v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Co., 575 F.2d 1374, 1388-89 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v.
City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 511-12 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Watkins
v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1181-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976);
Kaplan v. Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1975).
216. See Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
217. See Lerner, supra note 3, at 37. It is possible to view the question of
"job relatedness" as the standard applicable to the Section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(h)
"testing defense" to impact model liability and the "necessity" question the standard
applicable to the general defense to impact model liability. But see American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson __ U.S. - - 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1548 (1982) (Stevens, J. dissent-
ing). The fundamental notion underlying the job relatedness test-relevance- is,
however, the notion underlying statements of the defense in cases not involving
challenges to tests. See, e.g., Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th
Cir. 1973).
218. Bartholet, supra note 3.
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or policies (most particularly public safety) are subjected to a limited
burden of justification."9 Each of these explanations has merit; none
provides a satisfactory explanation of the function of the business
necessity defense.
Judicial confusion regarding the business necessity defense is
arguably traceable to two underlying difficulties: a failure to clarify
the standard under which necessity is to be measured and a failure
to clarify which of a number of alternative functions the defense is
to serve. The failure to clarify the legal standard and the failure to
clarify function are, moreover, potentially related.
(1) Employer Interests Underlying the Use of Neutral Criteria
Employers may adopt a race and gender neutral employment
criterion for one or both of two reasons. The criterion may be used
to identify skills, knowledge, abilities or other traits thought necessary
or useful to job performance in a particular job or the criterion may
be used as a device to limit costs-including both the costs of poor
job performance and the costs imposed by individual assessments of
projected job performance.' These reasons are obviously not mutually
exclusive motivations for the adoption of a criterion, but the reasons
will be treated for present purposes as distinct. The employer interest
underlying the use of a criterion for a purpose of identifying skills,
abilities or knowledge is an interest in ensuring, through accurate
prediction, satisfactory job performance. That interest is of course
also an interest in avoiding the costs of poor job performance, but
is here distinguished from those costs. The employer's interest in the
use of a criterion known to be an imperfect predictor of performance
is also cost avoidance: the device eliminates the costs imposed by more
individualized and direct assessments of prospective job performance.'
An example may illustrate this distinction. Assume a case in
which an employer conducts a training program for a job. The train-
ing program itself both serves to provide the prospective employee
219. See SULLIVAN ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 17, at 57.
220. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 1, at 301; Maltz, The Expansion of the Role of
the Effects Test in Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Analysis 59 NEB. L. REV. 345,
353-55 (1980) Rothschild & Werden, supra note 80, at 271-72; Comment, Business Necess-
ity, supra note 3, at 918-20.
221. Cf. Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (experience re-
quirement invalidated where employer had alternative of developing and validating
a practical performance examination-a selection device the cost of which would
presumably exceed the use of years of experience as a proxy for projected perfor-
mance), afJ'd, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976).
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with skills and knowledge necessary for satisfactory job performance
and to provide the employer with relatively direct measures of pro-
spective job performance. Success or failure in training is a relatively
direct means of predicting success or failure on the job if the train-
ing entails the acquisition and use of skills and knowledge used in
the job. The training program therefore serves the employer's interest
in job performance, its interest in predicting job performance, and
its interest in avoiding the costs imposed by poor performance. The
training program generates, however, its own costs.
Assume instead that the employer abandons its training programs
and substitutes a college degree requirement both to predict adequate
performance on the job and as a proxy for the skills and knowledge
necessary for satisfactory job performance. The employer's interest
in prediction and performance is satisfied to the extent that a college
degree is an accurate predictor and proxy and the employer has
avoided the costs of poor performance to the same extent. The
employer has, moreover, eliminated the presumably greater costs of
training. Whether the change from a training program to a college
degree requirement results in a net gain is dependent upon whether
the potentially greater poor performance costs generated by use of
the college degree (an arguably poorer predictor and proxy) and the
potentially greater wage costs potentially associated with a college
degree outweigh the training costs avoided by the college degree
requirement.
An employer criterion used to predict job performance will in-
evitably be both an over- and underinclusive predictor of the skill
or ability predicted: the criterion is a proxy for the desired trait rather
than a measure of the trait itself. And the over- and underinclusive
character of a criterion used to predict job performance is inevitable
whatever the character of the criterion. Even a relatively direct
measure of projected job performance (a typing test given prospec-
tive typists or a probationary employment period in which a new
employee is evaluated on the job) is over- and underinclusive with
respect to future job performance, for some prospective employees
who fail to satisfy such a criterion would develop necessary skills and
abilities and some who satisfy the criterion will be poor performers.
It is presumably the case, however, that the more indirect the measure
of projected job performance, the greater the risk of over- and
underinclusive prediction. And this risk would seem to be greater
where the criterion used is both objective and absolute.222
222. Cf. Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters 438 U.S. 567, 575 n.7 (1978) (impact theory
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Although objective and absolute criteria present the greatest
risks of over- and underinclusive error in the prediction of individual
job performance, they serve the employer's interest in cost avoidance:
the employer, by utilizing such criteria, need not incur the costs of
individual assessment. Over- and underinclusive error generates, of
course, its own costs, for the employer will incur the cost of poor
performance by some individuals who satisfied the criterion and will
incur the cost of lost good performance by some persons who failed
to satisfy the criterion. In making the decision to utilize such criteria,
the employer presumably weighs the costs of individual assessment
against the costs of imperfect prediction in light of the peculiar cir-
cumstances which confront him.22 So long, however, as the criterion
used has some tendency to accurately predict good job performance
on average and for the group of candidates for an employment oppor-
tunity, the costs of more direct and more individual assessment may
well exceed the costs imposed by prediction errors in individual cases.
(2) Distinct Aspects of the Business Necessity Defense: Relevance
and Necessity
When the employer must by reason of the disparate impact
generated by its use of a race and gender neutral criterion, justify
that use, it may be required to demonstrate either that the criterion
is justified by the employer's interest in predicting performance or
is justified by the employer's interest in cost avoidance.2 The most
applies to tests and "particularized requirements").
By "objective", I mean a criterion which may be applied to identify traits, talents
or characteristics without the intrusion of the employer's discretion. The risk of under-
or overinclusiveness is substantial in the use of such a criterion because it often re-
quires some degree of generalization about the relationship between performance on
the criterion and job performance.
By absolute criterion I mean that unsatisfactory performance under the criterion
precludes further consideration. A criterion of "relative advantage or disadvantage",
by contrast, is but one of a number of criteria under which assessments are made.
See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 57, at 182-84.
The risk run by subjective and relative criteria is, of course, the intrusion of
bias. To the extent that the impact model has been applied to such criteria, the ra-
tionale has often been the elimination of that risk. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Rowe
v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
223. See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1115 (D.S.C. 1977),
affd, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). It is of course also possible that the employer makes no
such rational decision; the employer may operate instead from inertia. See Rothschild
& Werden, supra note 80, at 271-72.
224. See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1115-15 (D.S.C.
1977), affd, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). In Los Angeles Dept. Water & Power v. Manhart,
[Vol. 18
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common statements of the business necessity defense suggest that
only the former interest is of concern.22 In fact, however, the courts
appear to have assessed both interests.2
26
The Supreme Court has used two phrases to describe the
employer's burden once disparate impact has been established: the
employer must establish "business necessity"' or "job relatedness.""5
The job relatedness notion, at least in its pristine form, requires that
the skill, ability or trait measured or predicted by a challenged
criterion (most particularly a challenged employment test) be in fact
relevant to job performance. 2 9  Traits perceived as generally
meritorious, e.g. intelligence, generally fail to satisfy the test of
relevance because it is difficult to demonstrate that satisfactory per-
formance in the specific job in questions is related to such traits.2 '
Confusion is introduced when it is asserted that the skill, ability
or trait the employer seeks is not "necessary" to the job in issue.
Such an assertion may mean that the relevance of the skill, ability
435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978) the Court appears to have rejected a "cost defense." Manhart
was, however, a disparate treatment case. If "necessity" is a requirement in addition
to "job relatedness", see note 226 infra, cost, even if analyzed in general terms and
without reference to actual dollar cost, is precisely what is assessed in impact model
cases. See EEOC Dec. No. 72-0708, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 437, 438 (1971) (balance
of cost of alternative practices against degree of impact).
225. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal __ U.S. -_. 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2531
(1982) (manifest relationship test); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975) (same); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (same).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d
Cir. 1971) (practice must both directly foster safety and efficiency and be essential
to such goals); Robinson v. Lorrillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (business pur-
pose must outweigh racial impact and there must be no acceptable alternative), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). In New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 587 n.31 (1979) the court upheld an over- and underinclusive employer rule on
the ground that it "significantly served" the employer's interests in safety and effi-
ciency. The Court's language in part adopts a reasonable relevance test, but the relaxed
standard imposed by the language also implicitly adopts a reasonable necessity test:
the employer rule served as a reasonable proxy for identifying employees or potential
employees presenting threats to its interests even if an imperfect proxy.
The tests in these cases are distinct, but the focus in each is upon more than
the relationship between a criterion and business purpose. See Contreras v. City of
Los Angeles, 565 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981) (distinguishing job relatedness from necessity
and opting for relatedness as the appropriate test), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1719 (1982).
227. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
228. Id. at 432-33.
229. See 29 CFR SS 1607.5, 1607.14 (1981). But cfld. S 1607.3(B) (employer should
consider alternatives with lesser impact where "appropriate"); Id. S 1607.7(B)(3) (fairness
studies).
230. See Id. S 1607.14.
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or trait to the job cannot be established. But it may also mean that,
although the skill, ability or trait is relevant, the employer's interest
in job performance is satisfied even if the employee lacks the trait
(e.g. the skill, ability or trait is a minor aspect of the job) or the costs
of ignoring the skill, ability or trait in the hiring or promotion deci-
sion are not excessive (e.g., the cost of utilizing a training program
to ensure adequate performance is not excessive). This latter possibil-
ity will be termed there the "necessity" aspect of the business
necessity defense. A judicial inquiry into the necessity of a criterion
is an inquiry into the costs which would be imposed by elimination
of the criterion."' Such an inquiry might include assessment both of
the selection costs imposed by alternative criteria and the poor per-
formance costs imposed by prohibition of a challenged criterion. It
is in effect an inquiry in the quality of the employer interests fur-
thered by a challenged criterion. For example, avoidance of poor per-
formance costs entailing safety risks might be viewed as necessary,
but avoidance of poor performance cost entailing mere financial risks
might be viewed as unnecessary.232
The distinction between an inquiry into relevance and an inquiry
into necessity is illustrated by the problem of alternative criteria.'
231. The Fourth Circuit in Robinson v. Lorrillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) set forth a three prong test of business
necessity:
thV business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial
impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business
purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable
alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the business
purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential
racial impact.
The second of these prongs appears to state a relevance requirement. The first prong
states a necessity requirement, the third prong appears to state both: there must be
no alternative which is both "acceptable" and equally effective. The Lorrillard stan-
dard was adopted by a number of lower federal courts prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). See, e.g., Green
v. Missouri Pac. Rd., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Rodriquez v. East Tex. Motor Freight,
505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
232. See Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 837 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
233. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) the Supreme
Court treated the question of alternatives as an issue of pretext and allocated a burden
of rebuttal on that issue to the plaintiff if the defendant establishes a business necessity
defense. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) the Court considered the
question of alternatives as part of its discussion of the defense. A number of lower
courts continue to treat the question of alternatives as part of the necessity prong
of the employer's defense despite Albemarle. See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611,
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An employer's failure to utilize an alternative criterion which would
better predict an ability or trait assumed to be relevant to job per-
formance and which would generate less disparate impact undermines
an employer's claim that its interest in job performance justifies use
of the challenged criterion. The failure to use a more relevant criterion
may therefore be viewed as proof of the irrelevance of a challenged
criterion to job performance. But the employer may have an alter-
native explanation of its choice of the challenged criterion: the alter-
native may be more expensive. To the extent that a court focuses
only on the question of relevance, it has ignored the employer's in-
terest in cost avoidance.3 4
Both the job relatedness question and the necessity question are
potentially subject to evaluation under distinct standards of proof. Job
relatedness might be evaluated under a standard of reasonable
relevance235 or might be evaluated under a validation standard requir-
ing a high degree of correlation between the quality measured by a
challenged criterion and job performance. 36 A reasonableness stan-
dard permits, in effect, reasonable levels of over- and underinclusive
measurement; a validation standard requires, in effect, no or very little
over- or underinclusive measurement. The latter standard therefore
disregards costs of assessment or selection and focuses exclusively
upon the question of accurate prediction. Ironically, however, a valida-
617 (6th Cir.) cert. denied 449 U.S. 872 (1980); Parson v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp.,
575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied 441 U.S. 968 (1979).
234. Cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir.
1971) (there must be no reasonably available alternative). Note that this language may
mean either that there is no feasible alternative which would serve the employer's
interest in prediction (relevance) or that there is no feasible alternative which would
not impose excessive costs in pursuing the employer's interest in prediction. See, Note,
Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No Alternative
Approach, 84 YALE, L.J. 98, 114-15 (1974).
235. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976).
236. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Robinson v.
Lorrillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 106 (1971); 29
CFR S 1607.5, 1607.14 (1981). Under the EEOC's guidelines, a selection criterion may
be validated by means of content, criterion or construct validity studies. Content validity
does not require proof of statistical correlation, but is both dispreferred under the
guidelines and nevertheless subject to a more rigorous analysis than mere
reasonableness. See Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Service Commission, 630 F.2d 79 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981). By "high degree of correlation", I mean
proof, even if not by means of statistical correlation, of a high quality of relationship
between a challenged criterion or practice and job performance. My non-technical use
of the term "correlation" would therefore include a requirement of strict compliance
with content validity and any requirement imposing strict standards of relevance in
contexts not subject to formal validation.
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tion standard may have the effect of disregarding costs of poor per-
formance as well. To the extent that it discourages attempts at pre-
dicting performance by imposing high compliance costs (costs of
justification in litigation or threatened litigation), its consequence is
the use of job performance itself as an assessment or selection
device-hiring or promotion occurs without an attempt at prediction.237
Similarly, the necessity question might be evaluated under a stan-
dard of reasonable necessity238 or might be evaluated under a stan-
dard of essentiality. 9 A reasonableness standard of necessity is in
effect a verification device-it seeks to verify the presence of a
business interest and the employer's assessment in fact of that in-
terest. An essentiality standard is a valuation device-it requires that
an identified business interest satisfy a predetermined level of high
valuation.
The job relatedness and necessity aspects of the business
necessity defense are interrelated. A reasonableness test of job
relatedness implicitly considers cost avoidance interests either by con-
sidering them directly or because the choice of a reasonableness stan-
dard implies an antecedent assessment of the necessity of the cost
avoidance interests furthered by the criterion evaluated.2" A valida-
tion standard of job relatedness implicitly assumes an antecedent con-
clusion that the employer's interest in avoiding assessment costs is
non-essential and that the employer's interest in avoiding poor per-
formance costs will be treated as essential only if the criterion
challenged and used to further that interest does so with high degrees
of accuracy.24 1
237. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210-12 (1979) (Blackmun,
J. concurring), Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228-29 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J. dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979).
238. See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979);
Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1981) note
226 supra.
239. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 443 U.S. 321, 332 (1971); Jackson v. Seaboard
Coast Line RR Co., 678 F2d 992, 1016 (11th Cir. 1982); Parsons v. Kaiser Alum. &
Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 446, F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) Robinson v. Lor-
rillard Corp. 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
240. See Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972) (safety
costs are a factor considered in balancing impact and business interests; reasonableness
test of relevance adopted).
241. See Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 3, at 91. A number of com-
mentators have pointed out the high cost of strict validation and the deterrent effect
of strict validation on the continued use of selection criteria. See, e.g., Belton, Discrimina-
[Vol. 18
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Job relatedness was the stated concern in cases, such as Griggs"
and Albemarle,243 in which general intelligence tests were the criteria
in issue. What appears to have impressed the Court in Griggs was
the problem of relevance: an intelligence test measures general
qualities not demonstrably related, even under a standard of
reasonable relationship, to the tasks performed in the jobs there in
issue. However, the Supreme Court's adoption of the standards of the
EEOC guidelines on selection procedures in Albemarle suggests a
distinct concern. As the standard of relevance becomes progressively
higher, the employer's interest in cost avoidance is progressively
discounted.244 It is discounted for two reasons. First to the extent that
a relevance inquiry focuses only upon the question of the relationship
between the quality measured by a challenged criterion and job per-
formance, it ignores the question of the costs which would be imposed
by alternative criteria. Second, to the extent that a relevance inquiry
requires a high correlation between the quality measured by a
challenged criterion and job performance it ignores the question of
the nature and level of employer costs. A criterion which has some
tendency to predict performance but fails to satisfy a correlation re-
quirement may both avoid some costs of poor performance and avoid
the costs which would be imposed by available alternatives. These
costs may be substantial, but a validation standard is not satisfied.
That the employer's interests in cost avoidance are ignored under
such a standard does not necessarily suggest, however, that they have
not been considered. The decision to apply such a standard itself
reflects a balance under which those interests have been consciously
or unconsciously discounted: the employer's cost avoidance interests
served by its challenged criterion do not outweigh the disparate ef-
fect generated by the criterion.4 5 Such a balancing analysis reflects
tion and Affirmative Action, supra note 3, at 551-52; Freeman, supra note 3, at 1099
(1978); Gwartney, Asher, Haworth & Haworth, Statistics, The Law and Title VII: An
Economists View, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW 633, 643 (1979); Lerner, supra note 3, at 18 n.6,
27; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 434.
242. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
243. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
244. A strict standard of relevance which fails to consider issues of "necessity"
would impose the greatest burden on employers of any potential interpretation of the
defense. See Johnson v. Pike Corporation of America, 332 F. Supp. 390 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(refusing to consider question of administrative costs). Pike is criticized in Wilson, supra
note 3, at 850-51. But a strict standard of relevance in combination with an essentiality
test of necessity accomplishes approximately the same result.
245. A number of courts have been rather explicit in advocating a balancing
test. See, e.g., Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Center, 558 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, F.2d 216, 219 (19th Cir. 1972); Robinson v Lorrillard Corp., 444 F.2d
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a policy not merely of relevance, but of precluding disparate impact
not outweighed by compelling interests in efficiency.24 The Court's
opinion in Dothard v. Rawlinson,"4 ' reflects this later policy rather
directly. The Court there invalidated a height and weight require-
ment on the grounds both that the requirement was an over- and
underinclusive measure of "strength" and that a less burdensome
alternative" 8 (direct tests of strength) could be developed. The poten-
tial cost of such a development (and of the validation of such a test
when developed) were ignored in the Court's opinion.
The Court's opinions in New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,249
and Washington v. Davis20 adopt, however, a reasonableness test of
relevance reflecting a distinct balance. A judicial insistence merely
upon a reasonable relationship between applicant or employee suc-
cess on a challenged criterion and the employer interests furthered
by the criterion assumes, absent pretextual use of the criterion,251 that
the employer's balancing of costs of assessment and costs of imperfect
prediction is to be judicially respected.252 Thus, the Court concluded
in Beazer that an employer's drug use rule, a rule conceded to be
overinclusive when applied to methadone users,2 "significantly served"
employer interests even though those interests did not "require" ap-
plication of the rule to methadone use.2" That conclusion grants
substantial discretion to utilize rough proxy criteria despite their
overinclusive character and despite the potential availability of more
perfect alternatives.2 5
791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972). Note that the balancing test
in this context entails a balancing of the effect of a challenged practice on protected
groups against the employer interests served by the practice. It is therefore to be
distinguished from judicial tolerance, under relaxed views of the business necessity
defense, of an employer's balancing of its conflicting interests. See United States v.
South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1115 (D.S.C. 1977), affd, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
246. See Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 3, at 912.
247. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
248. But compare Id. at 332 (less burdensome alternative analysis) with
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (burden of establishing less
burdensome alternative is on the plaintiff and is a matter of "pretext")See note 233
supra.
249. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
250. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
251. See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
252. See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1115 (D.S.C. 1977),
afJ'd, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978) Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 3, at 928-30 933-34.
253. See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979).
254. Id.
255. See Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case Under Title VII: Limiting
Judicial Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 207-10.
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The Court has not, then, been consistent in selecting either a
standard of relevance or a standard of necessity. The standard of
relevance is on occasion reasonable relevance and on occasion a stan-
dard of validation; the standard of necessity is occasionally
reasonableness and occasionally essentiality. A possible explanation
of judicial inconsistency in selecting a standards of relevance and
necessity may be found in the potentially distinct functions served
by the business necessity defense.
(3) Alternative Functions of the Business Necessity Defense
A standard of reasonable relevance or reasonable necessity
assumes the primacy of an employer's balancing of costs which
underlies the employer's use of a criterion having disproportionate
consequences. A judicial inquiry into reasonableness is functionally
an inquiry into the credibility of that balance. A conclusion that a
criterion is not reasonably relevant to job performance or is not
reasonably necessary is a conclusion that the employer's claimed
reasons for the use of the criterion are not believed.2"
If, however, higher standards for judging the relevance and
necessity issues are invoked, a distinct function of the business
necessity defense is implied. As the standards of relevance and a
necessity imposed by a court become progressively higher, the
employer's cost balance is treated with progressively less deference
and the impact model becomes progressively closer to a functional
prohibition of disparate consequences. A validation requirement adds
the costs of validation to the costs of assessment imposed by the use
of a criterion and therefore discourages that use. To the extent that
assessment costs and validation costs are ignored by a singular focus
on validation, employer interests independent of race or gender are
ignored. To the extent that a validation requirement imposes a
relevance standard difficult or impossible to satisfy in practice, the
job relatedness defense-and, therefore, employer efforts to achieve
relevance-become meaningless alternatives.257 In short, a high stan-
dard of relevance discourages use of neutral criteria generating
disparate impact and very high standards of relevance render the
business necessity defense an exercise in futility. Similarly, when the
standard for judging "necessity" is set at a level of essentiality, the
256. See Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 3, at 933-34. See also Fiss,
supra note 1, at 296-304; Rutherglenn, supra note 29, at 233-34 ns. 144, 146.
257. See Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 3, at 918-20. See also Belton,
Discrimination and Affirmative Action, supra note 3, at 551-52; Fiss, supra note 1,
at 300-02; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 426, 434; Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 234 n.146.
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extreme difficulty encountered in attempting to satisfy the standard
discourages the effort and renders the effort futile in any case not
presenting compelling employer interests. High standards of relevance
and necessity in effect reflect a judicial balancing of a policy disfavor-
ing disparate consequences against employer business interests.
There are, then, two distinct and partially inconsistent functions
potentially served by the impact model implicit in distinct versions
of the business necessity defense. First, if the defense is a defense of
reasonable relevance, the impact model is merely a proof scheme for
adjudicating an implicit allegation of illicit motive: disproportionate
impact generates an inference of illicit motive; a neutral criterion is
an employer's articulated claim of licit motive; the irrelevance of the
criterion to job performance renders the claim of licit motive incredi-
ble. The proof scheme seeks an approximation of a disparate treat-
ment model by allocating a greater risk of adjudicative error to the
employer where the employer's conduct is facially race and gender
neutral but suspected of being pretextual. Second, if the defense is a
defense of validation and of essentiality, the impact model is a pro-
hibition of disproportionate consequences, or, at least, of dispropor-
tionate consequences not outweighed by compelling considerations of
economic efficiency: disparate impact is presumptively illicit; employer
costs may be asserted as justification for impact; the court is to weigh
impact against cost under a standard which requires, in effect, a com-
pelling interest in cost avoidance. The ultimate objective of the first
of these possibilities is adjudicatory approximation of a disparate treat-
ment model. The ultimate objective of the second of these possibilities
is either the shifting of the burden of historical deprivations to the
employer or the banning of disparate consequences.
Both the dynamics of the group right to equal achievement sug-
gested by General Electric Co. v. Gilbert258 and by the dissent in Con-
necticut v. Teal.9 and the dynamics of a subgroup right to redress
for the effects of past harm suggested by the majority opinion in Teal'
confirm this taxonomy. From the perspective of either right, it is dif-
ficult to see why even reasonable necessity or reasonable relevance
should be permitted to defeat their enforcement. At least in instances
where (1) training is an alternative to prediction as a means of achiev-
ing satisfactory job performance, (2) the characteristic predicted by
258. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
259. __ U.S. . , 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2536-40 (1982) (Powell, J. dissenting).
260. See text and notes 169-74 supra.
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a challenged criterion is susceptible to acquisition over time, or (3)
the absence of the characteristic predicted by the criterion will affect
job performance but will not impose unmanageable costs, elimination
of a criterion which is a reasonable predictor of job performance ac-
complishes precisely what such rights seek to accomplish: proportional
results or a shifting of the costs of past deprivations from the pro-
tected group to the employer.
To the extent that the impact model is justified as a remedy
for past societal discrimination- as in effect shifting the burden of
that discrimination to the employer-the business necessity defense
expressed as an essentially standard operates to impose costs on the
employer which may roughly approximate current remedial expense
and to diffuse those costs through the employer by imposing them
on society. If a business necessity defense is to be recognized as a
justification for denial of a group right to redress in any given case,
the rationale is presumably not that costs should not be reallocated
but that a reallocation of costs should not so threaten economic effi-
ciency that application of the model places the employer's business
at risk. On these premises, the relevant employer interest to be balanc-
ed against the group right to proportional shares is not the employer's
interest in accurately predicting job performance. The relevant
employer interest is, rather, an economic survival interest-an interest
to be recognized only where a prohibition of disparate consequences
threatens a practice, criterion or rule essential to efficiency."
The Court's strict application of the business necessity defense
in Albemarle would therefore appear explicable in terms of an assump-
tion that a group right to proportional inclusion in a relevant oppor-
tunity or benefit or a group right to redress is the function of the
impact model. Relaxed applications of the business necessity test in
Washington v. Davis, and in Beazer are explicable on the ground that
pretextual disparate treatment was the target of the Court's inquiry
in these cases. If these functional explanations are assumed, there
remains, however, a recurring difficulty: when is a group right to equal
achievement or to redress invocable and when is an approximation
of disparate treatment model invocable?
261. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir.
1971): "Necessity connotes an irresistable demand .... [A challenged criterion] must
not only directly foster safety and efficiency of a plant, but also be essential to those
goals."
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III. RECONCILING THE DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL:
A PROPOSED ANALYSIS
The foregoing analysis may be summarized as making four points.
First, Supreme Court decisions under the impact model may be
characterized either as (1) seeking to enforce a group right to equal
achievement or (2) as seeking to enforce a right to compensatory
redress for the victims of past societal discrimination under a broad
definition of both victimization and discrimination, or (3) as using a
correlation between exclusion under the challenged criterion and race
or gender as evidence of the pretextual use of the criterion (i.e., as
evidence of illicit motive).
Second, the Court's opinion in Connecticut v. Teal renders exclu-
sion of a subpopulation predominantly composed of a protected race
or gender group subject to the model, but utilizes a rationale which
denies that the impact model's function is to enforce a group right
to equal achievement. If taken at face value, that rationale implies
that the function of the model is to partially redress past harm by
precluding exclusion of persons likely to be the victims of societal
discrimination.
Third, and despite the Court's rationale in Teal, there is nothing
in the Teal opinion's narrow holding which precludes use of the model
for an equal achievement objective. Although Teal eliminates one
employer incentive for complying with an equal achievement concep-
tion of equality (the bottom line defense), exclusion of the protected
group viewed as a whole remains a ground for liability following Teal.
To the extent that all objective criteria remain subject to the threat
of that liability, and to the extent that an employer must establish
essentiality as the sole defense to that threat, the threat forces adop-
tion of subjective and personal employment systems themselves sub-
ject to disparate treatment attack if they produce disparate conse-
quences. The most economically feasible means of avoiding liability
under such a scenario may therefore be that suggested by the Teal
dissent: quota hiring.
Fourth, to the extent that the business necessity defense imposes
a mere reasonable relevance requirement, it implicitly renders the
impact model a process construct for approximating a disparate treat-
ment model. To the extent, however, that the defense imposes an ex-
acting correlation or an economic essentiality requirement, it implicitly
renders the impact model either an equal achievement model or a
redress of past harm model. The conflicting views expressed in the
Court's opinions on the question of the character of the burden im-
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posed on employers by the necessity defense render either interpreta-
tion plausible.
What is interesting in these points is the potential combinations
of alternative conceptions of impact on the one hand and alternative
conceptions of business necessity on the other which may be postulated
from them. The possibilities appear as follows: (1) if Teal is read as
rejecting equal achievement as the impact model's objective and is
combined with a relevance test of business necessity, it suggests a
process construct for reaching a disparate treatment model of sex and
race discrimination; (2) if Teal is read as rejecting equal achievement
and is combined with an essentiality test of business necessity, it sug-
gests a redress function for the impact model-redress both of past
harm inflicted writ large and of past harm most felt by subpopula-
tions; (3) if Teal is read as rejecting merely the equal achievement
defense to the impact model without thereby undermining proportional
results as an objective of the model and is combined with an essen-
tiality test of business necessity, it remains partially consistent with
a group right to equal achievement conception of the impact model.
It should be apparent that all three of these possibilities cannot
always coexist. If equal achievement is the objective, the presence
or absence of even approximated disparate treatment or of victims
requiring redress is immaterial. Although equal achievement may con-
stitute both the ultimate objective and probable consequence of ap-
plication of either a redress or an approximated disparate treatment
version of the impact model, a disciplined judicial adherence to either
of the latter versions necessarily implies that there will be cases in
which neither version is applicable but in which an equal achievement
version would be applicable. There will, in short, be cases which should
be decided in different ways under different versions of the model-
Connecticut v. Teal is such a case.
It is however possible to view the impact model as not a single
model but as three distinct models applicable to distinct circumstances:
equal achievement is sometimes the objective; redress is sometimes
the objective and approximation of disparate treatment is sometimes
the objective. The obvious difficulty with this possibility is in deter-
mining the jurisdiction of each model. When, for example, is approx-
imation of disparate treatment an appropriate basis for decision and
redress not an appropriate basis for decision? In the remainder of
this paper it will nevertheless be argued that the impact model should
be viewed as three models applicable in distinct circumstances and
that these distinct circumstances are discoverable.
19831
Coz: Substance and Process in Employment Discrimation Law: One View of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
100 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
A. Equal Achievement: An Objective Rather Than Reason For Liability
The Supreme Court, in Connecticut v. Teal2. purported to reject
a group right to equal achievement as the theory underlying the im-
pact model. 6 ' It has previously been argued here that this rejection
cannot be taken at face value because the Teal holding does not
preclude judicial enforcement of such a theory.2 It is nevertheless
submitted that the Court should be taken at its word at least to the
degree that equal achievement is not a permissible independent reason
for imposing liability either by means of an express judicial reliance
upon such a ground for decision or by means of a surreptitious
manipulation of alternative grounds for decision. This submission is
potentially naive. The impact model has been used to satisfy equal
achievement objectives, 6 5 that is the source of the dissent's implicit
claim in Teal that a group right to equal achievement is the model's
objective." The submission is nevertheless supported by two
arguments.
First, there were two congressional purposes underlying the
enactment of Title VII: the ultimate purpose of improving the economic
condition of groups protected under the statute (and most particu-
larly blacks) and the mediating purpose of precluding the use of group
status as a reason for employment decisions. The latter purpose is
best captured (if not exclusively captured) by the disparate treatment
model. Although the Court has in the past mistaken the ultimate con-
gressional purpose for the mediating congressional purpose by ignor-
ing the distinction between the ends sought by Congress and the
means chosen by Congress to achieve those ends,2"' the fact remains
that an ultimate objective merely informs interpretation of interim
objectives. It cannot be substituted for mediating objectives without
upsetting the political compromise upon which the means chosen by
262. __ U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
263. See text and notes 90-101 supra.
264. See text and notes 102-04 supra.
265. See generally Blumrosen, Bottom Line, supra note 75. Cases in which courts
have ordered quota hiring or promotion relief are clear but not exclusive illustrations.
See, e.g., Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport,
647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1611 (1982); United States v. City
of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
266. See __ U.S. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2539 (Powell, J. dissenting):
[Discriminatory impact claims cannot be based on how an individual is
treated in isolation from the treatment of other members of the group.
Such claims necessarily are based on whether the group fares less will
than other groups under a policy, practice or test.
267. See Cox, Judicial Role, supra note 3, at 175-78.
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Congress was based. Equal achievement might constitute the ultimate
Congressional objective in enacting Title VII, and enforcement of that
objective directly by means of the impact model may well constitute
the most effective means by which that objective may be achieved,
but such an enforcement mechanism was clearly not the means chosen
by Congress."8
Second, Section 703j26 of Title VII constitutes both an express
repudiation of liability merely for disproportionate consequences as
the means by which an ultimate objective of equal achievement is
to be realized and a cautionary guidepost for assessing the discipline
with which courts enforce the mediating objectives of the statute. It
is quite possible to distinguish the Section 703j prohibition of liability
for disparities in representation rates on the theories that represen-
tation rates are used merely as evidence of illicit motive or that an
illicit barrier to opportunity rather than disproportion is the reason
for liability. 7' And the effort to distinguish the prohibition on such
grounds is legitimate if the reason is in fact a theory of liability mean-
ingfully independent of liability for disproportion. It is however not
legitimate to circumvent the policy judgment expressed in the pro-
hibition by imposing liability for reasons of disproportion -or for the
reason that an equal achievement objective will be better achieved-
under circumstances in which liability would not be imposed for
reasons independent of equal achievement. On these premises, the im-
pact model is not properly an equal achievement model; it is a means
to the ultimate end of equal achievement, but is a means not applicable
in circumstances where equal achievement is the rationale for its
application.
B. Redress: When Does A Neutral Criterion Perpetuate Past Harm?
If the prior explanation of Teal postulated here"n-that it adopts
a redress explanation of the impact model-is assumed, the remain-
ing question under such a view of the model is when is redress an
appropriate rationale for employer liability. Two bases for develop-
ing an answer to that question are the notion of redress itself and
the Court's emphasis in Teal upon the notion that the model targets
"barriers to opportunity."
268. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 231-52 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J. dissenting); Fiss, supra note 1, at 297; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 423-34; Wilson
supra note 3, at 852-58; Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 3, at 926-28.
269. 42 U.S.C S 2000e-2(j) (1976), quoted at note 180 supra.
270. See text and notes 181-87 supra.
271. See text and notes 163-75 xIsupra.
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It is apparent that redress does not mean full compensation for
past harm. There is compensation under the model only in the sense
that an employer is not permitted to exercise the freedom of business
decision otherwise permissible under the statute where an exercise
of that freedom would give effect to past harm. The protected group
is compensated by a grant of freedom from a "barrier" the operation
of which is permissible absent an assumption (grounded in part upon
disparity) that the group has been victimized. Notice, however, that
the underlying assumption is victimization: group membership or
status is a proxy for victim status. Such an assumption is clearly
overinclusive if redress is appropriate only for members of the race
or gender group disadvantaged by past societal discrimination," and
although it may be argued that all members of the group are the
victims of past discrimination, it cannot be viably argued that all
members of the group suffer from the disadvantage made relevant
by the challenged employer rule or practice. Teal itself illustrates this
point: The employer's hiring system operated to grant opportunity
only to those members of the protected racial group least likely to
be suffering from the disadvantage made relevant by the challenged
employment test in Teal."'
Despite the overinclusive character of the victimization assump-
tion, that assumption is arguably warranted where statistically signifi-
cant and quantitatively substantial disparities in race or gender suc-
cess or failure rates occur (i.e., where there is disproportionate exclu-
sion of the protected group viewed as a whole) and where the rule
or practice in issue measures a characteristic itself the product of
benefits disproportionately granted by society on the basis of race
or gender. The paradigm cases of the latter basis for a victimization
assumption are intelligence tests and education requirements- both
criteria measure characteristics which a court, as a matter of judicial
notice," ' may view as the products of educational benefits dispropor-
tionately withheld from some racial minorities. The former basis for
the assumption is the inference derived from statistically significant
and quantitatively substantial disparities that the protected group is
272. See Brest, The Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 11, at 32-33.
273. See text accompanying notes 173-74 supra.
274. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971): "Basic intelligence
must have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because
they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated schools.
• ." Griggs roots may be found in the perpetuation of past discrimination cases. See,
e.g., Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Quarles
v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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suffering from a disadvantage not suffered by the group favored by
the challenged rule or practice. Because forced elimination of a bar-
rier to opportunity satisfying these criteria relieves those members
of the protected group most likely to suffer from the handicap iden-
tified by such a barrier, the group is at least arguably a reasonable
proxy for victimization.
Three points should nevertheless be noticed about this scheme.
First, both disparate exclusion and a reasonable basis for a judicial
assumption that disparate exclusion is the product of group status
based maldistribution of societal resources are required for invoca-
tion of a redress model. When both elements are present, group status
is a reasonable proxy for a victimization assumption. 75 It is, however,
not a reasonable proxy where either element is missing. For exam-
ple, the facts of Dothard v. Rawlinson would not satisfy the redress
model: height and weight requirements cannot be identified with
characteristics dependent upon past distributions of societal resources.
Similarly, disparate impact attacks upon subjective criteria or "word
of mouth" recruiting in hiring or promotion systems... are not viably
explained within a redress model. There is no reasonable basis for
an assumption that such criteria give effect to handicaps generated
by past societal discrimination even if they may be said to give effect
to past employer discrimination.277
Second, if a reasonable basis for a judicial assumption that ex-
275. The long judicial experience with school desegregation provides at least
an arguable basis for such notice. The viability of judicial notice of claimed causal
links between past discrimination and criteria which purport to measure qualities or
traits the acquisition of which is not clearly a function of educational experience is
substantially more problematic. But see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
198 n.1 (1979).
276. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th
Cir. 1980); Lang v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,
457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970).
277. It is of course possible that such practices may perpetuate the effects
of past disparate treatment on the part of the employer in question. See Grant v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F2d 1007, 1018 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940
(1981) If an employer's past discrimination produced an all-white workforce and if cur-
rent recruitment is word of mouth, it is likely that the all-white character of the
workforce will be perpetuated. The irony is that in instances in which an employer
engaged in past disparate treatment so that the factual basis for a redress rationale
is most clearly present, application of that rationale would conflict with two statutory
policies designed to protect employers: a policy of repose and a policy that the legisla-
tion is not retroactive. See text and note 315 infra.
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clusion is the product of a status based maldistribution of resources
is warranted, exclusion of a subpopulation disproportionately composed
of a protected group should satisfy the redress model only where the
subpopulation excluded is reasonably identifiable with protected race
or gender group status. Teal therefore satisfies the requirements of
the redress model. Long-standing judicial assumptions about the
historical sources of disparate racial success on "pencil and paper"
tests were available, 8 the test challenged in Teal, when viewed in-
dependently, operated to exclude the protected group viewed as a
whole and the subpopulation excluded by the employer's promotion
system viewed as a whole was arguably disproportionately composed
of those members of the protected racial group suffering from the
effects of those historical sources of disparity." The members of the
protected racial group included by the operation of the employer's
promotion system were those members most like their white counter-
parts in the sense that they did not exhibit the educational handicap
which would preclude success on the employment test challenged in
Teal. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert2 80 would, by contrast, not satisfy
these requirements. Pregnancy is not a condition reasonably at-
tributable to historical discrimination even though it is a condition
precisely identifiable with gender group status.
New York Transit Authority v. Beazer28 presents a more difficult
case. It can be argued that drug addition is the product of systematic
misallocations of resources and should therefore not operate to han-
dicap the most obvious victims of those misallocations. It is never-
theless possible to distinguish Beazer from Teal and to therefore ex-
clude Beazer from the redress model on the ground that drug addic-
tion is not a condition reasonably identifiable with societal discrimina-
tion. Although a number of social ills are disproportionately suffered
by protected groups and although such disproportion may be viewed
as the historical legacy of societal discrimination"' the causes of such
278. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
279. See text accompanying notes 173-74 supra. There is of course a bootstrap
quality about this assertion: Failure under the test is used to identify those most likely
to fail the test. The link is provided by the assumption that education affects test
performance.
280. 429 U.S. 125 (1975).
281. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
282. See generally, D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, 589-601, 656-65
(2d ed. 1980); Freeman, supra note 3; Note, Bakke and Weber: The Concept of Societal
Discrimination, 11 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 297 (1980).
283. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1979); Lerner, supra,
note 3, at 41. Cf Id. at 37, (suggesting that Justice Rehnquist, in Furnco Const. Co.
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conditions are diffuse and complex. The group status based causes
of educational deprivations"' and, in some contexts, conditions like
the absence of specialized work experience2 are, by contrast, rela-
tively identifiable. If the underlying theory of the redress model is
that "unnecessary barriers" to protected group participation in employ-
ment opportunities are "like" race or gender barriers to employment
opportunities, 85 some causal link between race and gender and a
challenged barrier is essential. Mere disparity in results fails to supply
that link because it establishes only a greater probability of exclu-
sion for the protected group; it does not establish that exclusion oc-
curred "because of"' " race or gender." 7 A societal discrimination
hypothesis, despite its overbreadth provides a status based explana-
tion of current disparities arguably sufficient to supply the necessary
causal link. 88 But the hypothesis is not justified absent some credible
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 n.7 (1978), postulated a double standard requiring formal
validation for tests but not for non-test selection criteria-a double standard arguably
consistent with the argument made in the text for the premises underlying a redress
model).
284. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979) (taking
judicial notice of historical segregation in craft unions which precluded acquisition by
blacks of craft skills and work experience).
285. Cf. Fiss, supra note 1, at 299 (advocating functional equivalence theory
discussed supra note 169). Note, however, that the redress theory postulated in the
text is distinguishable from Professor Fiss' theory because it does not rely on the
irrelevance of a challenged "barrier" to productivity. Irrelevance would esy.ablish a
closer relationship to disparate treatment theory, but strict judicial applications of
the business necessity defense, particularly in the context of testing and educational
requirements, cannot be explained on mere irrelevance grounds. See generally Com-
ment, Business Necessity, supra note 3.
286. See 42 USC S 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976):
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(emphasis supplied).
287. See Brest, The Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 11, at 31-34. Cf.
Fiss, supra note 1, at 103 (court must distinguish between past discrimination which
relieves the individual from responsibility for his disqualification from past wrongs
"that are an inevitable part of the socialization or development process.")
288. See Brest, The Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 11, at 32; Fiss,
Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 8, at 770; Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, supra note 169, at 145-46.
It is true, as Professor Fiss argues in the cited works, that there is an element
of fiction present in use of the past discrimination theory to supply the necessary
causal linkage; because a true finding of past discrimination would require extensive
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ground, such as a history of pervasive discrimination in education,
for adopting the hypothesis.289
Exclusion from an opportunity under a race and gender neutral
rule or practice does not, absent pretext, constitute exclusion
motivated by race or gender, but it may arguably be said to constitute
exclusion "because of' race or gender where the rule or practice
operates to give effect to handicaps themselves the product of ascer-
tainable past discrimination. The predicate for such a characteriza-
tion is, however, some credible assurance that it is identifiable past
discrimination which has caused the conditions which give rise to ex-
clusion. The clearest cases in which the redress model is potentially
applicable are cases in which there is disparate exclusion of the pro-
tected race or gender group viewed as a whole. In such cases, a
statistically significant and quantitatively significant disparity stand-
ing alone does not satisfy the redress model-if it did, the model would
in fact operate as an equal achievement model.' If, however, such
a disparity is combined with a reasonably based assumption that past
discrimination is responsible for the disparity, it may be inferred that
the rule or practice generating the disparity is operating to identify
victims of that discrimination.
judicial inquiry and fact finding, presumptions are invoked instead. A presumptions
technique, again as Professor Fiss suggests, points in the direction of a judicial con-
cern not with the fact of a "violation", but with "results." The analysis in the text,
on the assumption that equal achievement for groups is not a legitimate characteriza-
tion of the policies and purposes underlying the legislation, nevertheless seeks to move
back in the direction of a focus on violation by confining the scope of the presump-
tions utilized.
Freeman, supra note 3, at 1093-98 argues that Griggs is explicable from a
"perpetrator" perspective if viewed as relying on past discrimination and that a past
discrimination rationale would require invalidation of all tests and education re-
quirements, but further argues that the business necessity test, if it permits employer
justification, "severs" impact theory from a past discrimination rationale. Notice that,
if it is not as a practical matter possible to establish business necessity in the case
of educational requirements and tests, the result contemplated by Freeman's
characterization of a past discrimination rationale - invalidation- is achieved.
289. A past discrimination rationale may explain the judiciary's tendency,
described in Bartholet, supra note 3, to impose a highly relaxed version of the impact
model in cases involving "jobs in high places." To the extent that such jobs are available
only to persons with advanced credentials (e.g., technical or advanced degree creden-
tials) access to such jobs is extremely limited even among white males. The hypothesis
of, e.g., past discrimination in education might be viewed as sufficiently attenuated
for such credentials that the remedial model appears inapplicable. See Townsend v.
Nassau County Medical Center, 558 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1015 (1978).
290. See text and note 288 supra.
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Exclusion of a subpopulation disproportionately composed of
members of a protected group-the exclusion, for example, in
Beazer-provides a less reliable basis for concluding that a challenged
rule or practice operates to identify victims because, although sub-
population membership may undoubtedly be partially attributable to
past discrimination, the relationship between subpopulation member-
ship and group status based past wrongs is problematic. There is in
a subpopulation exclusion case no quantitatively substantial exclusion
of the protected group, 1 and exclusion of the protected group is an
element of the basis for assuming that status based misallocations
of societal resources-past discrimination- is responsible for current
exclusion under a challenged rule or practice." This is not, however,
always the case. The, fact of "bottom line" equality in the actual
distribution of employment opportunities in Teal did not obviate the
possibility that the test there in issue was identifying victims of past
discrimination. And it is apparent that the subpopulation excluded
in Gilbert is identifiable with gender status (albeit for reasons quite
distinct from past discrimination). The factual predicates for an
assumption that drug addiction is the product of societal discrimina-
tion were not, however, sufficient in Beazer to warrant a conclusion
that the challenged rule in that case operated to identify victims of
such discrimination.
The final point to be made about the redress model is that, once
the predicates to its application are satisfied, an essentiality test of
justification is warranted. As previously pointed out here, a redress
objective assumes that the burdens of past discrimination are to be
reallocated to the employer in the form of the costs of accommodating
the employment system to that objective. There is no warrant for
imposing the lesser burden of reasonable relevance in a redress model
case because the issue in such a case is not whether a challenged
rule or practice is utilized by an employer for reasons of race or
gender. The issue, rather, is whether the rule or practice operates
to identify race or gender by reason of handicaps imposed by past
discrimination. And cases in which very high burdens of justification
are imposed on employers tend to substantiate this contention. It is
most often in cases of the use of tests and educational criteria that
quasi scientific validation requirements which approach essentiality
in operation are imposed. 93
291. See text and notes 173-74 supra.
292. See note 288 supra.
293. Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 628 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980)
(education requirements must comply with EEOC guidelines), vacated on other grounds,
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C. Approximation of a Disparate Treatment Prohibition: A Residual
Category
It was argued in the immediately preceding subsection of this
paper that neither Dothard v. Rawlinson,"4 General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert,"' nor cases involving subjective evaluation systems or "word
of mouth" recruiting systems' satisfy the redress model. That asser-
tion does not, however, preclude application of a third and distinct
conception of the impact model, for such cases may be explained on
the grounds that each involve either clear disparate treatment,
suspected disparate treatment or a substantial risk of disparate treat-
ment. A function potentially served by the impact model is approx-
imation of a disparate treatment model. The justification for such an
approximation is the difficulty of establishing illicit motive -and most
particularly the pretextual use of a race and gender neutral employ-
ment criterion-in the litigation process. But an approxiination func-
tion implies that the impact model will take on a character distinct
from that which identifies it when used to further either a policy of
equal achievement or a policy of partial redress.
Gilbert is a case of clear disparate treatment on a "sex plus"
discrimination theory. 7 The Court's treatment of that case on an im-
pact theory is explicable either as adopting equal achievement as the
function of the impact model (women viewed writ large obtained a
proportional share of benefits)"5 or as adopting approximation of
disparate treatment as the function of the model on the assumption
that sex plus disparate treatment is not subject to the disparate treat-
ment prohibition.
451 U.S. 902 (1981) Scott v. Anniston, 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.) (validation standard ap-
plied to test), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Chicago 573 F.2d 416
(7th Cir. 1978) (tests should be validated under EEOC guidelines) with, e.g., Chrisner
v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981) (experience and training
prerequisites to employment substantially promote employer's interests); deLaurier
v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978) (mandatory pregnancy
leave rule attacked on impact theory upheld on relaxed version of necessity defense).
See Lerner, supra note 3, at 37. But see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(relaxed standard applied to an employment test); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles,
656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1617 (1982) (applying relatively
relaxed standard in employment examination case); Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch.
Dist. #11, 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying essentiality language to subjective
criteria under impact model); Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.) (applying essen-
tiality standard to physical ability test), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980).
294. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
295. 429 U.S. 175 (1976).
296. See note 277 supra.
297. See text and notes 145-49 supra.
298. See text and notes 143-45 supra.
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Dothard was arguably a case of suspected disparate treatment.
The facially gender neutral criterion in issue (height and weight re-
quirements) operated to exclude a substantial percentage of the female
population and only a very small percentage of the male population,
an exclusion generating at least an inference of illicit motive. In addi-
tion to that challenged criterion, other of the defendant's express
policies of disparate treatment were challenged in Dothard- policies
which may be said to corroborate the inference generated by disparate
consequences. The defendant's justification for its height and weight
requirements -that they served as proxies for "strength" - may be
characterized both as a generalization and as a gender-related
stereotype. Finally, the Court's treatment of that justification was
structured as a pretext inquiry: the defendant had alternative means
of testing for strength short of a generalization which substantially
excluded women. It is of course true that the Court framed its in-
quiry as an impact model inquiry under which "motive" was said to
be immaterial, but it cannot be said that height and weight re-
quirements operate to perpetuate past discrimination (the rationale
for the redress model) or, if Teal is taken seriously, that equal achieve-
ment was the Court's objective. It is therefore submitted that the
appropriate explanation of Dothard is that the Court suspected
disparate treatment even if it could point to no direct evidence of
disparate treatment.
The difficulty with a suspected disparate treatment rationale as
an explanation of Dothard is, however, that it postulates a suspicion
rather than a finding of illicit motive. It therefore fails to provide
a basis for distinguishing application of the formal disparate treat-
ment model: if liability may be imposed on the basis of suspicion, what
justifies retention of a disparate treatment model under which a plain-
tiff must prove illicit motive? A similar difficulty is presented by
disparate impact model attacks on subjective hiring or promotion
criteria and word of mouth recruiting practices. A number of courts
have treated such practices as race and gender neutral criteria sub-
ject to the impact model. 99 The central concern in such cases appears
to have been the risk of disparate treatment inherent in such systems;
they may be used to engage in disparate treatment." ° And evidence
of the disparate consequences of such criteria generates an inference
of illicit motive which confirms such a risk.
A potential reconciliation of the difficulty presented by suspected
disparate treatment is the theory, offered by Professor Fiss, that race-
299. See notes 188, 198 supra.
300. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
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neutral criteria amounting to the "functional equivalent" of racial
criteria are prohibited under Title VI1121 A race neutral criterion is
the functional equivalent of a racial criterion where (1) a protected
racial group is more likely to be excluded under the criterion than
whites (a fact established by disparate impact), (2) the criterion does
not measure qualities subject to individual control and (3) the qualities
so measured are not related to productivity.2 The functional
equivalence rationale postulates criteria which operate to identify race
even if their use cannot be shown to have been motivated by race.
It is therefore similar to the redress model earlier postulated here3"'
with one important exception. Under the redress model, current
disparate impact and a reasonable basis for concluding that past
discrimination is responsible for that current disparity serve to
establish the causal link between race and a challenged criterion war-
ranting a finding that exclusion occurs "because of" race. Under the
functional equivalence rationale, disparity, absence of personal con-
trol and absence of a relationship between performance under a
challenged criterion and productivity serve as the causal link war-
ranting that finding. 4
The redress model disposes of the third of the elements of the
functional equivalence rationale because cases in which strict essen-
tiality and validation versions of the business necessity defense are
applied cannot be accommodated by the functional equivalence
theory;05 a mere reasonable relationship between performance under
a challenged criterion and productivity will not satisfy strict versions
of the defense." 8 The policy justification for the redress model is
limited redress: "barriers" to current opportunity are illicit if they
perpetuate past discrimination. By the terms of that policy, strict ver-
301. Fiss, supra note 1, at 298-304. See note 169 supra.
302. Fiss, supra note 1, at 299.
303. See text and notes 271-93 supra.
304. In Professor Fiss' theory, past discrimination satisfies the control element
of the causal link. Fiss, supra note 1, at 302-03.
305. It is possible to argue that Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and
New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) overrule strict versions
of the business necessity defense. It seems to me unlikely that this is the case with
respect to employment tests, educational requirements and experience requirements,
at least where such criteria are applied to "lower level" jobs not involving duties
related to public safety. See generally Bartholet, supra note 3. But the distinctions
proposed in the text would confine the strict business necessity defense along lines
somewhat similar to those suggested by Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court in
Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 n.7 (1978).
306. See text and notes 224-55 supra.
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sions of the business necessity test are warranted."7 If, however, the
policy justification for the functional equivalence rationale is viewed
as approximating in the litigation process a disparate treatment pro-
hibition so as to reach suspected but unproven disparate treatment, 8
both a distinct view of the business necessity test and a distinct im-
pact model are warranted.
On these premises, both Dothard and the "subjective criteria"
and "word of mouth" recruiting cases may be explained on grounds
independent of the redress model. The height and weight requirement
at issue in Dothard operated to identify immutable physical
characteristics highly correlated with gender. It is true that the Court
employed an apparently strict version of the business necessity defense
in Dothard,0 9 but its discussion of the defense was framed in terms
of an inquiry into pretext and emphasized the employer's failure to
produce any evidence justifying its criteria ' - a failure Justice Rehn-
quist in a concurring opinion viewed as rendering the employer's case
insufficient even under a disparate treatment model standard."'
Subjective employment criteria and word of mouth recruiting ef-
forts are practices with elements in common with the physical re-
quirements challenged in Dothard. Where an existing work force is
307. See text and accompanying notes 292-93 supra.
308. Cf. Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 3 (advocating a relaxed view
of the business necessity defense on the basis of an interpretation of the functional
equivalence rationale which renders it a disparate treatment theory). Professor Fiss
would apparently not agree that his theory seeks to approximate a prohibition of il-
licit motive. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 297-98.
309. "If the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona fide, their
purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test for applicants that measures
strength directly," 433 U.S. at 332.
310. "[T]he appellants produced no evidence correlating the height and
weight requirements with the requisite amount of strength thought essen-
tial to good job performance. Indeed, they failed to offer evidence of any
kind in specific justification of the statutory standards."
433 U.S. at 331.
311. Appellants, in order to rebut the prima fade case under the statute,
had the burden placed on them to advance job-related reasons for the
qualification. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
This burden could be shouldered by offering evidence or by making legal
arguments not dependent on any new evidence. The District Court was
confronted, however, with only one suggested job-related reason for the
qualification -that of strength. Appellants argued only the job-relatedness
of actual physical strength; they did not urge that an equally job-related
qualifications for prison guards is the appearance of strength.
433 U.S. at 339 (Rehnquist, J. concurring).
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predominantly white, recruitment of new employees through contacts
with existing employees is likely to perpetuate the current composi-
tion of that work force. 2 Such recruitment practices may be
characterized as operating to identify race because they are limited
to existing social and familial relationships of white employees and
because they often generate a disparate impact.3 Subjective criteria
may not be said to clearly or inevitably operate to identify race or
gender in the obvious way that the "objective" physical requirement
at issue in Dothard identified gender. But subjective standards pre-
sent substantial risks of the paradigm instances in which
characteristics beyond personal control and unrelated to productivity
are used as a basis for an employment decision: risks of race or gender
motivated decision.3 1 4
312. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 427 (8th Cir. 1970).
313. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329 n.32 (1977).
314. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). Judicial
analysis of subjective standards sometimes follows an impact model scheme and
sometimes follows a disparate treatment model scheme. See, e.g., Furnco Const. Co.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical Clinic, Inc., 660 F.2d
1064 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2229 (1982); Crawford v. Western
Electric Co., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980). To the extent, however, that judicial reliance
is placed on the risk of discrimination rather than upon a finding of illicit motive,
it is apparent that some version of the impact model is utilized. See Bartholet, supra
note 3, at 1006-08. See also Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir.
1982) (applying both theories to subjective criteria); Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch.
Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981) (same). A disparate impact model challenge
to subjective criteria attacks the employer's use of such criteria. A finding of liability
under the impact model implies an obligation to substitute objective criteria or, at
least, criteria which will produce no disparate impact. To the extent that a court declines
to consider the use of subjective criteria a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for
an employment decision in cases involving a disparate treatment theory because such
criteria generate disparities or risk disparate treatment, see James v. Stockham Valves
& Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978), it is
in fact imposing an impact model theory. To the extent that a court in a treatment
case rejects an employer's general claim that subjective criteria explain a decision
on the ground that the claim is not sufficiently specific to constitute a "legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason" for the decision or on the ground that the claim lacks credibil-
ity, it is legitimately operating under a disparate treatment model. Although these
distinctions are real, they obviously become blurred in practice. See Robbins v. White-
Wilson Medical Center, Inc., 660 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1982) (the more subjective
a decision making process, the more difficult it is to satisfy the disparate treatment
theory rebuttal burden), vacated on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2229 (1982). The chief
consequences of selecting between the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories
in this context is therefore the distinct allocation of risk of nonpersuasion (and, therefore,
of judicial error) and distinct content of the matters to be established in rebuttal under
the theories. See Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835 (10th
Cir. 1981); Smith, Employer Defenses in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A
Reassessment of Burden of Proof and Substantive Standards Following Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 TEMPLE U. L. Q. 372, 394 (1982).
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Neither subjective standards nor informal recruiting efforts may
be said, however, to perpetuate past discrimination within the mean-
ing of the redress model. It is true that limited recruiting may tend
to perpetuate the employer's past disparate treatment if the
employer's white male workforce is the product of disparate treat-
ment, but the impact model is applicable only where there is a "pre-
sent violation" of Title VII. If there is no present violation, the model
seeks to remedy past harm in violation of the principles both that
the Act is not retroactive and that satisfying statutory filing periods
is a prerequisite to suit.31 5 If a "barrier to opportunity" is a present
violation, it is presumably because it operates in a manner at least
similar to the paradigm case of a present violation: current exclusion
from employment opportunity for reasons of race or gender . 3 " The
redress model circumvents the retroactivity difficulty by imposing an
affirmative remedial obligation on employers (by means of strict ver-
sions of the business necessity defense) and by treating breaches of
that duty as present violations.
Such a treatment is perhaps warranted despite the problem of
retroactivity where clear societal discrimination has rendered use of
a criterion giving present effect to that discrimination tantamount to
the use of race or gender. The prospective character of the legisla-
tion and statutory filing periods protect employers from stale claims
of employer misconduct; they do not necessarily immunize employers
from a policy treating them as vehicles for the shifting of the burdens
generated by societal misconduct. But a policy of shifting the burdens
imposed by societal discrimination is not available as a rationale in
the cases of subjective employment decision or internal recruiting prac-
tices. The link between race or gender and such practices is not sup-
plied by handicaps society has imposed on the basis of race or gender,
it is supplied by a perceived risk of current misuse on the basis of
race or gender. Subjective criteria and recruitment methods which
perpetuate a white male workforce may be said to operate in a fashion
functionally similar to race or gender based decision if they appear,
315. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); United Airlines
v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Although
findings that an employer once engaged in disparate treatment and that its present
race and gender neutral practices perpetuate that past discrimination provide a basis
for application of a redress rationale, the noted policies are designed specifically to
limit an employer's exposure to liability; the policies trump the redress model.
316. Cf. Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Service Comm., 633 F.2d 232, 253 (2d Cir.
1980), aff'd on other grounds, __ U.S. -, 51 U.S.L.W. 5105 (1983) distinguishing
merit from seniority system on the theory that a seniority system perpetuates the
effects of the past discrimination on the part of an employer and a merit system operates
as present discriminatory practice).
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in the circumstances of individual cases, to present substantial risks
of current disparate treatment and if these risks appear confirmed
by disparate consequences.
Disparate consequences confirm risks of disparate treatment if
they are plausibly consistent with an inference of disparate treatment.
Disparate exclusion of a protected group viewed as a whole will often
give rise to such a plausible inference. Exclusion of a subpopulation
disproportionately composed of a protected group may in some in-
stances give rise to such an inference-particularly, as in Gilbert,
where "sex plus" disparate treatment is suspected. But exclusion of
a subpopulation defined by a race or gender neutral criterion will most
often not generate a plausible inference of disparate treatment.
However ignoble the motivation for exclusion of a subpopulation, that
motivation will seldom be related to protected group status. Beazer
is an example. The anti-drug use rule at issue in that case excluded
a subpopulation of drug users and may have been motivated by un-
warranted generalizations about such persons, but the fact that the
subpopulation was disproportionately composed of protected groups
did not in that case give rise to a plausible inference that protected
group status motivated the rule. 17
Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters318 illustrates the points made
here. The employer in that case utilized both a subjective and limited
recruitment scheme and a past experience with the employer scheme
in selecting employees. That system was attacked on both disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories, but there was "bottom line"
proportion in the employer's workforce - the hiring system had not
produced disparate representation rates. 19 The Supreme Court treated
the case as presenting only a disparate treatment issue despite the
plaintiffs' impact model claim."0
Upon the assumption that Furnco is not an equal achievement
case (that the employer's "bottom line balance" does not imply that
the impact model was satisfied by equal achievement), the Court's
insistence upon treating the case within the traditional disparate treat-
ment model was appropriate because the risk presented by subjec-
tive evaluation and limited recruiting did not materialize. "Bottom line
317. Another example of a case in which subpopulation exclusion gives rise
to no plausible inference of prohibited disparate treatment is EEOC v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3rd Cir. 1980) discussed at note 139 supra.
318. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
319. See id. at 583-84 (Marshall, J. concurring and dissenting).
320. Id.
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balance" in Furnco eliminated the possibility of an inference of illicit
motive from disparate consequences: there were no such consequences.
Use of the suspected disparate treatment version of the impact model
was therefore inappropriate despite the risks inherent in the
employer's hiring methodology. The only remaining issue was in-
dividual disparate treatment to be resolved within the boundaries of
the traditional disparate treatment model.
If the foregoing explanations of Dothard, Gilbert, Beazer and
Furnco are assumed, the disparate impact model is at least often not
what it purports to be. It is not in such cases a prohibition of un-
justified consequences but a means of approximating a disparate treat-
ment model. It is moreover submitted that in any case which does
not satisfy the redress conception of the impact model, approxima-
tion is the sole remaining justification for invoking the impact model
label. If approximation is the sole remaining justification, judicial
utilization of the model in circumstances not warranting redress should
be undertaken with the limited objective of approximation firmly in
view; approximation, as Furnco implies, should not be permitted to
serve as a facade for equal achievement.2 '
The difficulty with the approximation model remains, however,
that of determining when approximation is a legitimate substitute for
direct invocation of the formal disparate treatment model. Approx-
321. "The Court of Appeals, as we read its opinion, thought Furnco's hiring
procedures not only must be reasonably related to the achievement of some legitimate
purpose, but also must be the method which allows the employer to consider the
qualifications of the largest number of minority applicants. We think the imposition
of the second requirement simply finds no support either in the nature of the prima
facie case or the purpose of Title VII." 438 U.S. at 576-77, (treating the case, however,
under a formal disparate treatment model theory). Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. Pat-
terson, - U.S. .. - 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1548 (1982) (Stevens, J. dissenting):
The Court's strained reading of the statute may be based on an assump-
tion that if the Griggs standard were applied to the adoption of a post-
Act seniority system, most post-Act systems would be unlawful since it
is virtually impossible to establish a seniority system whose classifica-
tion of employees will not have a disparate impact on members of some
race or sex. Under Griggs, however, illegality does not follow automatically
from a disparate impact. If the initiation of a new seniority system-or
the modification of an existing system-is substantially related to a valid
business purpose, the system is lawful.
But for the provisions of Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 USC S 200e-2(h) (1976), man-
dating application of the formal disparate treatment model to the operation of such
systems,. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), such systems in some
circumstances may be viewed as operating to identify race in a fashion arguably within
both the redress and functional equivalence rationales.
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imation implies both that the burdens of proof normally mandated
under the treatment model may be modified to ease the plaintiffs task
and, therefore, that a greater risk of adjudicative error is allocated
to the employer. The choice between an approximation model and a
pure disparate treatment model is therefore largely a decision whether
the greater risk of adjudicative error should be allocated to the plain-
tiff or the defendant. 2
The allocation question is informed, however, by the distinct
nature of the problem confronting the court in a case in which ap-
proximation is invoked as a theory. An approximation case is essen-
tially a disparate treatment case in which the plaintiff has relied upon
disparate consequences and circumstances suggesting a substantial risk
of disparate treatment and in which the employer's articulated non-
discriminatory reason for a disparate result is a race and gender
neutral criterion challenged as pretextual. The pure disparate treat-
ment model allocates the burden of persuasion regarding that issue
to the plaintiff. The impact model as approximated disparate treat-
ment model arguably allocates at least the initial burden of persua-
sion on the pretext issue to the employer in the form of the business
necessity defense: a non-discriminatory reason (neutral criterion) must
322. Compare Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(disparate treatment) with Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981) (disparate impact). There is a split in authority over
the question whether Burdine's allocation of the burden of persuasion applies in
disparate impact model cases. Compare Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753
(5th Cir. 1981) with Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3rd. Cir. 1981).
Whether or not the burden of persuasion regarding even a relaxed version of
the business necessity defense is on the employer, there is a distinction between the
matter to be established by the employer in a disparate treatment case and the mat-
ter to be established by the employer in a disparate impact case. The employer's burden
in a treatment case is to produce evidence of a "legitimate non-discriminatory reason"
for its action. See Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 358-59
(1981). The employer's burden under a relaxed version of the business necessity test
is to establish that a neutral criterion "significantly serves" its legitimate interests.
See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979). But see Fur-
nish, supra note 80, at 444 (postulating a convergence in the disparate treatment and
impact theories and in the defendant's burden under these theories).
It is of course apparent that the distinction between these burdens breaks down
in practice: it is in the employer's interest in a disparate treatment case to not only
establish a reason independent of race or gender for it action, but also to establish
the credibility of that reason by establishing the substantiality of the interests fur-
thered by that reason. See Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical Clinic, Inc., 660 F.2d 1064,
1067 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2229 (1982). But this degree
of convergence under the suspected disparate treatment version of the impact model
should not be surprising; the function of that model is approximating disparate
treatment.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1983], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss1/2
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
not only be "articulated," it must be justified in the sense that it must
be job-related. Reasonable relevance is on an approximation premise
the appropriate standard for the defense because irrelevance generates
a strong inference of pretext. Once relevance is established and that
inference therefore eliminated, it is the plaintiffs burden to establish
pretext despite relevance.3 '
The justification for allocating a burden of establishing
relevance-and therefore a greater risk of adjudicative error-to the
defendant in these circumstances is that the inference of illicit motive
which arises from proof of disparate consequences is much stronger
in a case in which a criterion is shown to have generated disparate
group consequences than in an individual disparate treatment case.2 4
It is true that the criterion which generates group consequences is
facially race and gender neutral. However, the facts that there are
disparate group consequences and that the criterion gives rise to
substantial risks of disparate treatment or operates in effect to iden-
tify race or gender status largely eliminate the strong possibility of
legitimate idiosyncratic reasons for employer action which weakens
the inference of illicit motive in an individual disparate treatment case.
The inference of illicit motive is strongest in a systematic disparate
treatment case in which the employer can point to no race and gender
neutral criterion or must rely upon protestations of good faith in the
operation of a subjective system as explanations of disparate group
consequences.325
It must be emphasized, however, that the burden on an employer
to establish relevance cannot, on an approximation rationale, become
a burden of establishing essentiality without risking an equal achieve-
ment objective. The function of a business necessity "defense" on ap-
proximation premises is analysis of a pretext issue. The appropriate
standard for assessing relevance for purposes of satisfying that func-
tion is a reasonableness standard, not a validation standard.36
323. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 339 (1977) (Rehnquist, J. concur-
ring); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
324. See Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
325. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
326. The affirmative obligation imposed on employers under the redress model
(or under an equal achievement model) implicit in strict versions of the business neces-
sity defense is reduced or eliminated if the model employed is an approximation of
disparate treatment model. The employer's obligation under an approximation model
is negative: race or gender may not motivate decision. The greater burden of proof
imposed on the employer by a relaxed version of the business necessity defense is
a modification of that negative obligation necessitated by the limitations of process.
19831
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CONCLUSION
The fundamental difficulty inherent in the history of the judicial
application of the impact model has been that its function has been
ambiguous. Until Connecticut v. Teal, it appeared, despite the "bar-
rier to opportunity" and "perpetuation of past discrimination" ra-
tionales judicially employed to explain the model, that its function
was in fact to enforce an equal achievement objective through a threat
of liability for failures to satisfy that objective. In form, the model
precluded unjustified use of neutral criteria with disparate impact;
in operation, the model often precluded any employment decision which
failed to result in proportionate hiring or promotion. The Court's ra-
tionale in Teal is inconsistent with an equal achievement objective
even if its holding permits continued judicial pursuit of that objective.
It remains to be seen whether the Court will refine the impact
model in a fashion which renders equal achievement merely an
ultimate objective of Title VII or will continue to tolerate the am-
biguity which permits employer failure to satisfy an equal achieve-
ment objective to be utilized as an independent basis for liability. This
article has proposed an explanation of the impact model which treats
it as three models-one rejected as an illegitimate understanding of
its function and two proposed as tolerably legitimate understandings
if properly confined. The basic contentions of that proposal are, in
summary, as follows. First, the disparate treatment model should be
viewed as the paradigm conception of Title VII's prohibitions. Second,
departures from that conception for purposes of accommodating the
limitations of the litigation process are permissible if undertaken for
the purpose of approximating that conception. Third, a departure from
the conception to accommodate exclusion from employment opportunity
reasonably attributable to past societal discrimination within the mean-
ing of the redress model here postulated permits accommodation of
cases employing strict versions of the business necessity defense and
is arguably justified on a remedial rationale if confined to criteria
which give current effect to known instances of societal discrimina-
tion. Fourth, a departure from strict adherence to the disparate treat-
ment model by means of allocating a greater risk of adjudicative error to
employers is legitimate if the departure is undertaken for the limited
purpose of identifying pretextual use of facially race and gender
neutral criteria and is confined to that purpose.
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